

# **OPERATION DESERT SHIELD - DESERT STORM**


## **The Vernon J. Kondra Notes**

**24 August 1990 - 31 May 1991**

**Transcription Prepared By**

**Clayton H. Snedeker**

**21st Air Force Historian**



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KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:


That I, VERNON J. KONDRA, have participated in a series of oral, magnetic taped interviews with the 21st Air Force History Office, covering my best recollections of events and experiences which may be of historical significance to the United States Air Force.

I understand that the transcribed manuscript resulting therefrom will be accessioned into the United States Air Force Historical Research Agency (USAFHRA) to be used as the security classification permits. In the best interests of the United States Air Force, I do hereby voluntarily give, transfer, convey and assign the interviews and remembrances contained in the aforementioned manuscript to the Office of Air Force History, acting on behalf of the United States of America, to have and to hold the same forever. I also understand that the Office of Air Force History may use the manuscript for whatever purposes they desire. I further understand that I may also use the manuscript as I desire.

  
VERNON J. KONDRA

DATE: 7 APR 92

Accepted on behalf of the Office of  
Air Force History by:

  
CLAYTON H. SNEDEKER

DATE: 7 Apr 92

## PREFACE

The following pages are my attempt to recall the daily activities of DESERT SHIELD - DESERT STORM. The interview/questions came from daily notes and "to-do" lists that I used to try and put some semblance of order into what was best described as ever-changing requirements. As the notes were transcribed a year after the fact, they may not be as clear as I would have liked. It should also be noted that, in many cases, my opinion or perspective might be quite different from those of others involved in the operations described.

A special thanks to the 21 AF Historian, Mr. Clay Snedeker, for taking the time and initiative to see this project through.



VERNON J. KONDRA  
Lieutenant General, USAF

# **OPERATION DESERT SHIELD - DESERT STORM**


## **The Vernon J. Kondra Notes**

**24 August 1990 - 31 May 1991**

**Introduction:** Major General Vernon J. Kondra, since promoted to Lieutenant General and assigned to the command of 21st Air Force on 17 July 1991, served as the Hq MAC DCS/Operations throughout DESERT SHIELD - DESERT STORM, which now stands as the biggest, longest and most complex airlift operation in military history. What follows is a compilation of the more significant portions of the notes General Kondra wrote during the 24 August 1990 - 31 May 1991 period, as elaborated and expanded upon by him in a series of interview sessions that he began in early October 1991 with the 21st Air Force Historian, Mr. Clayton H. Snedeker.

On 23 August 1990, while still serving as the Hq MAC DCS/Plans, General Kondra - after having observed the first two weeks of DESERT SHIELD activities<sup>1</sup> - jotted down a "List of Concerns/LIMFACS"<sup>2</sup> and passed them on to Major General James J. LeCleir, then the MAC DCS/Operations. That same evening, General Kondra was asked by General H.T. Johnson, the CINCMAC, if he would take over the DCS/Operations job. General Kondra accepted the challenge, and "at four o'clock the next morning I went to my new office - and found the list I had prepared the day before waiting for me on my desk."

The first of these interview sessions took place on 10 October 1991 and was devoted to a discussion of the entries on that list.



**LTGEN VERNON J. KONDRA**

1. *The Iraqis invaded Kuwait on 2 Aug 90.*
2. *LIMFACS = Limiting Factors.*



## Thruput Into Saudi Arabia

Question: Your first entry expresses concern about the thruput into Saudi Arabia and matching loads with the aircraft; what problems were you facing?

LtGen Kondra: The issues there - the "loads, aircraft matchups, eastbound vs. westbound" - had to do with airplanes going from the East Coast all the way to their West Coast home stations, then turning around and coming back to the midpoint...

Question: Like Tinker (AFB, OK)?

LtGen Kondra: Yes, or any number of other places...to onload... and we were wasting a lot of flying time, which didn't make any sense. As for the "changing priorities," that was happening hourly. Priorities were changing, airplanes were being diverted in flight, airplanes were showing up at places where there were no loads, the loads never existed, or had already gone, nobody knew about them, or they weren't ready...

Question: To what do you attribute that problem? Was that a command communications problem?

LtGen Kondra: Well, there were a number of things involved. Number one, the priorities were changing so rapidly, depending on how General (Norman H.) Schwartzkopf saw the situation. Number two, the JOPES<sup>3</sup> system, the FLOGEN<sup>4</sup> system, was trying to be used as an executor, and it was only a deliberate planner - it was never meant to be an executor. It couldn't keep up with the changes, and so things that were showing up in the TPFDDL<sup>5</sup> may or may not have existed. The end result of this was having to designate a group of people - and if my memory serves me right there were nine people on each shift that worked around the clock - so that when we would get a requirement from TRANSCOM that said, "This load is ready on this day and it has this many people and this much cargo," we would get a point of contact (POC). These people...their only function in life was to call them up and say, "Is this true? Here's what it says you have; what do you have, and when will it be ready?" We had to do that to make sure we weren't sending airplanes to places where there wasn't anything for them to pick up.

Question: How long did this go on?

*3JOPES = Joint Operations Planning and Execution System.*

*4 FLOGEN = flow generation. A method of preparing mission/contingency aircraft schedules. Now in the process of being replaced by ADANS.*

*5 TPFDDL: Time Phased Force Deployment Data List (commonly pronounced "tipfiddle").*

LtGen Kondra: That went on forever...throughout the whole thing, we had to do that. It was the only thing you could do to preclude having a 747 fly from Paris to the East Coast to pick up 400 troops that didn't exist - and fly empty back to Paris.

Question: What about this "load expertise" entry?

LtGen Kondra: That refers to the ACDACG<sup>6</sup> at Pope. I don't know about all of the things that happened there, but there were some problems with getting the 82 ABN and the XVIII Airborne Corps (personnel) out of Pope, at least from the MAC perspective. If you talk to the people at Pope, their view is different. But one of the things that came out of it was that there was nobody who was permanently in charge; things were always done *ad hoc*. There was never a permanent ACDACG, never anybody permanent at Pope or at Ft. Bragg who was responsible for moving people out of those facilities. Now that system is in being; there are people who have been identified, and that is their function in life.

Question: You're talking about Army people?

LtGen Kondra: Yes. As for (the entry on) "air refueling tracks"...they were having trouble getting air refueling, getting airspace. What we were trying to do was set up an anchor over the Red Sea, where a tanker would remain in orbit, and if there were aircraft that needed refueling they could get it there...rather than setting up and coordinating a mission against a tanker at a specific time. We learned to set up an airborne gas station, keeping a tanker airborne, and if a crew needed it they knew where it would be. That never did work very well, though.

### **Refueling Problems - On The Ground At Dhahran, And Airborne**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "Refueling delays at Dhahran" - we had people waiting up to nine hours on the ground for fuel.

Question: Because Dhahran didn't have enough fuel pits, or trucks?

LtGen Kondra: We had too many airplanes on the ground; we had 28 on the ground there at one time, and there were not enough fuel pits to service them all. There were a couple of things happening. We were putting too many airplanes in there for what they could handle, and then to go down (to the AOR) and back, with your onload, your en route time, your offload, and back (to Europe) again...if *everything* went perfectly it was about a 22-hour crew duty day. Then you throw in a nine-hour wait for fuel...you just went past the 24-hour crew duty day. We had people, in the initial stages, who went up to 36 hours.

Question: Of course, you had augmented crews, didn't you?

6 ACDACG = Aircraft Departure/Arrival Control Group (US Army).

LtGen Kondra: Yes, but the augmented crew duty day is still 24 hours.

Comment: And you had to extend that...

LtGen Kondra: Yes. They were being extended up to 30-36 hours.

Question: How long did that go on?

LtGen Kondra: It took awhile for that to sort itself out. I don't know the exact time frame, but I would say it took almost a month for us to finally sort it out and get somewhat smooth.

Question: Didn't the aerial refueling help alleviate the waiting on the ground?

LtGen Kondra: It didn't help. We learned a couple of things about aerial refueling. Number one, we had trouble setting up the anchors. The problem was, if we sent a tanker up, it was fine if you get them (the MAC aircraft) coming inbound...there was enough time. But they were also trying to hit the tankers coming outbound. Didn't work, because if you were delayed then it was such a short notice from the time the airplane was supposed to take off until it did that the tanker, already airborne, would have to abort, dump fuel, and go back. Or the other thing that was happening is that the guys were having to hit the tanker right after takeoff, after already having put in a horrendous day, and we found that it just didn't work very well. So in essence we started hitting tankers when we were coming inbound - and not all missions air refueled, obviously.

Question: You mention Dhahran only here; what about the other bases? Of course, Dhahran was the major one, I know.

LtGen Kondra: Yes, Dhahran was the primary one, in the beginning. I asked the question, from the very beginning, if we were doing (LtCol) Doug Cole<sup>7</sup> a disservice, as a lieutenant colonel, having him over there in charge of the operation at Dhahran...that we put him in an untenable position. We needed to send an O-6 over there.

Question: The upgrading of the rank structure over there...how did that improve things?

LtGen Kondra: What that did was free up Cole to worry about the "doing" of things. When we sent an O-6 in there - Col Taylor<sup>8</sup> - he became top cover for Doug so he wasn't being hung up by the other O-6s; he (Cole) could do his business and let Taylor take care of all the other nonsense.

*7 LtCol Doug Cole (438 MAW ADO) was assigned as the ALCE Commander at Dhahran.*

*8 Referring here to Col Robert "Bob" Taylor of the 60 MAW (Travis AFB).*

### Use of Commercial Aircraft - "Hub and Spoke" Concerns

LtGen Kondra (continuing): As for our use of commercials...there was discussion about whether we really needed to set up a "hub and spoke" system. What the commercials really wanted to do was, say, go to Jeddah,<sup>9</sup> offload there, and then have everything go forward via military airlift. That subject is going to come up again, of using a hub and spoke, as they get into hammering how the CRAF is going to be operated. It came up the other day...that maybe what we ought to be doing is taking commercials and moving them into places like Frankfurt, Luxembourg, you name it...and then using just military (aircraft) to move stuff down into combat areas.

Question: You mean just use the commercials to move stuff across the Atlantic?

LtGen Kondra: Yes, and then use military to shuttle it from there. There are some pros and cons to that.

Question: But you couldn't have moved all those troops and all that cargo into Saudi so quickly without the commercials, could you?

LtGen Kondra: The real issue was that there were some things that only the military could do. The other issue was that it made more sense to be using the 747s to haul passengers than (using) 141s to haul them. Although it sounds great to have a hub and spoke, because of the incompatibility of the airplanes and some of the missions that had to be done, it doesn't make a lot of sense to do it, in all cases. But that was a major concern.

Question: Of course, when the shooting started - I'm getting a little ahead of things here - but when the shooting started, some of the commercials didn't want to fly into that area, right?

LtGen Kondra (agreeing): Some of them did *not* fly into it; that takes some time to explain...we'll get to that a little later.

### Aircrew Management - Flying Time Concerns

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Under "aircrew management" - the biggest problem was answering the question, "when do the crews run out of flying time?" Nobody knew. There were two things involved with flying time. One was, "when are the crews going to run out?" I had no visibility over that, and I needed to know that because that determined when you brought up additional Reserve squadrons. I had

<sup>9</sup> Jeddah (also spelled "Jiddah") is a Saudi Arabian city and airfield located on the Red Sea coastline, close to the Islamic holy city of Mecca.

to have hard data that said, "Here's where we are, and if we don't get some more crews, the whole system is going to come to a stop."

Question: But didn't 21 AF provide you with that data?

LtGen Kondra: Eventually they did, but it took a lot of beating up because our crews didn't know how to do that.

Question: You mean count their flying hours?

LtGen Kondra (agreeing): That's right - they didn't know how to keep track of them. We have a whole generation of pilots who have never maintained their daily flying time. When you're only getting 35 hours a month, who gives a damn whether you have a 150-hour-a-month maximum, or a 275-60, or a 330 or 400-90-day (maximum)? When you're getting 35 hours a month...

Question: Who cares about logging it down, eh?

LtGen Kondra: Right...that's all they've been flying. Besides that, it was all being done for them by computer. The problem was the computer data wasn't any good because in order for the computer to work the aircraft forms have to get back to home station, and the airplanes were staying out there in the system for 30 days or more. So they were never getting back to where this data could be plugged in.

Question: Is that going to be resolved in the future?

LtGen Kondra: It has to be. The crews are going to have to know how to do that. That used to be standard for all of us. We were "non-computer illiterate," in that we didn't know how to do things without the computers.

Question: We sure get dependent on things like that, don't we?

LtGen Kondra: We certainly do. And that became very, very important, because on the 7th of September I had to go to Washington and brief the Air Force Chief of Staff on why we had to call up more Reserve crews. Now, I had to have empirical data that I could show him, and at that time 44 percent of the C-141 crews in the system were at 150 hours. The system was about to come to a screeching halt.

Question: That's 150 hours in a 30-day period, right?

LtGen Kondra: Yes, in a 30-day period. Up to that point they hadn't quit flying yet.

Question: And that's the maximum allowable, without somebody way up there waiving it?

LtGen Kondra: It had been waived already, from 125 to 150. Now you're faced with 60-day time of 275 (hours). Now if you've got 150, that means you can only get 125 in the next 30. The CINC was prepared to go to 400 hours in a 90-day period, and I said I had never seen (the limit of) 330 waived. I asked him to "let me manage the 330, and if you have to surge with no notice, you'll have 70 hours per crew member

which you can play with." I only gave two waivers, myself. There may have been others, but I was supposed to be the one who did that. I gave two waivers to two crew members the night we moved Patriot missiles from Rhein Main to Israel.<sup>10</sup> They called me and said they had two crew members who would be over 330 by the time they got back, and I said, "Send them down - they have the waiver to go past 330 - but when they come back, take them off and replace them with other crew members." That's the only time, in my 30 years of flying, that I know of anybody ever going past 330.

Comment: Then when you called in more Reserves, that obviously gave you some relief for the active duty guys...

LtGen Kondra: Well, you had more people to spread the hours around.

Question: Did any more of the actives come up against the line and have to stop?

LtGen Kondra: Oh, yes, a lot of them - a lot of Reserve people, too. We used our Studies & Analysis people to help make the decision; they told me within two days when I was going to run out of 150 time. And they were right on. Again, that's the first time I know of that we've ever done that. They were very helpful...they provided a lot of inputs for us to help us make good, sound operational decisions.

Comment: It's interesting that - going way back - during the Berlin Airlift, when they were pushing crews and airplanes into Berlin around the clock, that they didn't come up against this flying hour limitation problem.

LtGen Kondra: Well, look at the reason why - you were only flying 300 miles, not 7,000.

Comment: Oh, yes, of course. Now your next entry - "stage crews."

### **Positioning and Use of Stage Crews**

LtGen Kondra: The issues became (1) of staging, and (2) where did we have them. It was obvious to me that we didn't have stage crews in the right places, and we didn't have the right numbers.

Comment: You ended up with them in Torrejon, I know that, and...

LtGen Kondra: Well, we changed... and you know the background on this.<sup>11</sup> But it was obvious that we needed to be looking at where we had the stages...and we'll get into the whole concept of what we did there.

Comment: You also staged them here in the United States.

<sup>10</sup> *The Patriot missile airlift to Israel commenced on 24 Jan 91.*

<sup>11</sup> *See hist 21 AF, CY1990, Vol II, Operation DESERT SHIELD intvw with Cols Cotter & Clay, "Stage Crew Manning," pp. 53-54, 65-67, et seq.*

LtGen Kondra: Well, we changed the whole thing around. Initially, every crew was augmented...once they got going, they had augmented crews, rather than basic ones. That's what was eating up all the flying time. So what we did - and it took a long time to do it - was set up the East Coast stage...in other words, we took 141s and crews from the West Coast and moved them to Charleston and McGuire. We took all the C-5s (from Travis) and moved them to Dover and Westover. And the concept was that airplanes and crews would not go back to the West Coast. The way it worked was that the 141s would go from Charleston to the onload point to McGuire - a basic crew duty day. Then a new crew at McGuire would take the airplane, now loaded, to Torrejon, Zaragoza, Ramstein or Rhein Main, where there would be a crew change. There would be a first pilot pool there, at that European stage base, so that the basic crew that went over, when it came out of crew rest, had a third pilot added to it...and now they would go augmented from Europe to Saudi Arabia, and back. The crew would then go into crew rest, the first pilot would stay there, and the basic crew would come back (to the CONUS) and start the cycle over again, out of Charleston. The C-5s worked the same way, except they went from Dover to the onload to Westover, and crew changed at Westover. There were some originators at Dover also, because of the port there, obviously. But then the same thing...a first pilot pool, so that you were using basic crews on the Stateside legs and to Europe, and from Europe back to the States - but an augmented crew on from Europe down to the AOR. The reason for that was we could not get a staging base - nobody would give us one - in Saudi Arabia. It took 29 days; I worked 29 days with CENTCOM to get a base in Saudi Arabia that I could stage through. I wanted Jeddah, because it had the fuel and the parking space, all the good things. For any number of reasons, they wouldn't give us that. The idea was to go from Europe to the offload, to Jeddah, crew change, refuel, and a basic crew back up to Europe and start the cycle again. Twenty-nine days after starting this, I got a message from CENTCOM J-3 that said I could have Cairo West for C-5 operations, but "if the war breaks out, you have to be out within 24 hours."

Question: So what good was that, eh?

LtGen Kondra: That's right...so I said, "No way, I'm not going to do it." They were very upset. They said they'd used "all kinds of green stamps with the Egyptian government to get their approval," and then I wasn't going to do it. I went to the CINC and I told him,. "Sir, this is dumber'n dirt...we're not gonna do that. We've already set up the East Coast stage since I couldn't get it on that end; so I set it up on

this end, and we're gonna use it. It makes no sense to change how you do business once the war starts." He agreed, so we never did set up the stage at Cairo West.

### **Loadmaster Shortages**

Question: OK..."loadmasters"...?

LtGen Kondra: Loadmasters were always an issue, because you need more than one (when planes carried more than 40 passengers).

Question: Were there waivers given on that, ever?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...there were all kinds; we used students, others...

Comment: I remember (MGen) Logeais saying once, "Why don't they pick some Army guy who can walk and chew gum at the same time and make him a loadmaster on the spot?"

LtGen Kondra: We talked about that, using troop commanders, getting them to help the loadmasters.

### **Communications and Intercommand & Commercial Airlines Relationships**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Under "communications," what I was getting at there was that it was obvious to me that people weren't talking to the folks they needed to be talking to, they were just sitting and watching. What I said that I would do was, every day, I would talk to TRANSCOM J-3 - J-4, I would talk to the MAC CC's and DO's to make sure they stayed current, and the ALCC's at the 322 ALD and in Riyadh...

Comment: You spent an awful lot of time on the phone.

LtGen Kondra: Yes I did. I never did talk to the JCS; I'd put them down to do so, but I never did talk to them - that was TRANSCOM, working that. I had put down "Air Staff," and we did talk to them, on occasion. But every day I talked to the SAC and TAC/DO's, the CENTCOM J-3, the TRANSCOM J-3, and the FORSCOM J-3. I made an effort to call them every day and say, "Here's what we're doing, what are you doing? What problems have you got? What is causing a burr under your saddle, and what can we fix?"

Comment: That's where a lot of your notes (to be discussed) come from, obviously.

LtGen Kondra: Yes, sir. We did that, and that set up the network that people started watching.

Question: It all worked pretty well, would you say?

LtGen Kondra: Yes. They made that same commitment, in that if I didn't get to them, they would get to me. I think the relationship between SAC, MAC and TAC



was never better than it was during DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. We also needed to talk to the airlines, and we did that with our CRAF cell up there.

Question: How cooperative were the airlines through all of this?

LtGen Kondra: The airlines were very cooperative. There were some issues - and we can get into them a little here. When we activated Stage 1 of the CRAF - and if I remember right that was on the 17th of September - we already had over 100 volunteer missions on the books, scheduled, that they (the commercial airlines) were going to fly. They'd already come on board and were flying some missions, and we had 100 on the books they'd volunteered - but it just wasn't enough. There were 41 aircraft in the first CRAF activation in September. The issues that we had with the airlines concerned the short notice requirements that they couldn't react to. They have a 120-day flying cycle for their crews to get on routes and do all those things; they had to compress that down into two days.

Comment: That's quite a job.

LtGen Kondra: Yes, and it's a big process. You can't just call up a commercial airline today and say, "We want you to operate tomorrow out of East Jesus." I mean, they've got to have crews there, support equipment there; they're not just sitting there waiting for you to do that. That was one issue. The issue of chemical warfare ensembles in Saudi Arabia was another, and it became a very emotional issue with the crews. Our people were trained (in the use of CWDE), their people were not. We didn't give them equipment to take with them initially, because we said they wouldn't know how to use it anyhow. But our people were supposed to meet them. Well, that did and did not happen in some places, and when the SCUDs started flying there was some real concern - and rightfully so. So we didn't do that very well, and we needed to fix it quick. Another issue concerned communications and en route briefings. The commercials were going through Brussels, through Paris, and through Rome. We sent briefing teams there - an officer and an enlisted Intelligence person, to tell them what was going on. That paid dividends for us, when these people had face-to-face contact with the airline crews and gave them the latest intel, the procedures for communications, and all of those things - and we should have done that earlier. That was one for the 'lessons learned' pile. Another thing we did was bring carrier representatives to work in the command center at MAC. That helped us - not so much that we needed their help, but because they needed to see what we were going through to have a better understanding of the things being done, and why they were being done that way. We also had all of the carriers come in - their chief pilots and their CEOs<sup>12</sup> - and we gave them an Intelligence briefing - this was

after the war started. We briefed them on what was the "no kidding threat" of the SCUDs, what was the chemical threat, what was their range, what was the aircraft threat. We laid it all out for them, and the pumped-up command and control, how they would be notified, and all those sorts of things...and we sat down and answered their questions, one-on-one. That helped a lot. We sent a team to Minneapolis, to Northwest Airlines, too.

Another thing that was a part of this and that needs to be said and understood was - and I won't identify which airline - that there were some airlines that were going through contract negotiations at the time, and these issues were used as leverage for more money.

Question: Out of the government, you mean?

LtGen Kondra: No, out of the companies. They were using the danger issue as leverage, saying that they should be getting paid more money to go fly; not against the government, but against the companies.

Question: You're talking about the Airline Pilot's Association union?

LtGen Kondra: Yes. It was the pilot's union that was involved in negotiations with some companies, and they were using that as leverage to get higher pay.

Question: Did they succeed?

LtGen Kondra: I don't know, and I didn't ask - it wasn't my concern.

Comment: The one great thing that stands out, of course, was the incredible safety record throughout this whole *mishegass*. Nobody crashed, except for the C-5 out of Ramstein, and that AC-130.

LtGen Kondra: Yes, the gunship that got shot down over the desert.

### **The "Tiger Teams" and Kudos to Studies & Analysis**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): OK, the "Tiger Teams"...I think that's worth talking about. (Yes) I set that up, I think, on the second day I was there (as the MAC/DO). It became patently obvious to me that the colonels who were running the Crisis Action Team - the CAT Directors - could not handle all of the issues that were coming up; there was just too much going on. So I formed two teams that worked 12-hour shifts, seven days a week, on duty 24 hours a day. On these Tiger Teams were people from across the staff. From the IG - the IG wasn't doing any inspecting - and other people from across the staff with different expertise...Operations, Logistics, Supply, Maintenance, whatever. Each team was headed by an O-6, and there usually were from six to eight people on a team. As issues came in that the CAT Director before  
*12 CEOs = Chief (or Corporate) Executive Officers.*

was trying to work, I would give the Tiger Team the issues and say, "Here's your task; now, come up with a solution."

Question: Within a certain number of hours, presumably?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...they would work 'em. They would work them on their shift and pass them on to the next one if they couldn't get it done on their shift. The idea was to solve them immediately and give the CAT Director the answers. Included on each one of the teams was a Studies & Analysis person to help them with Ops research. We used the Studies & Analysis better than I've ever seen it done before - not because of me, but because of the Studies and Analysis guys. They gave us those "no kidding, real good inputs" to make operational decisions - like the one I mentioned about our crews running out of flying time, and how many airplanes you could run through a given place, based on MOGs and all the other things, what the flow would look like, how many stage crews did we need to have this kind of a flow, etc.. They had models that they could run all this against, and they worked those issues of flying time, ute rates, maintenance.

Question: You didn't have a helluva lot of time to put any of the airplanes down for maintenance, or home station checks, that sort of thing, did you?

LtGen Kondra: We didn't put any of them down; we discontinued all of that, and the HSCs were waived.

### **Briefings and Reports and Maintenance "Driving the Operation"**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "Briefings and Reports"...it was obvious to me that nobody had sat down and asked, "What do you really need to know? What does the CINC need to know? What should we really be briefing?" And after you see it, what the hell does it tell you? So we did some things about that...how accurate was it? How relevant was it, to what we were looking at?

Question: What kinds of things did you finally determine would be relevant?

LtGen Kondra: It was evolving. It depended. We changed things continually, and I don't remember all of the things now, Clay... but as an example: "If you're moving this unit, how many missions have you moved, how many do you have left to move, what were the major issues with that movement with that particular unit?" Those are some of the types of things.

Question: And how many broken aircraft were on the ground at Rhein Main, no doubt?

LtGen Kondra: Yes. My biggest problem, when I took over, was that I didn't know what I *wasn't* doing. That takes some explaining. I knew how many missions were

flying, but I didn't know - simply put - how many good airplanes were sitting on the ground that could be flying; I didn't have visibility over that. So I went to the Maintenance guy, (MGen) John Nowak, the MAC/LG. I brought him into my office, shut the door and said, "John, I'm going to shut the door, because this is heresy. Maintenance is going to drive this operation. You're going to tell me how many in-commission airplanes you've got, and I'm going to schedule missions against them. As a matter of fact, I'm going to *overschedule* them. I'm going to make sure that, every day, there will be more missions scheduled than you have airplanes...so that there will not be a good airplane sitting on the ground that isn't flying." Now, that ran into some problems, because you get into the definition of what an "in-commission airplane" is. We got into some issues there and we had to change some things, because Maintenance was saying that if an airplane was in-commission for six hours during a 24-hour period, it was mission capable. There were some non-players there, in that the numbers weren't quite what they were saying. But because of the computer support that the Maintenance people have, I could get good data. I could go station by station and see what airplanes were on the ground, see what was being called in-commission, and what had missions scheduled against it. And I found in many instances that there were airplanes sitting on the ground that Maintenance had but wasn't *releasing* to Ops to load because they had an ETIC<sup>13</sup> on them, they weren't quite in commission for some reason, and we were wasting some time. This all evolved over a period of time, and we worked some issues to resolve the problems.

#### Interaction With TRANSCOM

LtGen Kondra (continuing): I will be the first to admit that I went around TRANSCOM when I first took over; as far as I was concerned, they were another layer - and so I'd go straight to EUCOM, or straight to CENTCOM. It became apparent to me, after a couple of days, that that was a dumb way to do business, so I quit doing it. I would go to TRANSCOM and say, "I've got this problem with CENTCOM - fix it." And let them do it - that's what they were getting paid for, that was their job. You see, until then we, MAC, had always gone straight to the users. This was the first time we've ever had to operate through somebody else, and old habits were hard to break. But it became apparent to me that it was dumb, what I was doing.

Question: Can you give me an example of what sort of thing prompted you to "go around TRANSCOM" to get done?

13 *ETIC = Estimated Time In Commission.*

LtGen Kondra: Well, one of the first issues was trying to get that base in country. I worked directly to the CENTCOM J-3 on that one.

Question: You mean Jeddah?

LtGen Kondra: Yes. I didn't work with TRANSCOM at all.

Question: But you're not talking about the various kinds of lift, though - like sealift, etc.?

LtGen Kondra: No, no...I couldn't care less about that; that wasn't the issue. The issues had to do with things that would come up about airlift. Rather than having TRANSCOM going back to CENTCOM and work it, I would work it - but then I quit doing that...and that was the right thing to do.

Comment/Question: But (Gen) H.T. Johnson is wearing two hats up there, so I don't understand quite how you did this; it's kinda confusing, because you had to talk to your boss every day - your MAC boss. (Yes) So are you going to ignore the fact that he's also wearing the TRANSCOM hat?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...but the "how" I did things was the key. *(laughter)*

### **Changeover Briefings**

Question: OK..."changeover briefings"...anything you want to add here?

LtGen Kondra: That's pretty insignificant, but what it was was...it was obvious that the briefings that were being given were being given for the staff, for the general officers, and not for the worker bees. I said, "You guys have to give your changeover briefings two times a day, and you should brief them however you want."

Comment: "Don't try to make me happy," eh?

LtGen Kondra: Yes..."Do what you need to do to share knowledge with your people, and quit worrying about us. There are certain things that the CINC wants, and that's fine; but that's not your changeover briefing. You've got to do them your own way," I said.

Question: OK. That takes care of your preliminary notes "to yourself." It's 1030, and what time was it you were going to fly today?

LtGen Kondra: We're going to leave here shortly - they're (a C-130 from Pope) due down at 1100.

Question: So why don't we stop this right here, and we'll pick up on your daily notes in our next session, all right?

LtGen Kondra: Fine.

**END OF FIRST SESSION**

## SESSION 2 - ENTRIES OF 24-31 AUGUST 1990<sup>14</sup>

### 24 August Entries:

#### Use of Kuwaiti 747 Aircraft

Comment: Now, I can only hope that the entries I extracted and put on this listing are the ones that you would consider the most pertinent. For instance, the first thing I have here, on the 24th of August, was this entry: '747s from Kuwait - two released.'

LtGen Kondra: What that was ...there were two 747s that Kuwait offered for airlift. We were not allowed, by some level of bureaucracy I don't remember, to use them. The concern was the nationality of the crews. As a matter of fact, it even came down that if they would put British crewmembers on them, then we would use them.

Question: Where were the planes?

LtGen Kondra: One was at Pope, and the other was at Andrews...and the Kuwaitis offered them.

Question: But you never did use them, eh?

LtGen Kondra: Never did. We wouldn't use them to haul passengers, because of the concern about the nationalities of the crews...that the airplanes might be hijacked by the crews. Consequently, it finally ended up we could only use them for pure cargo. But we had a problem there, too - one airplane was configured as a combination passenger-cargo, and there was so little cargo you could put on it that it wasn't worthwhile. I can't remember if we actually ever used them or not.

#### Use of Goose AB, Labrador

Comment: OK, 'a summary of aircraft passing through Goose...330 C-141s, 56 C-5s, 51 C-130s,' with the comment, 'no fuel by October; CAT-D working; need decision on ops at Goose Bay.' What about this?

LtGen Kondra: Yes. The issue was, because we were going to pull out of Goose Bay...and this really kinda went around in a circle. Number one, I didn't realize we had anywhere near that many airplanes passing through there. Because we were going to pull out in October of '91, there was concern that we were going to run out of fuel. Later on it became a concern - because we didn't use Goose - that we had fuel sitting there that we weren't going to use...and did we want to use it rather than leave it there for the Canadians?

Question: Do you remember what happened?

LtGen Kondra: We chose not to use it (Goose AB).

*14 The taping of this session took place on 17 Oct 91.*

Question: And you left it (the fuel) there for the Canadians?

LtGen Kondra: We left it there, because we did not want to set a precedent that said we had to use Goose. We also felt that it made more sense to use Plattsburgh (AFB, NY) or some other base, and see how that would work...since it was a *fait accompli* that Goose was going to close.

Question: Which it has, now, true?

LtGen Kondra: Yes, it has closed.

Question: Because the rent went up, basically, wasn't that it?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...they priced themselves out of business.<sup>15</sup>

#### **Routing of Movement Through the Pacific- Securing Overflight Permission, Thailand, India, Burma - Use Of Diego Garcia**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Let's see (referring to notes)... some movement was going to take place through the Pacific, and it was going to be coming out of Hawaii...

Question: Going to the AOR?

LtGen Kondra: Yes. And the route was going to be from Honolulu, and the question was were we going to go through Clark, or through Thailand, or through Diego Garcia. We would have to do some refueling coming out of Honolulu. What we ended up doing was that we came out of Honolulu and Kaneohe, refueled over Guam, and then went in to U-Tapao (AB, Thailand), crew changed at U-Tapao, then we ended up going into Jubail. Then, as we came out of Jubail, we went back through U-Tapao with another refueling on the way out to Hawaii. It took two (aerial refuelings) going in, and one coming out, because you didn't have the weight on board (on the outbound leg).

Question: How often was this done?

LtGen Kondra: This was done for a movement of some Marines out of Kaneohe.

Question: So it was a one-time shot?

LtGen Kondra: Well, it involved a group of missions...I don't remember the total we ran, but it was fairly significant. And there were a couple of political issues. One, were we going to use Clark? PACCOM wanted us to use Clark. We really didn't want to use Clark because operationally it wasn't going to help us. Two, politically, the CINC wanted us to get as many countries involved with overflight rights as we could get. So we got the use of Thailand, and we got the overflight of India so we didn't

<sup>15</sup> See also 21 AF hists, CY1989 (pp. 92-95) and CY1990, (pp. 38-39 and 65) for additional background information on future of MAC operations at Goose Bay AB.

have to go around it going into the AOR. We did not try to get overflight permission from Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam...we just said that was too hard to do. We bypassed them and went around them into U-Tapao.

Question: What about Burma?

LtGen Kondra: Yes, I think we got Burma, too. Although I think you can go south of Burma, and not have to (get overflight permission). So we got these other countries involved as part of the coalition through the use of overflights. It was a conscious decision by the CINC to do that.

Question: You never did use Diego (Garcia), then?

LtGen Kondra: We did use Diego, but we used it in different ways...

Comment: Well, some B-52s operated out of there, I know.

LtGen Kondra: Yes, we - MAC - didn't use it that much, but SAC did.

## **25 August Entries:**

### **Refueling Considerations, Ground Times At Jubail**

Question: OK - up to the 25th of August now?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...and here we got into that 1st MEB<sup>16</sup> move. The C-5s were going to go into Jubail. I wanted to have them A/R<sup>17</sup> in and out, because Jubail didn't have much refueling (capability) on the ground. If I could hit the tanker on the way inbound...

Question: Over the Indian Ocean?

LtGen Kondra: Well, just before they got there...tank up, land, and then on the way out have another A/R, then we wouldn't have to try to refuel on the ground. I was trying to cut the ground times down, because we were having to wait eight, nine hours for fuel. What happened was...we were finally denied the tankers, because somebody decided we didn't need them. Well, we didn't need them to get there and back, but we needed them to cut down on the ground times. But some people who don't understand ground time and thruput didn't look at it in those terms. So we had a problem there.

Question: Did you resolve it?

LtGen Kondra: We never did refuel, inbound; we never did get the tankers. I can tell you that, for the first missions...let me see if I can find in my notes how long it was taking, once the missions operated...yes, here it is, on the 29th of August: the first C-5 took six and a half hours of ground time at Jubail to refuel. The second C-5

*16 MEB = Marine Expeditionary Brigade. The 1st MEB was based at Kaneohe, HI.*

*17 A/R = Aerial Refuel(ing).*



was nine plus 41 on the ground, the third airplane took two hours to refuel, the fifth at Jubail took four hours, and the sixth took two hours. So we had two airplanes that met their ground times, and the others went from four to almost ten hours on the ground, waiting for fuel.

Question: Well, from those notes we can probably figure out how many planes, total, were involved in this move...because you're talking about the movement of a Marine brigade-size unit, right?

LtGen Kondra: Yes, someplace later I probably talk about how many were involved.

### **Use of Foreign Aircraft in DESERT SHIELD / STORM- Use of Free Airlift, "Keeping Faith" With U.S. Carriers**

Question: You had another entry here (on 25 August) about the Kuwaiti 747s, which you've already covered. But I had a question inserted here: how much foreign CRAF did we actually get into using during DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM?

LtGen Kondra: We never actually got foreign CRAF; we had some foreign carriers...

Comment: Yes, that's what I meant.

LtGen Kondra: Yes....KAL (Korean Airlines) provided free flights, Martin Air from Holland provided flights. The Japanese *paid for*, but did not provide the airplanes, a contract with Evergreen Air for some flights. We tried to get others, but had problems doing it. Now, there's a two-sided sword to that. There was a real hue and cry from our domestic carriers that if we started using foreign carriers we'd be putting them (our domestic airlines) out of business. So we had to be very careful, and what we did was...if it was *free*, we used it. But to go out and *contract* with foreign carriers...we could only do that if every American carrier said they could not meet the requirement. But even the free airlift, as things started drawing down - and now we're talking about after March - was a problem. We had Korean Airlines providing free airlift in the Pacific. Unfortunately, what that was doing was taking away from Federal Express.

Question: You mean just across the Pacific?

LtGen Kondra: Yes. It was taking FedEx' business away. So we had to make a decision: do we use free airlift and break faith with our partners for the last 10 months, or do we say, "Thank you very much, but we have made commitments; we went out 30 days in advance and made these contractual agreements with Federal Express, and they've moved all their aircraft, their crews, their mission support...they've set it all up."? I don't remember the total numbers, but the upshot

was that we cancelled some free airlift to keep faith with our partners. And I think it was the right decision to do that.

### **26 August Entries:**

#### **Lost Crypto Gear Incident- Intransit Visibility - Late Requirements Changes**

Question: OK...on the 26th of August there's an entry, '24th ID<sup>18</sup> lost crypto gear - commercial;' was it recovered?

LtGen Kondra: It was lost, and I don't know if it was ever found. That was one of those things that became 'yesterday's crisis.'

Question: All right...then you've got another one here, 'Meeting with FORSCOM,' with questions about 'intransit visibility.' What were you referring to there?

LtGen Kondra: Intransit visibility was having the ability to know what cargo was where. Where was it in the system, including on the airplanes? That is still an ongoing project, to be able to do that.

Question: Anything else here on the 26th?

LtGen Kondra: Let's see...here's something about 'requirements changes...three commercials were cancelled by TAC.' Two were cancelled by the 24th Mechanized Division, and three were on hold.' Now there's a case...we'd set the commercials up to do this, and they'd committed crews and airplanes...

Question: And at the last minute you cancelled them out?

LtGen Kondra: Yes, and when you cancel you have a helluva time trying to find something to substitute for them. And this is where they (the commercial airlines) get jerked around. Then they come on board and say, "When you do that to us, we lose money." There has to be some way to compensate them for those last-minute cancellations.

Question: This will still be a problem in future contingencies, won't it?

#### **Determining Airdrop Capability in AOR**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Oh, yes, it sure will. Let's see what else we've got here. ...yes, here's an important issue. On the 26th (of August), we started asking about C-130 airdrop capability in the AOR. Nobody could tell us what it was. We didn't know if there was a requirement, but we started asking... 'What is the capability, what do we have for airdrop assets?' And , 'What do we have for buffer boards, what if we have to do CDS, LAPES? What do we have in the way of riggers, chutes, if we have to do personnel drops? Is anybody thinking about this, or looking at it?' This is when 18 ID = Infantry Division.

we first started this. As we go through the notes, we will find it carried through all the way into March.

Question: You couldn't get the answers?

LtGen Kondra (agreeing): We were still trying to get answers in March on what was there and was anybody even considering...

Question: You mean what was in theater, or what was here in the CONUS?

LtGen Kondra: Both. We started identifying, or trying to, in late August. It was going to become an important issue, later on.

Question: Did any airdrops ever materialize, of any sort, during the war?

LtGen Kondra: Yes. I can't get into it here, though.

Comment: I understand; I'd just as soon not classify this, anyway; if it gets classified, it'll get stuck in a drawer somewhere and nobody will ever read it.

LtGen Kondra (agreeing): Yes...but there were some big "what ifs" involved.

Question: But you were definitely searching out the *capability* to do airdrops?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...because all of a sudden somebody was going to come and say, "MAC, airdrop this," and we'd say, "Whoo! What the hell have you got there to do it?"

Question: It had to be C-130s? It couldn't be C-141s?

LtGen Kondra: No, we were looking at both. At that time (August), we were looking at 130s, but eventually we got to looking at our 141s, also.

Question: But what was the problem about determining the capability?

LtGen Kondra: Nobody had thought about it. They were still all concerned about doing this other stuff that they hadn't gotten that far ahead in the process.

#### **Reason For Non-Use Of Kuwaiti, Korean Air Lines (KAL) Aircraft**

Question: Anything else here on the 26th?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...here's the business about the Kuwaiti aircraft being put on hold. That was done because it had a Middle Eastern crew; there were two Sudanese, and British were on the crew. Then we had a KAL airplane that was sitting in San Francisco, and it actually got stopped on the runway...and it was not used before we could get permission. It finally ended up that we could not even have couriers on board - that it could be used for cargo only.

Question: No couriers? (Yes) Because of the fear of hijacking again?

LtGen Kondra: I think it goes back to the paranoia over the Arrow Air incident,<sup>19</sup> and the concern about having U.S. passengers on an airplane somebody wasn't sure

of. The ITV - intransit visibility - business came up again, and that continued as an ongoing thing, trying to get that to work.

### 27 August Entries:

#### **More on AOR Airdrop Capabilities - KC-10 Usage- Allocation of Aerial Refueling Assets**

Question: On the next day (27 Aug), you did get some discussion figures on airdrop assets...you had determined there were 66 airdrop crews, seven LAPES, 50 riggers, 26 JAIs.<sup>20</sup> I wrote the question down here, "What were some of the airdrop scenarios?" But you may not want to discuss that here...

LtGen Kondra: What date are you on there?

Comment: That was on the 27th, the next day...you came up with those numbers.

LtGen Kondra (checking notes): Oh, yes, here they are...yep, this was what there was in theater. But there was no rigging equipment, or facilities.

Question: You also made mention of the KC-10 contribution; how significant was it?

LtGen Kondra: At that point in time it wasn't that much. Eventually, we got up to 20 aircraft, total, that were being used at one time. But at that point there was not much, because they were doing fighter drags and they just weren't available to us.

Question: Didn't they pose problems because you had to have those Cochran loaders on hand to take care of KC-10s? Did you have enough of those available?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...the MHE equipment was there, eventually, and worked with them. Oh...going back to the refueling going into Jubail; the first two missions were eight hours late due to no fuel, and SAC was reluctant to do any refueling, in or out. We finally did get the India overflight permission, on the 27th...

Comment: I should think that in the future, when MAC becomes the Air Mobility Command and acquires some of its own tankers, you won't have to rely on SAC to provide the gas stations in the sky.

LtGen Kondra: Well, the problem is that you're going to have to have an allocation. There are never enough tankers to go around, and somebody is going to have to decide who has priority; do the fighters have priority, or do the airlifters have priority? And that won't be determined by MAC; the priorities will be determined

<sup>19</sup> Referring here to the 12 Dec 85 crash of a MAC-chartered Arrow Airlines DC-8 shortly after takeoff from Gander Airport, Newfoundland, in which 248 soldiers from the 101st ABN and eight crewmembers perished.

<sup>20</sup> JAIs = Joint Airborne Inspectors.

by the theater CINC, whoever's being supported, down through the JCS and down through TRANSCOM.

### **ADANS Capability**

Question: You mentioned a need to "build on the present ADANS<sup>21</sup> capability," and said "we need a MAC system, not a functional system." (Yes) Has there been any change in this since?

LtGen Kondra: Oh, yes, there was a great deal done with ADANS. ADANS was a program that was due to come on line in two years; it literally came on in two months. It was to take the place of using JOPES (q.v.) as a scheduling tool. ADANS was developed to be a scheduler, to put out schedules that could accommodate changes. It went through a lot of growing pains, and it's still being perfected. But it did work.

Question: Does this have anything to do with accounting for flying time, which was another thing we were talking about?

LtGen Kondra: No, ADANS doesn't have anything to do with that.

### **28 August Entries:**

#### **"JAL - How To Use?" - Test of Egyptian Overflight Rights**

Question: On the 28th, you posed the question "JAL - how to use?" You were talking about Japan Air Lines, I presume?

LtGen Kondra: Yes. And at that point we didn't have anything firm regarding them.

Question: Then you referred to calls regarding the "29 August overflight rights over Egypt?"

LtGen Kondra: Yes. I think what was going to happen there was that they (the Egyptians) were going to give us blanket clearances.

Question: Did they?

LtGen Kondra: Yes, they did, finally. We didn't have to have clearances by airplane (tail number); we were given block clearances.

Question: Was that before the air war started in February? (Yes) And it continued afterwards? (Yes)

### **Weight Waivers for C-141s**

Question: OK...what about the entry, "Waivers across the board except for EWP weights"? Meaning 'Emergency War Plan'?

21 ADANS = *Airlift Deployment and Analysis System.*

LtGen Kondra: Yes...that had to do with the 141s and their wing cracks; we had to have specific waivers by tail number.

### **The 94th and 130th PTAS Deployments**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Let's go back up here to the note about the 94th PTAS - the Provisional Tactical Airlift Squadron. That was made up of a group of different Reserve bases...and I don't remember what the bases were now...<sup>22</sup> but they were sent out immediately, on a volunteer basis, and they got as far as Alconbury (UK). Then they couldn't get a beddown site for them in country. So there we were, on the 28th of August, and they'd been sitting there (at Alconbury) for a week or so. You'll see, someplace later on in my notes something that says, "Either move them in country, or we're bringing them back home."

Comment: I recall, during an interview with Col Welch in the last history, where he talked about some of these problems...about how some Reservists and National Guard guys went over to England...and people over there looked up and said, "We didn't know you were coming."<sup>23</sup>

LtGen Kondra: Well, they probably didn't. England was an en route stop, and they were supposed to go on down in country, but there was no place there to bed them down. So they were put on hold, and they sat there for quite awhile. They went for a 30-day TDY in volunteer status and it got to the point, after two weeks, that they still hadn't gone (to Saudi Arabia). You'll see another reference down here which talks about the 130th PTAS...that's the (Air National) Guard. They were out of West Virginia, Missouri, Texas, Tennessee and Delaware. They were sitting at *home station*! They'd already used up 12 days of a 31-day call-up. We finally got down to a bottom line which said, "If they can't get over there...if you can't make a decision, get them bedded down to where they can get at least 10 days in country, then we're gonna release them." And we finally got approval to send them; on the 28th of August, the 94th (PTAS) finally went to Sharjah (UAE).

### **ARC Wind**

Question: Also, "ARC Wind run out of DOO (Current Ops)." What was this about?

<sup>22</sup> Col Bill Spitzer, 21 AF AFRES Advisor, later informed this historian that the 94th PTAS was an all-AFRES unit formed from the 94th TAG at Dobbins AFB, GA, and the 700th TAS at Maxwell AFB, AL.

<sup>23</sup> Referring here to Col Ben J. Welch Jr., ANG Advisor to 21 AF/CC. See 21 AF hist, CY1990, Vol II, pp. 143-152, intvw with Col Welch and LtCol Robert L. Tobias.

LtGen Kondra: ARC Wind was the Air Reserve Component, with C-130s, and it was run by the folks in Current Ops at Hq MAC. Guard and Reserve 130s were used to go around and pick up things Stateside and consolidate them at a major port. They'd pick up the bits and pieces of units and bring them to Dover, or McGuire, or to Charleston, where they would be consolidated into a C-141 or C-5 load. ARC Wind was very helpful.

### 29 August Entries:

#### **Reflections on the C-5 Crash at Ramstein**

Question: On the 29th of August, your entries included, "Crew flying data on C-5 crash at Ramstein," in which 13 were killed and four survived. Do you have any comments on that crash at this late date? It was the only "baddie," really, of the whole war...

LtGen Kondra: Yes...let's see, that was five days after I took over, about 1800L (Central Time). I heard the call come in from (Col) Bucky Jones, the 322nd ALD/DO, to 21st AF over the SATCOM. He relayed that an airplane had gone down, and said that it appeared there weren't going to be any survivors.

Comment: But four did (survive).

LtGen Kondra: Four did, right. And I walked up to the CINC's office to let him know. Probably one of the hardest things I've ever had to do.

Question: Have you ever had to do that in your past, in your career, report on a crash? (No) You've been fortunate in that respect, I guess.

LtGen Kondra: Yes. That was a long walk, from the second floor to the third floor. And I must say that there were doubts that went through my mind...thoughts that said, "Have we pushed too hard?" Because I had no idea what had caused the crash. I only knew it was at night; I had no idea what the crew duty day had been, had no idea what they had been doing beforehand. So you have those doubts that go through your mind..."Have we tried too hard, have we driven the crews too hard?"

Question: Without getting into the details of the cause of the crash - because that's a no-no in histories - I know that it was not pilot error. Let's put it that way...it was due to a mechanical malfunction.

LtGen Kondra (agreeing): It was a mechanical malfunction. But there were a great many personal thoughts that went through my mind...and I know that they went through the CINC's mind, too.

### **CENTCOM Complaints Over Three Missions**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Let's talk about this entry that says "CENTCOM." There were three missions that I got a call about, at home, from CENTCOM. Three missions that they were in absolute anger about - three missions which hadn't operated the way they thought they should have.

Question: 141 missions?

LtGen Kondra: Two were. One was a C-5 mission that had gone to Hurlburt (Field, FL) to pick up a hospital...and the hospital wasn't ready, so they put comm gear on it. Then there were some maps bumped at Sigonella (Italy) on the 27th of August, and (the question was) "didn't we understand how important those maps were?"

Question: Are you talking about "mobile aerial port squadron" personnel?

LtGen Kondra: No, *maps*. And then there were six Cobras (helicopters) that were supposed to come out of Frankfurt on the 28th and they were delayed...and we, MAC, obviously "were not providing good service." We'd obviously screwed up. So I went and found out what had happened to those three missions. The issue about the hospital and comm gear was...the comm gear was already loaded and the field hospital wasn't ready, so a decision was made, rather than downloading what was a validated load, to send it - so we did. The maps were bumped at Sigonella because there was a Navy ship that was dead in the water for a turbine, and we bumped the maps because somebody had validated that the turbine was of higher priority than the maps. And the six Cobras that were supposedly not going...there was a maintenance delay at Frankfurt on the 28th, and they were going to move on the 29th. There were over 1,500 missions that had operated the way they were supposed to, just *three* of them had not, but nobody gave a damn about the 1,497 that had...and somebody was raising hell about those three. The point of this whole story is: when you provide a service, you have to be 100 percent every time, because people only remember the bad service, they don't remember the good. This was a perfect example of that...and I've used this reference to these three missions since.

Question: Did that happen again during the war? Did you get zinged again?

LtGen Kondra: Yeah, it did, later on - and I'll talk about that.

Comment: That's been a problem for MAC...forever. It's always been, "You call, we haul," and not a helluva lot of gratitude. (Yes)

### **Management of Flow Control - Associate Squadron Call-Ups**

Question: OK...regarding "a flow control problem," and the difference of opinion you had with 21st AF; would you care to discuss this?



LtGen Kondra: The issue was that the NAF was the executing agency. 21st AF was the supported NAF, 22nd was the supporting NAF. 21st had the authority to do what they had to do to make the flow work. From the MAC perspective, it was hard to get them to accept that responsibility - rather, to accept that *authority* - to make it happen. They kept calling and asking for permission to do things, when all they had to do was do them. That was my view. Their view (the view of 21st AF) was certainly a different one.

Question: Was that also the CINC's view?

LtGen Kondra: Yes. Oh, also here on the 29th...we started getting into identifying the Associate crews we were going to call up.

Question: Numbers of, or units?

LtGen Kondra: Four squadrons, and also the numbers of units we were going to call. Three C-5s (units); the 301st from Travis, the 326th from Dover, and the 68th squadron from Kelly. And then there were four C-141 squadrons that would give us 40 A/R crews. In 21st AF...the 702nd out of McGuire, the 701st out of Charleston...

### **30 August Entries:**

**Status of the 94th PTAS - CINCPAC, Clark AB, and Move of the 1st MEB - Call-Up of C-5s Only From Reserves - 130 PTAS Beddown**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Then on the 30th ..still no word from CENTCOM (re the disposition) on the 94th (PTAS). Three of the 94th (C-130s) were in country, the rest were flying in EUCCOM. On the 30th, too, that's when CINCPAC wanted us to use Clark, if possible, to move the 1st MEB. We had nine missions that closed at Jubail by that time, with one diverting to Dhahran.

Then this note that says we could call up C-5s, but no C-141, Reserves. That came out of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) office at 0745 on the morning of the 29th...

Question: Why did he say that?

LtGen Kondra: I have no idea. We were still working on the Jeddah problem, checking the sensitivities involved. CENTCOM J-3 understood our problems and were supporting us. We were still working the problem of bedding down the 130th PTAS. Then on to the 31st...

### **31 August Entries:**

**94th PTAS Moves, Operations - 101st ABN Mission Cancellations**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): The 94th PTAS...three (C-130s) were in country and three were moving, while six (C-130s) were operating between Lakenheath and Taif, four per day for the next six days. And we had four working for EUCOM, so we were using them productively even though they weren't bedded down in country. We finally got something off top dead center and they weren't just sitting there, doing nothing. The 101st Airborne cancelled 25 C-141 and 28 C-5 missions between the 1st and the 3rd of September. Those were missions that were scheduled and were cancelled because of changing priorities and/or loads.

Question: Did they give you a reason for the cancellations?

LtGen Kondra: I don't remember what the reasons were. Either there wasn't a requirement, or they weren't ready.

#### **60 Missions for 1st MEB Move - Ground Times at Jubail, Refueling Capability**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Here's the answer on the 1st MEB move - "60 missions, predominately C-5s." That was down to 40 missions by the 31st.

Question: You say mostly C-5s? (Yes) But you didn't configure the C-5s to handle 400 people, or anything like that, did you?

LtGen Kondra: No; we did not use any air bus configurations. We talked about it, but we never did.

Question: You say here, "Ground times are a thing of the past," referring to the fueling operations at Jubail, where you had "two R-14 bladders, one hose, and one filter."

LtGen Kondra: Yes...the system was in being, and we were now able to start meeting the ground times that we needed, here on the 31st. We'd been operating into there for 24 days, so that gives you a clue - it took about three weeks to get things set up.

#### **Rising Flying Hours for C-141s - Beddown Locations, 94th PTAS, 37th PTAS, 130th PTAS**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Here's an interesting one, regarding 141 flying hours...on the 27th, we flew 1,617 hours. On the 28th we flew 1,812, and on the 29th we flew 2,004; that gives you a feel for how the hours were going up.

The beddowns were determined...the 94th (PTAS) was going to be at Sharjah, the 37th (PTAS) at Al Ain (UAE), the 130th PTAS, in 48 to 72 hours, was going to move from Alconbury,. There was also a unit on call at Dyess.

Question: The 94th and 130th outfits - how many aircraft are we talking about here - 18 or so?

LtGen Kondra: No...I believe it was eight for each one.

### **Indemnity Problems Begin Surfacing**

Question: There's something here about an "indemnity problem." What was that about?

LtGen Kondra: OK...indemnity started to become a problem - but let's talk about that when we have more time, because that becomes rather significant. We're talking about insurance for the commercials, and that became a real problem.

Comment: I think I've worn you out for the day...we'll pick this up beginning with 1 September next time, OK?

LtGen Kondra: OK...sounds good.

## **END OF SECOND SESSION**

### **SESSION 3 - ENTRIES OF 1 SEPTEMBER - 11 NOVEMBER 1990**<sup>24</sup>

#### **1-4 September Entries:**

##### **Deer Struck on Runways at Ramstein, Dover - Use of MAC Staff Loadmasters**

LtGen Kondra: Interesting (entry here, 1 September)... "747 at Ramstein, hit two deer; 747 at Dover, damage unknown, two dead deer."

Question: Same day?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...they hit them on takeoff.<sup>25</sup>

Question: You also had an entry which said, "Need to work items - loadmaster volunteers - students/instructors, all qualified, from staff..."

LtGen Kondra: Yes. We needed them for C-130s, C-141s, and C-5s. What I was talking about was trying to go out and get all the loadmaster volunteers we could get for our two-loadmaster requirements, using a student and an instructor to fill the requirement, rather than two qualified ones. We were even looking at the possibility of using C-130 loadmasters on 141s and C-5s.

Question: Did you end up doing that?

LtGen Kondra: No, we did not.

<sup>24</sup> The recording of this session took place on 19 Dec 91.

<sup>25</sup> Neither incident involving the deer severely damaged the aircraft nor delayed the missions.

Question: Are you talking about active duty loadmasters, or Reservists?

LtGen Kondra: We're talking about both active and Reserve, it didn't make any difference...and getting all our qualified loadmasters from the staff out and flying. We did do that. I actually got approval to use some people who were still current and qualified loadmasters and who were working in the Flow Cell, where they were figuring out the requirements and stuff. What I really did was use (flying assignments) as a reward for guys busting their butts 12, 14, 16 hours a day down in the CAT. We got them a break - I'd send them out for two weeks and let them go fly as qualified loadmasters.

Question: This was a "break" for them?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...to get away from working seven days a week, 12-14 hour days. An aviator would rather go fly than do staff work.

Question: Even if it's an 18-hour mission, or something like that?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...that's a piece of cake, see? I also got all the loadmasters out of Stan/Eval and Training and sent them out, too...not as evaluators, but as basic crew members.

Question: You did this at the headquarters...but did you pass this down to the wings, and suggest they do this sort of thing, too?

LtGen Kondra: No, they were already doing it.

### **C-141, C-5 Crew Ratio Issues - Attempts to Bring More KC-10s Into Flow - SAC Ignorance of Stage System**

Question: You also said something here about "XP - need to work crew ratio issues hard." What was that about?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...that had to do with increasing the crew ratios for 141s and C-5s. That's been an ongoing thing, and it's never been really resolved.

Question: You also say, "Figure out a concept for KC-10s, how many, where to use..."?

LtGen Kondra: Yes. We wanted to get KC-10s into the flow. General Johnson pushed very hard to get KC-10s because there were 70-some of them - and about 50 were bought with mobility money, which was supposed to be used to provide mobility support. So we pushed SAC hard to get those. To make a long story short, the most we ever had at one time was 20. They were not manned, they (SAC) had not called their Reserves up, they didn't have the crew ratios, and they didn't know how to run a stage. As a matter of fact, one (SAC) individual called me thinking that I had KC-10 crews to man the stage.

Question: Where were you supposed to get them from?

LtGen Kondra: (*agreeing*) I said, "I don't have any KC-10 crews...you have them all." They didn't know how to do that, had no concept of it.

Question: Did they learn, eventually, during the war?

LtGen Kondra: Yeah...but they never did really stage. That's totally foreign to them.

### **130th, 94th PTAS Moves to AOR - Explanations to FORSCOM On Aircraft Distribution**

LtGen Kondra(*continuing*) : The 130th PTAS we talked about earlier...that was the Provisional squadron that had been sitting in England...finally closed on the 8th (of September) at Al Ain. The 94th (PTAS)...on the 3rd there were six in country and six shuttling.

Question: Took them awhile to get there, didn't it?

LtGen Kondra: Yes.

Question: You have something mentioned there on the 4th about a "Telecon with Guy Laboa...?"

LtGen Kondra: Yes...he was the FORSCOM J-3; he wanted to know where all the aircraft were. I had to explain the system to him. General Burba<sup>26</sup> had an interest in that, too. This was one of the typical things; FORSCOM didn't think they were getting their fair share of the aircraft, so I had to explain to them how the system worked.

### **Discussions With 21 AF/CC Over Crew Management, Stages in Spain - Use Of Al Kharj**

Question: You also make mention here on the 4th of a conversation with (MGen) "Paul Landers - Torrejon - crew management/flying time, augmented stages in Europe." You apparently had a discussion with him about that?

LtGen Kondra: Yes. This was the beginning of the first pilot pool. We'd been running augmented crews everywhere, and it was just eating our lunch. This was where we began saying, "You need to have augmented crews and stages in Europe, but you need to fly basic from CONUS to Europe and from Europe to CONUS...and then augmented from Europe down range and back." This was when this concept began.

Question: Then you note, "Fred Buckingham<sup>27</sup> advises 'no fuel or billeting available at Al Kharj; possible use of Cyprus?"

*26. Referring here to Gen Edwin H. Burba Jr., Commander, FORSCOM.*

LtGen Kondra: I don't know what the reference to Cyprus was for, but we were going to Al Kharj and there was nothing there - it was a bare base, just being set up. We were going to be moving in there, though...

Question: Did that ever come to pass?

LtGen Kondra: Oh, yes...we finally got set up there, and it became a full base.

**Flight Surgeon (LtCol Gilford) "Surge" Checkout ("Volant CAPE") of C-141 Crews - Offshore Crew Support - Considerations Of And General Kondra's Personal Experiences With Restoril - Medical Merit of Nondirectional Stages**

LtGen Kondra: (*continuing*): Let's see, we've got "Gilford"...

Comment: Yes, I noted that - "Gilford/SG."

LtGen Kondra: Yes...he was on the (Flight) Surgeon's team. (LtCol) Gilford was the individual who was originally set up to work the surge thing on the 141s, like we'd done on the 130s. We had a medical team set up...*VOLANT CAPE*, that was what it (the C-141 surge test) was called.

Question: To check out the crews?

LtGen Kondra: Not only the crews - we were also going to validate the WRSK requirements for the 141s. Gilford had been out flying with the crews, because I wanted a report on how they were doing...were we beating people into the ground? Because we'd been into this almost 30 days by now. Basically, what he briefed was that pre-mission (crew rest hours) of 10 and 2 should really be 15, rather than 10, because 10 was too short a time. And when crews came home it was ideal for them to get one to two nights at home, rather than 12 hours and then turn to go on - because that kinda got them back into a cycle.

Question: He apparently mentioned something about "Nonsupport at Officer's Clubs, snack bars, lack of food...?"

LtGen Kondra: (*agreeing*) Yes...the nonsupport thing goes back to some of the problems we had at Torrejon and some of the other places, where all you had was 'greasy spoons' to eat in, etc.

Question: Were you ever able to resolve much of that?

LtGen Kondra: Yes, it finally got done - but it never was done as well as it should have been. But Gilford was recommending that we should have been using the hospital dining hall at Torrejon. Finally, they set up a 24-hour snack bar in the Officer's Club where guys could get beer, soft drinks, sandwiches, hamburgers, and

*27. Referring to BGen Fredric N. Buckingham, the 21 AF/CV, then serving as the COMALF in the AOR.*

some salads...but you couldn't get a really balanced meal - and how often can you eat nothing but hamburgers? "There was no decrement in the cognitive abilities of the pilots," Gilford said, but he said, "the tests may not be accurate."

Question: And then you make a mention of "Restoril"?

LtGen Kondra: Restoril is a sleeping pill. I talked to him (Gilford) specifically about Restoril. I've used it, occasionally. I have used it out in the Pacific when I was going to be gone for 20-some days out of a month, out there flying and getting out of sync. What happens to me personally is that I will go to sleep immediately when I go to bed, but I will only get three hours' sleep, and then I'll be wide awake. Now I can function like that for a few days, but I can't function like that for an extended periods. With Restoril, you take one pill...and the impact on me is that I will get a solid six to eight hours' sleep; I will not wake up. But when I *do* wake up, I have no aftereffects whatsoever - no grogginess, no hangover, no fuzziness, nothing. I can get up and feel totally rested and in good shape. The Brits (British) used it in the Falklands; their guys would use it, and six hours later would be flying missions. I talked to Gilford about it...if it got to the point where guys were going out - because we were flying so much - without extended sleep, that we might want to look at doing it (authorizing Restoril).

Question: Did you?

LtGen Kondra: We never did do it.

Question: Because the stages kicked in?

LtGen Kondra: No...they'll give you a million reasons...on all of the things you've got to do, the impact on different people, and how have to test it, and you have to do this and you have to do that. I still maintain, at least based on my experience - and maybe I'm unique - that it could have helped.

Question: Of course, it could affect different people in different ways?

LtGen Kondra: Yes, it could, that's true. They talked about (the use of) dexedrine, as an "upper," and I was totally against that. I did not want to do that, but I would certainly have been willing to address the use of Restoril.

Question: Restoril isn't addictive, is it?

LtGen Kondra: No, nothing like that. It is a super sleep aid, at least for me, personally.

Question: It is a prescription drug, though, isn't it?

LtGen Kondra: Yes, it is.

## **Nondirectional Vs. Directional Stages**

Question: To finish up this business with the Surgeon...you also mention here (on 4 September) that "a nondirectional stage may have merit medically." What did you mean by a 'nondirectional stage?'

LtGen Kondra: In other words, you'd go out to Europe...and you might stay there and just circle from Europe down to the AOR and back. "Directional" means that you'd go from the East Coast to Europe to Saudi to Europe and back to the CONUS. We really didn't run a directional stage.

### **5 September Entries:**

#### **Discussion Re Dedicated C-21 for General Burba**

Question: OK...here's an entry regarding a "dedicated alert of a C-21 for General Burba at Maxwell," and your comment, "None dedicated to anyone else." Why for him?

LtGen Kondra: This had nothing to do with DESERT SHIELD or DESERT STORM - it had to do with the support of OSA,<sup>28</sup> and that he wanted his own airplane. I have problems with that, because OSA is a service responsibility, and if he wanted a dedicated airplane that would be an Army responsibility, not an Air Force one.

Question: What made him think he was so special? And you're saying the same thing?

LtGen Kondra: (*agreeing*) He's not special - he is a 4-star commander, though.

#### **Consideration, Rejection of Use of Cairo West, Jeddah As Stage Bases**

Question: Then there's the entry, "Three KC-135s, six KC-10s for General Fitzgerald, Army 2-star, request at Cairo West." What was the extent of use of Cairo West during DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM?

LtGen Kondra: This had to do with trying to find a place in country to operate a stage...so that we could go in from Europe, into the AOR, offload, and then go to another base, refuel and crew change there.

Question: Meaning Cairo West, in this case?

LtGen Kondra: Well, Cairo West was what was being used by General Fitzgerald, an Army 2-star who was the senior (U.S.) military representative in Egypt. What they were saying was that they were going to have three KC-135s and six KC-10s at Cairo West, and that they were still trying to find us (MAC) a place to operate. This was the one (issue) that took me 29 days to get resolved, and Cairo West was finally it.

28. OSA = Operational Support Aircraft.



And that's when they said, "Oh, by the way...if the war breaks out you must leave within 24 hours."

Question: And so you said, "Forget the whole thing"?

LtGen Kondra: That's right. This goes on down here, where you see the comment, "Burt Moore and the CINC spin up, religious and political, too hard to do." That's trying to get Jeddah (in Saudi Arabia).

Question: Oh, yes...that's near Mecca, isn't it?<sup>29</sup> (Yes) That was in the "too tough" category, too?

LtGen Kondra: Yes, we couldn't see doing that.

Question: So you never did come up with another (stage) base after the war started?

LtGen Kondra: We did get other bases, and we finally did start doing some of that during the redeployment - but that's way downstream. We never did it during the initial phases.

#### **7-9 September Entries:**

##### **Evacuation of Americans from Jordan**

Question: OK...nothing much on the 6th, but on the 7th of September you make note of a possible "evacuation of AmCits<sup>30</sup> from Amman?"

LtGen Kondra: Yes...we got a heads-up that a NEO<sup>31</sup> might be needed from Amman (Jordan) to the East Coast; 175 first, then 140 - with the 175 using a Northwest Airlines 747.

Question: Did it happen?

LtGen Kondra: I believe that we did do that. It wasn't really a NEO, but we did evacuate some people.

##### **Cancellation of Specialized Altus Training - Evacuation Of Americans From Jordan**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): We looked at canceling the instructor, airdrop and A/R<sup>32</sup> schools at Altus (AFB, OK). And we did do that.

Question: To get more pilots?

*29. Jeddah (King Faisal Naval Base) is on the Red Sea coast of Saudi Arabia, about 60 miles west of the Moslem holy city of Mecca.*

*30. AmCits = American Citizens.*

*31. NEO = Noncombatant Evacuation Order.*

*32. A/R = Aerial Refueling.*

LtGen Kondra: (agreeing) To get more pilots, yes. We kept the basic school open, but we cancelled the other schools - and that helped us. (continuing) Oh...regarding getting the American citizens out of Amman, to Charleston..the first Northwest Airlines was going to go on the 8th (of September) with 350, and another one on the 9th with 175 people.<sup>33</sup>

### **Reserve Call Ups Stop - Decision Made Not To Use C-141s For Intratheater Strategic Airlift**

Question: Then there was the "CINC's meeting on the 7th - Reserve call-ups?"

LtGen Kondra: Yes..."Aircrews...no mas."

Question: Meaning you had exhausted your Reserves?

LtGen Kondra: We weren't going to call up any more; we were not given approval to call up any more aircrews. (continuing) Then, on the 9th, we said "No strat airlift" when they made a request to use C-141s for intratheater airlift.

Question: Who was "they"?

LtGen Kondra: Buckingham and the ALCC, down in the AOR.

### **Stage Concept To Begin At Zaragoza**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Also here on the 8th of September, we started using 28 first pilots, 12 missions per day. We were starting to get into the stage business, and setting up the augmented crews out of Europe...

Question: You'd gotten them (the pilots) there by then?

LtGen Kondra: Well, I don't think they're there yet...but they're going to start it there (at Zaragoza) and see whether it works or not. Let's see...we started talking about this on the 3rd of September, and it took them (21 AF) five days to make up their mind that they were going to do that.

Comment: I still don't quite understand the reluctance on General Landers' part.

LtGen Kondra: I don't know, either - to this day - what the problem was. Where are you now, in your notes?

### **Move of Navy CeeBees- 94th, 130th PTAS Closings**

Comment: I'm on the 9th of September.

LtGen Kondra: OK - let's talk about the Navy SeaBees;<sup>34</sup> we had missions going out

<sup>33</sup> On 8 Sep 90, Gen Kondra subsequently would note that this second mission was cancelled. "We thought we were going to have it, but the need went away."

SeaBees (or "CBs") = Navy Construction Battalions.

of Guam to Jubail; eight scheduled from Guam to Jubail, and eight more from Kadena to Shaikh Isa. That was significant.

Question: Using 141s?

LtGen Kondra: Five C-5s. (*continuing*) The 94th PTAS...15 (of their C-130s) had closed, and one was broken at Alconbury; that finally closed on the 9th, as did the 130th PTAS.

#### **Identification of "Tiger Team" Members**

Question: Then there's mention of the 'Tiger Team' which you had established; you've got their names mentioned here; Van Wagner, Chuck Henry, Carl Duerson, Steve Taylor...?

LtGen Kondra: Yes, they were on the team. I thought I had started that before this, though.<sup>35</sup> The Tiger Team were some people I picked to work issues so that the CAT Director wouldn't have to work them.

#### **Japan's Lease, Use of Evergreen 747s - First Pilot Pool Stage Begins At Zaragoza**

Comment/Question: Yes, you mentioned that in our first session.<sup>36</sup> You also mention (on 9 September) that "Japan leased two Evergreen 747s," and your question was, "How are we going to use them? No bullets, weapons, troops, 18 round trips"?

LtGen Kondra: Yes. They (Japan) leased and paid for the Evergreen 747s, but we couldn't carry any war materials, troops, etc.

Question: What did they carry?

LtGen Kondra: Food (MREs), tents, medicine - general type stuff, but no war goods. (*continuing*) I see here where that first pilot pool finally started on the 9th of September (at Zaragoza).

#### **10-11 September Entries:**

##### **First Mention of Stop Loss Program - Need For Periodic GDSS Purges**

LtGen Kondra (*continuing*): Let me see..."stop loss, stop PCS..." This is the first time we started talking about the stop loss program, where we were not going to let

<sup>35</sup> Gen Kondra was correct in his statement here; he had established the "Tiger Team" on his second day on the job as the MAC/DO. See earlier reference, pp. 11-12.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*

people get out of the service, from certain AFSCs. We were talking about Services, PRIME RIB and PRIME BEEF types.

Question: Then there something here about the "GDSS - need to purge it every so often?"

LtGen Kondra: That had to do with the fact that there was so much data getting loaded into it that it was slowing the system down.

Question: Have the problems with the GDSS been resolved yet?

LtGen Kondra: They say they have, but I don't know - because we're not in a surge situation right now.

### **Lack of Management of Large Aircraft Into Lajes**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Here's a significant thing: "No management of large aircraft into Lajes." There was no *combining*. Lajes was getting KC-135s dropping in with no advance warning. We were sending airlift planes in there, and we're advising them...then all of the sudden tankers were showing up, and there's no coordination, no management of the airplanes coming to Lajes; they had no idea.

Question: Were they being left out of the communications loop somewhere?

LtGen Kondra: (*agreeing*) They were just not being told. SAC's not letting them know that their tankers are coming through.

Question: Oh, SAC?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...we (MAC) are not following the tankers. So all of a sudden Lajes is getting all kinds of big airplanes coming through there, and they're got a finite number of parking spaces, trouble with handling them...and no coordination.

Question: And so you discussed this with SAC?

LtGen Kondra: Well, yes, to try to make sure that they would let them (Lajes) know.

Question: Did they do better afterwards?

LtGen Kondra: I can't answer that; I don't know if they ever did or not. It's still happening today, though; they'll still come in there on short notice.

Comment: That's kinda funny...these are people in the airplane business, and they should know that there are a finite number of parking spaces at every airport...

LtGen Kondra: But they think they're the only ones that are going to be there.

### **Management of Port at Pope, Ft. Bragg - Training Regiments at Altus For Basic Crewmembers**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "First O-6 to work management of port at Pope/Bragg..." This is the discussion about getting the 18th Airborne Corps and the

82nd Airborne Division out of Pope, and that - while it went all right and they got them out, it didn't go as smoothly as it could have. A group of Army and Air Force people was put together to figure out how to do that...and there were a whole bunch of things that came out of that.

Question: Who was the (MAC) O-6, do you remember?

LtGen Kondra: The guy who finally ended up being the head of that was (Col) Corky Mauchline; he was the ADO at Pope.

(continuing) We also went back to six-day-a-week training at Altus.

Question: "Back" to it?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...for the basic crewmembers.

### **Cargo Sorting at Dover**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): We started sorting cargo at Dover for alternate destinations, rather than mixing loads. In other words, we tried to get loads set up for Dhahran, loads for Jubail, Riyadh, and so forth, rather than just putting it all in country and letting them sort it out over there.

Question: That continued throughout the war, I presume? (Yes) Did that pose any problems...that sorting of all the cargo in advance? That must've been a big chore at Dover.

LtGen Kondra: Yes, it did, and it was.

### **Report By LtCol Pete Kaminsky, CINCMAC's "Circuit Rider" - ROTE Squadrons In AOR**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Here's a note about a report from (LtCol) Pete Kaminsky's, who was the CINC's circuit rider...

Question: Yes...he was the command's "troubleshooter," wasn't he?<sup>37</sup>

LtGen Kondra: Yes. He gave a report in which he said things like: "morale was high, but command and control was a sore subject, computer flight plans were not occurring, that they needed an air cart and a power cart at Jubail, Bravo crews still existed at Torrejon and Ramstein...and everybody was going into Bravo." He said we "needed to put a few crews in Bravo at home station, and keep the rest normal," and that "some of the Reserves were not happy about being activated," that we

*37. LtCol Pete Kaminsky was appointed as the MAC "quality of life czar" by MGen Kellim, then the MAC/DO, in 1989, and given the task of visiting all MAC installations on a fact-finding tour. See 21 AF history, CY1989, pp. 207-208.*

"needed an airfield summary for the Saudi fields," because there just wasn't a lot of good information about them.

Question: Here on the 11th (of September) you have a note, "ROTE squadron - let them know what they're doing"?

LtGen Kondra: Yes, I think that was part of his (Kaminsky's) feedback...just to keep the ROTE squadrons informed as to what they were going to be doing.

Question: Are these the squadrons that go to England?

LtGen Kondra: No, these are the ones in country.

Question: Is Kaminsky still doing that job?

LtGen Kondra: No, he's retired now.

### 11-14 September Entries:

#### **Return of Pallets to CONUS**

Question: On the 12th you say, "Brought back 500 pallets this week; the only limit is on commercial one-way trips"?

LtGen Kondra: That's right. You can't put pallets on a commercial because we buy them on a one-way trip, not on a round-trip basis.

Question: And you say you "relayed this to Billy Barrett." Who's Billy Barrett?

LtGen Kondra: Billy Barrett was the Assistant LE. That came out of the Chief's visit, when they saw pallets and nets over there (in the AOR) that weren't moving. The allegation was that MAC wouldn't bring back pallets. Well, it wasn't that MAC wouldn't bring them back, it was that we couldn't put them on the commercials. That was relayed back to Barrett, as to what was *really* going on.

#### **FAA Eases Restrictions on Cargo Flights - Cairo West Concerns Continue**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Let's see...the FAA went from 120 to 150 (hours) in 30 days for cargo only (flights), but they would give no 90-day waiver to the 300 restriction.<sup>38</sup> We were going 150 in 30. But they (the FAA) wouldn't do it for passenger flights.

Question: Did they ever change their minds on that?

LtGen Kondra: No, it stayed that way.

*(continuing)* Here on the 14th...(MGen) Burt Moore is saying, "We need a message for Ops at Cairo West..."

Question: So you were still fighting that battle, eh?

38. General Kondra was speaking of cumulative pilot flying hour restrictions here.

### **Discussion With MGen Ryan, TAC/DO, On Responsibilities**

LtGen Kondra: Yes. Here's a note here on (MGen) Mike Ryan, who was the TAC/DO; we had a discussion about, "You tell me what you need, I'll tell you how; don't tell me how to do my business." We finally got through to them...to tell me what their requirement was, and then I would figure out how to do it. He (Ryan) got out of the "telling me how to do it" business.

### **15-17 September Entries:**

#### **FAA Agrees to Perform Flight Checks in AOR**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): On the 15th of September the FAA agreed to do flight checks in the AOR. That had been an issue; we had the C-27s, they had airplanes, and it was their responsibility. They were holding out, weren't going to do it...and they finally agreed to go and do them.

Question: What sort of "flight checks" are you talking about?

LtGen Kondra: Nav aids.

Question: Oh, on the ground type things? (Yes) So they did this for the rest of the war, or was this a one-time good deal?

LtGen Kondra: They did it up this time; we did most of them, though.

#### **"1.5 Days Behind What?" - Austrian Overflights**

Question: There on the 16th you've got an entry, "1.5 days behind - what?"

LtGen Kondra: Yes...evidently, I got a message from somebody saying we were "1.5 days behind," and I'm saying "behind what?" (laughter)

Question: Then you say something about,, "Austrian overflight - have to request"?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...they wouldn't give us blanket clearance; we had to request them each time. That eventually changed, but at that date we were still doing that.

#### **21st AF First Pilot Stage In Place- Options on ARC Call-Ups - ARCs To Perform Fair Share of Taskings**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "21st Air Force stages, first pilots are set." Finally, on the 17th of September, 12 days after we first discussed this, we finally have them in place now.

Question: On the 17th, you've got a note about "options on ARC call-ups"? Something about "four active, two ARCs," or "three and three," etc?

LtGen Kondra: OK...there were three options, concerning the C-130s. One, we would call no ARCs up. The second option was to have four actives and two ARCs, 60

days in country, 30 days home, or 90 days in and 60 days home. Then the recommended one (third option) was that we'd have three active and three ARCs, 90 days in and 90 days out, and we'd still do EUCOM and SOUTHCOM. I think that's what we ended up deciding to do. My view on that was...if they (the ARC) owned 60 percent of the assets, they ought to have 60 percent of the job - and I was adamant about that. I didn't think it should be all dumped on the actives.

Question: And so they (the ARCs) handled the SOUTHCOM operation, too, during all this?

LtGen Kondra: Yes, they were still doing some of that.

### 18-21 September Entries:

#### **Consideration of Reduced CAT Hours - CINCENT Request For Four Additional C-121s**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "Reduce the CAT and get back to normal ops on a day-to-day basis..." That was something we were considering then. We thought we were *in*...we basically were in country by then.

Question: Oh, you mean you thought everything was there, so you thought you could back off a little?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...that didn't last long, though. "Reserves keep the C-5s on a 180 day string; 90 days, look at the C-141s." This was on the 19th, and we're talking about maybe going back to normal operations. Bad idea! On the 20th of September we called up 890 people, and here the CINCENT is asking the JCS for four additional C-121s...

Question: Did you ever actually reduce the CAT hours?

LtGen Kondra: No...not until July (1991).

#### **Westover AFB Visit: Impressions; Use As Major Operations Base; AFRES vs. MAC-Gained Unit Status; Its Future Use in Contingency Operations**

Question: On 21 September, you've got a comment regarding (BGen) Mike Walker, at Westover?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...I think this was when I made a visit to Westover, and these were the things that I found...that they had just done absolutely super things. They had (for the passengers) free sodas, ice cream, food, papers, magazines, video games, they'd set up a chapel in a hangar - which was also being used as a passenger terminal. They got additional phones installed, had a 24-hour mess hall set up which was manned by volunteers, they set up box lunches, the bowling alley hours had



been extended. They had a guarded area for crew flight gear and A-bags, so they didn't have to drag them up to their rooms. The issue was...Westover is an AFRES-gained unit, not a MAC-gained one. It was never intended for Westover to be a major aerial port, or for it to be a major base of operations. That was due to some fallacious thinking that, when Westover had a C-130 unit it (the unit) would deploy, so nothing would come there. We never changed that thinking when we made it a C-5 base; we kept the old thinking with a new mission and never really thought it out. I still maintain that it should be a MAC-gained unit, and that's an ongoing study to this day, to see whether in fact that's going to happen. Westover was a case where, in my opinion, we took the old Prop process from the old mission and never applied a new Prop process to the new mission. And there's no doubt in my mind that, if we ever do this sort of thing again, we're going to use Westover. We ought to step up to that; Westover should either become a MAC-gained organization, or we need to activate the support unit required to support a major flow through there. Because he (BGen Walker) had to do it all with *volunteers* for a long, long time. It wasn't until November or December sometime that we finally pulled up the rest of the support equipment that he needed to make Westover run. Yet he was operating 24 hours a day, and the only thing called up were his C-5 squadrons! All the support that goes with them was never activated, until we were way into this thing.

Comment: I recall that Col McAllister visited Westover at one point in time, and he told me they ended up sending over 180 people up there to help out.<sup>39</sup>

### 22 September Entries:

#### **General Kondra's Trip To Saudi Arabia; Meeting Crews At Torrejon And Overcoming The Inertia Of The "Old Ways Of Doing Things"**

LtGen Kondra: Yes...(continuing) Here's an entry on 22 September: "Torrejon, 50% of crews still augmented." We still haven't got the first pilots in there yet. This was after I left for my trip to Saudi Arabia, on the 21st. I went through Westover, then to Torrejon, where I had a 2.5 hour crew meeting. "Face-to-face exchange for C-5 flight engineers to expedite the checklist - why don't we do this?" I mean, it was a case of *overcoming the inertia of how we'd always done business*. Why *didn't* we have a face-to-face exchange? "Well, we've never done it that way." Well, dammit, we

39. Referring to Col Donald A. McAllister, 21 AF DCS/Logistics, who visited Westover on Nov 90. See pp. 135-136, 21 AF CY1990 history, McAllister interview.

ought to do it! We ought to, to decrease the ground times and move those airplanes through.

#### **Concurrent Operations at Home Stations**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): For the LG, I asked, "Why don't we have concurrent operations at home stations? We can do it out in the system, why can't we do it at home station?"

Question: By "concurrent operations" you mean...?

LtGen Kondra: Refueling, loading and maintenance, all at the same time. We do it at the en route bases. And, in essence now, the home stations were the en route stations. They're not "home stations," because the airplanes are coming home, turning, and going out. Why don't we do concurrent ops? Because "we've never done it that way."

Question: Did you instill this in them?

LtGen Kondra: Well, we tried to work it; I can't really tell you whether they did it or not.

#### **Finance Use Of Classified Vouchers**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Finance...the vouchers were classified, because the destinations were classified, so it slowed down the processing. What a stupid way to do business! I mean, that's dumber than dirt!

Question: And why were the destinations classified, anyway?

LtGen Kondra: That was done by CENTCOM, through the whole operation. So you couldn't write it down, that you were going to Al Ain, or Bateen...they had to be classified vouchers. Really dumb. We need to use J-codes, or something else. It really slowed down the processing times.

#### **Imminent Danger Pay For MAC Crewmembers**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Then there was the question that came up about imminent danger pay, and were they (MAC crews) going to get it? Eventually, they did.

Question: "What qualified them for it," and things like that?

#### **Variable Housing Allowances For Reservists**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Yes...how many hours in the AOR, all of those things. Then there was the question of variable housing allowance for the Reservists. They

had to be on duty for 143 days before they could get it, and they hadn't reached that by this time (in late September).

Question: Did you get that resolved?

LtGen Kondra: Yes, that finally came around, because they wound up being on active duty long enough.

### **Considerations In Calling Up Reservists**

Comment: I did an interview with (Col) Ben Welch and (LtCol) Bob Tobias in the last history,<sup>40</sup> and they mentioned the way that MAC treated the Reservists - which seemed pretty shabby, the way they were called up, etc. This may be off the subject somewhat, but then from your perspective...

LtGen Kondra: Yes, from my perspective that would not be true, because we tried to do everything we could. We did not call any Reservists up without carefully thinking through what the impact would be. All of those things were taken into consideration. You see, we had a lot of Reservists who didn't realize why they were being called up.

Comment: Well, there were complaints about getting called on Friday and told to report on Sunday, for instance.

LtGen Kondra: Yes...but those are the rules. The rules state that, when you're activated, you've got 48 hours. That's part of the contract.

Comment: Well, it created hardships, because of their jobs, their having to notify their employers, etc.

LtGen Kondra: But that's all part of the contract. Now, could we have done that differently? I don't know. We tried to give people a "heads up" that (their activation) was coming, and they'd better start thinking about it. They usually had anywhere from three days to a week advance notice that (the call up) was coming. But when they actually got the *notice*, they had 48 hours - because I think that's what the rules specify.

### **Meeting With 16 AF/CC - Poor ACC Facility At Torrejon**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): While I was at Torrejon I met with the 16th Air Force Commander for an hour, and we discussed the support. We talked about Torrejon vs. Rota, and the ACC working conditions, which were lousy...absolutely terrible.

Question: The Airlift Control Center? (Yes) Were they in a tent, or something?

40. See "Operation DESERT SHIELD and the ANG/AFRES - An Interview With Col Ben J. Welch Jr. and LtCol Robert L. Tobias," 21 AF hist, CY1990, pp. 143-152.

LtGen Kondra: No, it was just a very small facility, totally inadequate; they needed more room.

Question: Did they get it?

LtGen Kondra: They've got it now. They fixed it up and it looks a lot better.

Comment: Now that we're about to move out of Torrejon...

### **Visits To Al Ain, Bateen, Riyadh - Meeting With CENTCOM J-3, Cairo West Discussions**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Then I went to Al Ain...

Comment: Oh...that's where my historian assistant (SMSgt) Ciborski was stationed.

LtGen Kondra: Yes. I talked to (Col) John Wingfield, who was the Provisional wing commander there. They were using the Guard system for supply, and they needed to be part of the Air Force - that was brought back to the MAC/LG, who worked that. They needed a radio net at Al Ain, because the Guard was going to take theirs out when they left on 9 October; that was worked. They were also setting up low-level routes for airdrop training. Then I went to Bateen, where the 50th (PTAS) was doing all right, and then to Riyadh, where I met with the CENTCOM J-3 and explained to him why we were not using Cairo West. He had some concern that we had used some "green stamps" with the Egyptians to get Cairo West, and I said, "Bull----, we just wrote off a \$70 billion debt the Egyptians owed the U.S., and I think that's some rather significant green stamps on our part." I told him I wasn't concerned about them being upset about our not using Cairo West.

### **Meetings With Gens Starling and Horner - Gen Horner's Concern About Replacing COMALF**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Then I met with the (CENTCOM) J-4, General Starling, who was very positive, as was General Horner...who said to me, "Don't worry about Cairo." I talked (to Horner) about the COMALF there (BGen Buckingham); he was concerned we were taking Buckingham out and putting another one in (BGen Ed Tenoso).

Question: That was a question I meant to ask of somebody...why was BGen Buckingham only over there for such a short period of time?<sup>41</sup>

LtGen Kondra: It was an opportunity for us to get another COMALF trained.

41. BGen Tenoso, the 22 AF/CV, replaced BGen Buckingham as the COMALF at Riyadh in Oct 90.

**Visit To Dhahran: Concern Over MHE Status - "Roles And Mission" Issue -  
Need For Additional K-Loaders**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Then I went to Dhahran, where the concern was the status of the materials handling equipment (MHE); they had five of their ten 25K-loaders broken, needing brake parts and transmissions.

Question: Did you get some support for them, eventually?

LtGen Kondra: Yes, we finally did...what happened was, the (MAC) LG sent in a WRSK kit. This was a *theater* responsibility to handle and support MHE. The problem was that the theater - CENTAF - didn't give a damn about it. This is a "roles and mission" issue that needs to be addressed, that the *host* is supposed to do that kind of stuff. The fact is, the host (in this case, TAC) didn't give a damn, and we (MAC) are the ones that use it, and we, MAC, are the ones who are going to suffer if it doesn't work - and we might as well step up to fix the damn thing. Now this is Vern Kondra speaking...this is my opinion. We literally sent in a WRSK kit and did all that stuff...but this really needs to be addressed.

Question: Because, in the future, the same thing is going to happen, isn't it?

LtGen Kondra: Sure it is...there's no doubt about it.

Question: Then you say here, "TR could use six more K-loaders"? (at Dhahran)

LtGen Kondra: Yes...I don't remember what we got to them, but we did improve their situation.

**Question Of Sizing Of UTCs - Tying Of CCT To 82nd ABN Wrong**

Question: And then, "A question for the DO; how are UTCs<sup>42</sup> sized, and who does it?"

LtGen Kondra: Yes...we needed to look at the tailored UTCs to meet contingencies. You know, there are many contingencies, from Grenada to Panama to Saudi. In other words, have a *tailored* UTC. If you're going to go to St. Croix, you don't need to same size thing as if you were going to go to Dhahran. That's been an ongoing thing, and those things have been worked on...and will continue to be looked at.

Question: And here you ask, "Why is the CCT tied to the 82nd Airborne?"

LtGen Kondra: Yes...I wanted to know why that particular CCT was tied to the 82nd, when it ought to be...

Question: Free to roam?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...it's not the 82nd's CCT, it's the COMALF's CCT.

42. UTCs = Unit Type Codes.

### **Rhein Main Stopover**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): OK...Rhein Main on the 25th and 26th (of September)...they needed a paved approach to the ramp for access to the hangars. They built all those big hangars there, but you can't bring big airplanes in to them. I wanted them to look at the Riyadh facilities for the C-130s; they've got some of the best maintenance facilities in the world, and why were we flying C-130s all the way from Saudi Arabia to Germany to do maintenance on them - when the Lockheed facilities at Riyadh are the best in the world? We were never able to do that, though.

Question: You couldn't bring the Lockheed reps in to do the work?

LtGen Kondra: They were there; we just never could get access to them. But Rhein Main had good crew control and good community support. And on the 27th, I was back home.

Question: Pretty fast trip, wasn't it? (Yes) "If this is Thursday, this must be Riyadh," eh? (Yes) Was this your first trip to that area of the world?

LtGen Kondra: I'd been in there before, but it was a long time ago.

### **1 - 3 October Entries:**

#### **Consideration of Increased C-130 Crew Ratios**

Question: There was (on 1 October) another mention of "crew ratios"?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...and did we really want to go from a 1.5 to a 1.75 (ratio) on the C-130s...

Question: Did we?

LtGen Kondra: We did eventually end up sending some additional crews over there (to the AOR) because we were flying them (the C-130s) at such a high ute rate.

#### **Convincing CINCMAC Not To Change Ground Times**

Question: And "3:15 vs. 4:15 ground times"? Was that for all aircraft, or what?

LtGen Kondra: That was 3:15 for the 141s, 4:15 for the C-5s. This was something that the CINC brought up, that he wanted to reduce the ground times. I went into his office and talked to him and convinced him not to do it, because I could see the crew problems that would ensue.

#### **Active, ARC Rotation Plans Discussed, Shelved**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): On the 3rd of October...a rotation plan was discussed. I had to check with the AF/XOO...Active would be 180 days, and ARC would be 90 days - that was our proposal.

Question: Did they buy it?

LtGen Kondra: We never actually got around to doing any rotations. We did move some ARC out, but basically the people stayed over there. We were also starting to work the "go to war" plan, how would we do it, what would we do if we went to war, etc.

Question: You mean the 130s, or the whole thing?

### **"Go To War" Planning Begins - CRAF Considerations**

LtGen Kondra: The whole thing. I had people looking at the question, "What do we do if we go to war?" What things have we *not* done?" We'd gone through the buildup and were now in the sustainment phase...and if we had to go to war, what things did we still have to do? What are the issues we should be looking at, and what problems do we have ahead of us, now that we'd gone to a peak and dropped back down? If we have to get back up again, what things do we need to work? We were looking at releasing the CRAF - do we release them, and when?

Question: But you never did release them, did you?

### **More Talk Of Reducing CAT Hours**

LtGen Kondra: No, we didn't. As a matter of fact, we called for more of them. We were looking at having the CAT go down from 2200-0600 local to four folks, plus some Requirements people...we'd have a "CAT-O," the Operations guy, a "CAT-X," the Exec, "CAT-T" for Transportation, "CAT-L" for Logistics...we were talking about taking the CAT down to those levels.

Question: But you never did that either, did you?

LtGen Kondra: No way.

### **TAC Rotation Plan**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): So TAC was going to have a 179-day unit rotation; that's what they were saying. We were still trying to figure out what we're going to do.

Question: Did they (TAC) ever do that, rotate their people out? (No) This business of rotating people was discussed periodically...but it never got done, I know that...

LtGen Kondra: Yes...and it went by the wayside.

### 12 - 15 October Entries:

#### **First Discussion of DESERT EXPRESS, Dissuasion of CINCMAC From Original Aerial Refueling En Route Idea**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Here on the 12th of October is the first discussion of DESERT EXPRESS - the daily flight from the CONUS to Riyadh, with redistribution at their end. We were originally looking at aerial refueling it en route; originally, they wanted to go from the East Coast all the way to Riyadh with a refuel; I talked the boss (General Johnson) out of it.

Question: That was his idea, at first?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...it would have been a monster.

#### **General Russ (TAC) 180-Day Rotation Plan**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): On 15 October, we were still working the idea of a rotation policy, working on DESERT EXPRESS, the DO/TR reorganization, and the Pope - Ft. Bragg ACDACG<sup>43</sup>...plus we're talking about having a MAC/DO conference. (General) Russ (the TAC Commander) is proposing a rotation similar to ours, 180 days, according to the Chairman of the JCS.

### 17 October Entries:

#### **Question of Reserve and CRAF Release Policies - DESERT EXPRESS Hub and Spoke Arrangement, Priority Levels**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): On the 17th of October, we're talking about the Reserve release policy...and the CRAF - "track requirements through the next unknown period of time; is the CRAF going to be released around the 5th (of November)?" That was a political decision..."ask them whether they'd rather be released or be on the hook."

Question: What did they say?

LtGen Kondra: They really preferred to stay, I think, activated - than to be jerked back into it again.

Question: This was still "Phase I" of the CRAF, wasn't it, that we're talking here?

LtGen Kondra: Yes. The DESERT EXPRESS hub and spoke arrangement; the "world loves it." It will have priority over all other missions.

### 22 - 23 October Entries:

43. ACDACG = Aircraft Departure/Arrival Control Group.



### **Rotation Policy**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): On 22 October, we're to have a 90 to 179-day rotation policy joint system (established) by the end of the week, but there's nothing firm on the Reserves and their 90-day policy.

### **Two Stops for DESERT EXPRESS In AOR, No Staging**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): DESERT EXPRESS is to have "two stops in country, and it may require staging in country - where? Riyadh and Jeddah?" It never happened.

Question: It went directly to Riyadh, didn't it?

LtGen Kondra: It went to Riyadh, and eventually went to Dhahran.

### **Plan For Reserves Rotation In Early November**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): On 23 October..."Reserves rotate 9-10 November from the AOR."

Question: That was the *plan*, wasn't it?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...and some of them did.

### **Integration of SAC, Commercial Flow Into Slot Times**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "Need to integrate SAC and commercials with the organic flow into slot times." This was when we first started talking about slot times (on 23 October).

Question: Yes, I noted that entry. You were able to do this, eventually, weren't you?

LtGen Kondra: Yes. We gave the notional flow out of MAC to 21 AF, and then 21 AF made the thing happen.

### **CINCMAC Desire To Use All KC-10s, SAC Reluctance to Release**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "The CINC wants to use all KC-10s." He kept pushing to get KC-10s.

Question: Do you know *why* he kept pushing this issue?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...because they were supposed to be allocated and SAC wouldn't release them - and he wanted to make the point that they were supposed to be mobility assets.

### **More CRAF Considerations - Discussion Of Use Of Three C-5s In Airbus Configurations; Use Of In FIERY VIGIL**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Also here on the 23rd..."continue to work CRAF. Friday, tell carriers requirements to keep CRAF, and we'll free them up as we can, with 24 hours' notice if we need them." We were also looking at using three C-5s in an airbus configuration - but we really didn't want to do that.

Question: You never did, did you?

LtGen Kondra: We did do it, eventually. We actually used one (C-5 in an airbus configuration) to take some Philippine volcano people out of Mactan.<sup>44</sup>

Question: In an airbus?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...where you floor load the pallets of seats. We really didn't want to do that, because it's noisy and uncomfortable...but we ended up doing it there.

Question: Is that the main reason for MAC's reluctance to use them (C-5s configured as airbuses)? Because they're so uncomfortable?

LtGen Kondra: They're noisy...and there's also the safety factor. Once you get the stairs and things put away, and you button up the plane...and then if you had an engine fire, or some other fire on board, you'd have a helluva time getting them out. We made them put ropes in place (in the Mactan airlift) and made sure the people were briefed on how they would have to slide down the ropes (in an emergency).

Question: How many people could that thing carry, if they really wanted to jam it full up?

LtGen Kondra: I think it's 300 something, if you're using the seats. If you wanted to floor load them, and not use any seats...probably a lot more.

#### 24 October Entries:

##### **Command & Control Of Flow By 322 ALD, "Leaky Water Pipe" Analogy**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "Command and control..." We said we've got to control the flow into the onload point, control the stages, and control the inputs into the offload points, and that the 322nd Airlift Division had to do it. This was where we were starting to talk about not just jamming things down into the AOR, as we started to increase the tempo. We were going to have to control the flow at the onloads into the European bases. This is where I used the analogy of the water pipe...how you overstuff it at the onload end, because there's going to be leakage en route. But the 322nd ALD is the spigot, and they control the flow into the offload bases - and you only schedule into the offload bases what they can handle.

*44. Speaking here of MAC's Operation FIERY VIGIL, the airlift of approximately 5,000 Clark AB-based American military personnel and their dependents from the Philippines following the eruption of the Mt. Pinatubo volcano there in mid-June 1991.*

Question: At this point in time - this being the 24th of October when you're discussing this - haven't you been jamming things in there all along?

LtGen Kondra: We had been. But the level of activity had gone down, so it was not a problem. I'm concerned now that if we surge again, how do we do it better than we did before? This is part of that, "if we go to war tomorrow, what did we do well in the first phase, and what didn't we?" This is the flow control portion.

Comment: I see...because that did get put into effect, later on.

LtGen Kondra: Oh, yes, it surely did.

#### **Integration of Organics, KC-10s and Commercials Into Flow - Communication Between Onload, Offload Stations - Facilities At Torrejon - Which DOD Waivers Still In Effect? - Satisfying European Requirements, CENTCOM -TRANSCOM - EUCOM Coordination**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "Integrate the organics, KC-10s, and commercials." We had to work them all together, you can't work them in isolation - an airplane is an airplane, and you've got to work them all into the flow...and we did that. "Why don't the onload and offload stations know the aircraft are coming?" We had to sort that out, to make sure they knew what was coming. "Facilities at Torrejon - are they all right?" Had we fixed those problems, (provided) feeding facilities, crew rest facilities, base support? "Waivers from DOD - what are still in effect?" Do the crews know what's in and what's out? Crew controllers don't drive crews...and we solved that problem. What I'm doing here is trying to think ahead, as we start to go back up, as to what sorts of things we needed to be looking at. How were we going to get European requirements as we started moving things out of Europe? Would we get them from CENTCOM through TRANSCOM, and how was EUCOM going to fit in? Where were those requirements going to come from, and how were we going to know what they were?

#### **Status Of ADANS, Interface With GDSS, IPS**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): What was the status of the ADANS,<sup>45</sup> and how were we going to use that to run the flow? We'd been working at trying to speed it up, and I wanted to know where we stood on it. The ADANS - GDSS - IPS interface; how did they tie together, and where did we stand on it?

Question: You're still working that one, aren't you?

**45. ADANS = Airlift Deployment and Analysis System (computerized network).**

### **Training Requirements, Use Of Simulators**

LtGen Kondra: Yes...but we made a lot of headway here. I was also looking at potential airdrop requirements (in the AOR), and training requirements. "Look at the use of simulators." We were paying for training time in the simulators, but we weren't using them.

Question: Because we didn't have enough people to do it?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...they were all out on the road.

Question: Did you get that resolved in any way?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...I think we started getting more efficient on the use of the simulators.

### **ATA and War Risk Insurance - Indemnification - Compensation For Cancelled, Shortened Commercial Missions**

Question: I noted this big "roundtable discussion" thing you had here on the 24th of October...and you had something about "Paul Hyman, ATA"?

LtGen Kondra: Yes - that's the Air Transport Association. That's a lobby group for the carriers. "War risk insurance...need to simplify the procedures;" that's been going on, the indemnification problem we talked about before, where they couldn't get insurance, etc. There were also compensation concerns for when we cancelled missions on them (the commercial carriers) because of no requirements...they feel like they ought to be paid.

Question: Did you get any of that resolved?

LtGen Kondra: That's all been worked; I don't know what the status of it is now, since I've been out of it for so long. Then there was the "low utilization" business...if it's less than 10 hours a day, they feel like they should get paid.

Question: That's been resolved?

LtGen Kondra: I don't know if it has been resolved; it's been worked. It'll be part of the CRAF contract negotiations, which were ongoing when I left Hq MAC.

### **MACR 55-8 Rules and Stage III**

Question: There's something here about "55-8 rules"?

LtGen Kondra: 55-8 rules apply to Stage III; those are the rules that govern the CRAF. There are certain things in there that don't necessarily apply to Stage I and II.

Question: Of course, Stage III is the "ultimate worst case," isn't it, when we take everything?

LtGen Kondra: Everything, right. We never got to that.

### **Future Structure of CRAF - LMI Study Deemed "Poor"**

Question: Then you've got a question, "Future structure of CRAF?"

LtGen Kondra: Right...what's it going to look like? That's an ongoing thing, too. The Logistics Management Institute (LMI) Study (on the CRAF)...came up with some recommendations, but it was a poor study, really.

### **Hughes C-141 Air Training System (ATS) "In Trouble"**

Question: You also mentioned that the Hughes ATS C-141 was "in trouble"?

LtGen Kondra: Yes..that's the C-141 Air Training System. They were running behind at the time.

Question: Did they catch up?

LtGen Kondra: I don't know where they stand right now, to be perfectly honest.

### **1 - 3 November Entries:**

#### **CINCMAC Disdain For LMI Study**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): This "CINC comments on the CRAF review by LMI..."

Question: I take it he didn't have much use for their report?

LtGen Kondra: No, he didn't like it at all.

Question: What sorts of things were they (LMI) saying in this report, do you recall...any of them?

LtGen Kondra: Oh, there were lots of little things, a very superficial study of the CRAF.

### **Control Of CRAF**

Question: OK...then you say here, "Take control of CRAF through Frankfurt, give slot times..."?

LtGen Kondra: Yes. You see, they would go through the *Flughafen*, rather than through Rhein Main, and they weren't following procedures. We needed better control, to make sure we had them covered and they were all part of the process; they couldn't work independently.

### **Chemical Gear For Commercials And Their Refusal To Fly Into AOR At Outbreak Of War, Lacking Chem Gear**

Question: And "chem gear for commercials"?

LtGen Kondra: Yes, that was an issue. They didn't have chem gear, and we didn't give it to them, initially. We said we'd have people on the ground meet them and give it to them. That became a very emotional issue...we didn't do that very well. Eventually, they were issuing their own chem gear to their people, after the war started...and we talked earlier about how they refused to go.

Question: When the war started, did the commercials continue to fly into country?

LtGen Kondra: No...they stopped on their own for a couple of days; they refused to go.

Comment: Well, you couldn't very well blame them...they weren't protected, lacking the chem gear...

LtGen Kondra: Well, we had procedures set up at the other end, but they didn't always work. For instance, our people - in some cases - didn't do very well. It took longer to get that into being than it should have. We eventually just gave them the chem gear.

#### **CENTAF Desire To Reduce Number of C-130 Squadrons - Peak Of 151 C-130s In AOR**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Here on the 2nd (of November)... "96 (C-130) aircraft being driven by the J-4 staff; CENTAF wants to take a squadron down."

Question: Why, do you know?

LtGen Kondra: He didn't think there was a requirement (for that many). We ended up with 151 in country over there.

Question: That's a lot of 130s...were they being used mainly to shuttle cargo from point to point?

LtGen Kondra: Yes, and for the movement of people.

#### **Rotation Program Plans Calling For One Year For Actives, 6-8 Months For First Reserve Units, 180 Days For ART**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "Message today on rotations - 2 November: One year, For the Reserves, six to eight months on the first units, 180 days for the ARTs. ART recalls...shouldn't release; needs SecAF approval." We were going to bring up some more of them.

Comment: Fortunately, the war ended sooner than was originally anticipated, so you didn't have to worry about that one-year limitation. (Yes)

#### **5 - 7 November Entries:**

**Move of 7th Corps, Combat Service Support, 2nd Armored Division, 1st Armored Cavalry, Plus European Brigade (Beginning of 250,000 Troop Buildup) - Delay In Moves Until Early December**

LtGen Kondra: Here's something about a "warning, tomorrow - alert, execute in two weeks, 7th Corps, plus combat service support, 2nd Armored Division (AD), 1st Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), plus a brigade out of Europe." This is the beginning of the movement of the 250,000 troops which was to be done by the 15th of January. This was when the decision was made that we would increase things. It says we'll "get the warning tomorrow, and the alert and execute within two weeks." This becomes significant, because we started ginning up the stages and doing things, figuring we were going to start on about the 15th (of November)...and it didn't happen, and didn't happen, and it didn't happen until about the 5th of December. The 7th Corps and their combat service support, the 2nd AD, the 1st ACR, plus the brigade out of Europe, the 1st Mechanized out of Ft. Riley, and the 6th MEB<sup>46</sup> out of (Camp) Lejeune (NC).

Question: So you've got both CONUS-based and Europe-based outfits involved?

**32 C-130s Added At COMALF Request - Beddown Locations**

LtGen Kondra: Yes...that we've got to work at the same time. "Additive of 32 C-130s," from (BGen) Ed Tenoso. So we've got 96 over there, and we're going to add another 32.

Question: He asked for these?

LtGen Kondra: Yes..."time to be determined...possible beddown is Thumrait. Later, I've got "24 at Thumrait, 10 at Al Ain, four at Sharjah...full WRSK kits; need to build up war reserves." That's where the 32 additional 130s were going.

Question: By this time you've taken all the C-130s out of Europe down there, haven't you? So these 32 are probably coming from the States?

LtGen Kondra: Yes. And I see here where we were also working a really significant thing, getting the *Singing Sergeants* into Hanscom (Field, MA), for an Electronics Systems Division (ESD) dining-out.

**8 - 9 November Entries:**

**Delays In US Army Moves From Europe, Lack Of Mobility Awareness, Readiness**

**46. MEB = Marine Expeditionary Brigade.**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Here on the 8th I noted, "Europe moves; Army folks who have moved - help." The point there was, I went to TRANSCOM and said, "Europe has not moved. Europe is in an entrenched mentality. They (the US Army) went over there to dig in, and they're not in a mobility mode. They weren't positioned there to go forward - they were where they were going to fight. We needed to take people who had moved out of the CONUS to the AOR - and even if they were already in the AOR - and send them to Europe, to help them get ready to move. Don't make them learn the same mistakes that these guys have already learned. And I think some of that went on, some of that happened, because I worked that with TRANSCOM, CENTCOM and FORSCOM.

Question: Do you have any estimate on how many troops were moved from Europe down to the AOR?

#### **ALCE, MHE, Foreign Carrier Support**

LtGen Kondra: I think we'll run into some numbers here (in the notes) shortly; it changed considerably. Also, I wanted the same thing done for Ft. Riley, another place where we were coming out of...we needed to send people there, too. We also needed to know what ALCE support we needed, what MHE at the on and offload points, the staging bases in the AOR...and certification of foreign carriers; were we going to be able to use foreign carriers? We were looking for every bit of lift we could find.

#### **Downloading Of Dover (DESERT MAIL to McGuire) - Overflights Of Eastern Europe**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "Download Dover" - we needed to move some things out of Dover to McGuire. That's when we started moving the mail out of Dover up here.<sup>47</sup> "Overflight of the Eastern European countries" - in other words, we ought to be able to come down out of Germany over Czechoslovakia and Rumania and Turkey...

Question: Shorten the route? (Yes) Were you able to do that?

LtGen Kondra: Yes, we did that, eventually.

#### **No Rotation Of MAC Forces**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "There is no rotation - we are in the offense mode."

Question: That's when the decision was made (9 November)?

*47. McGuire began taking over the DESERT MAIL operation on 31 Oct 90.*



LtGen Kondra: Yes...they were going to stay. Up to this point we'd been in a defensive posture, and now we're going on the offensive...there "ain't no rotation."

Question: That included the Reserve types?

LtGen Kondra: Yes. The Reserves were going to end up being extended indefinitely.

#### **Night Vision Goggles, Binoculars For C-130 Crews - Starscopes**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "NVGs for C-130s, and binoculars for airdrops for C-130s." We did that.

Question: And what's "Starscope"?

LtGen Kondra: Starscope is kind of forerunner to the NVGs, which allows you to see at low light levels...so you can increase your visibility and pick up drop zones.

#### **MHE Repair Team to Ft. Riley - Army Mobility Experience**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): On 9 November..."Kansas; Mauchline and team to (Ft) Riley to help repair MHE." This is Corky Mauchline, who was the guy who helped solve the problems at Pope and get the 82nd (ABN) and 18th (ABN) moving.

Question: So the only Army guys at the time who seemed to know how to move out quickly were the 82 and 18 ABN guys?

LtGen Kondra: Well, that's not quite fair...the Ft. Riley folks had a mobility mission. Other (Army) people had done it, too...like the 24th Mech(anized Brigade); they got out of town. But the point was that, if you'd been through this, why make a unit go through all the learning steps? Why not use people who had the experience?

#### **10-11 November Entries:**

**Pope Runway Problem, Seymour Johnson Alternate - Forbes Site Survey - Deployment of MAC Personnel To Brussels, Paris, Rome To Greet Commercial Crews**

Question: OK...10 November, "Runway at Pope...problem"?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...we were trying to do anything to get a full runway there. It's a short runway, because there's power lines off the end of it, and that limits your ACLs.<sup>48</sup>

Question: You couldn't resolve that problem?

LtGen Kondra: I wanted them to look (at using) Seymour Johnson (AFB, NC). Everything had been moved out of there, because they'd already deployed. We never did have to use Seymour Johnson, but I wanted it available in case we ran into weather problems; we're now getting into the use of alternates. Could we move  
48. ACLs = - Allowable Cabin Loads.

our operation to Seymour Johnson and use its longer runway, get bigger ACLs? That was a consideration. We also did a site survey at Forbes (KA), and we were looking at deploying people to Brussels, Paris and Rome to greet the commercial crews - we did do that, and it paid big dividends.

#### **Rejection Of Use Of Restoril**

Question: And "Use of Restoril for crews - do we want to pursue?"

LtGen Kondra: We didn't...we never ended up using Restoril.

#### **COMALF Tasked To Get AOR Airfields Day-Night Operational**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): On the 11th of November, "COMALF needs to do following: get Thumrait day-night operational." In addition, King Faisal was only day operational, too. King Khalid Military was only day VFR - we needed to fix the VASI there. The same things needed to be done at King Fahd and at Al Ain, so we could go in there at night. At al Al Minhad we needed a taxi plan...and so on and on.

### **END OF THIRD SESSION**

#### **SESSION 4 - ENTRIES OF 14 NOVEMBER 1990 - 15 JANUARY 1991<sup>49</sup>**

##### **14 November Entries:**

##### **Evergreen Airways Certification**

Question: OK, here on the 14th of November you noted, "Evergreen certification probably refused by Moore and Morales."?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...that had to do with them being permitted to carry passengers on their 747. There are certain requirements for passenger certification in the CRAF, and that's all a result of the Arrow (Airlines) crash up at Gander.<sup>50</sup> You have to have been operating for so long a period...I don't remember what the exact terms are.

Question: Was Evergreen in fact later certified?

LtGen Kondra: Eventually, yes, but not right away.

Question: Were they used in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM?

<sup>49</sup>The recording of this session took place on 8 Jan 92.

<sup>50</sup>Referring here to the 12 Dec 85 incident when a MAC-chartered Arrow Airlines DC-8 crashed shortly after takeoff from Gander Airport, Newfoundland; all 256 aboard (248 soldiers from the 101st ABN, plus eight crewmembers) perished in the accident.

LtGen Kondra: Yes. They were used for cargo carrying right from the beginning, but they only had one passenger airplane, and it took awhile to get that certified.

### **VOLANT BANNER - SILVER Support Demands**

Question: Then there's the entry, "Data on VOLANT BANNER/SILVER growth over the last few years; try to show how the tail has grown"?

LtGen Kondra: Right. The issue there was that, here in October and November (1990) we were running 140-150 VOLANT BANNER and SILVER missions. Those were still going on, even though we were involved in DESERT SHIELD. And it just takes an inordinate amount of airlift...just like this trip that's going on now, to Australia.<sup>51</sup> There's a tremendous amount of lift required for all of it to happen. The idea was for us to take a look and see, was it more trips? Or has the entourage, and the things that go, has that grown?

Question: Were you able to determine anything?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...and it appears that there were more trips, but that the (size of the) entourage had stayed pretty much the same. So the "tail" had not really grown.

Question: So they weren't sending more Secret Service personnel, or more comm gear, or limousines?

LtGen Kondra: No, all of that seemed to remain fairly steady.

Question: What about the idea of having all VOLANT BANNER/SILVER stuff strictly operated by the 89th (Airlift Wing)?

LtGen Kondra: They don't have the airplanes, the C-5s, the C-141s...

Question: But if they had a few dedicated, assigned to them? Couldn't they do that?

LtGen Kondra: You start doing that - dedicating airplanes to little pockets - and all you do is fractionalize the ability to use things as a whole. That's why we have a single manager for airlift, so that we don't do that sort of thing. We don't have each little "node" controlling its own stuff.

### **15-23 November Entries:**

#### **Increases in C-130s Assigned, Beddown Sites in AOR - Use of Al Kharj Airfield**

LtGen Kondra: Here on the 15th (of November), there's a note about "Thumrait getting 16..." I was talking about increasing the number of C-130s in the theater.

<sup>51</sup>. At the time of this interview, President Bush was on the last leg of a 2-week, 26,000 mile trip that took him and his entourage to Australia, Singapore, Korea, and Japan.

Thumrait would get 16, Al Ain would get eight, all "H" models, "Al Kharj might get eight, going to 16." That's 32 additional, over what we already had over there, plus we're talking about 16 more.

Question: I believe you said earlier that you ended up with something like 150 C-130s in country, didn't you?

LtGen Kondra: 151, at the peak. At this point in time (15 November), I think we had 96 over there, and we're going with another 32, with a possibility of 16 more after Christmas and New Years.

Question: A lot of airplanes. (Yes) Were these (C-130s) actives, Reserves, or both?

LtGen Kondra: Both. "Eight C-130 H's into Al Kharj, from Dyess." We didn't have a clearance for Al Kharj, to move stuff in there. We had to move ammunition forward from Thumrait (Oman) up to Al Kharj to get it closer to the front.<sup>52</sup>

Question: Did all of these C-130 moves into the AOR close on time, basically?

LtGen Kondra: Yes.

#### **Search For Additional Offload Bases**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Then I'm talking about Dhahran and King Fahd; King Fahd had the potential for big offloads, with its three wide-bodied pits - which could handle three C-5s or five C-141s. Now we're talking about coming up with additional offload bases.

#### **Attempts to Integrate GDSS, ADANS Computer Networks - Outstanding ADANS Support By Oak Ridge Personnel**

Question: On 23 November...I had a question about your entry, "Will we need classified GDSS when the ADANS is operational?" Did you?

LtGen Kondra: That had to do with our work to bring the ADANS on board. We actually had two (computer-communications) systems, and the CINC didn't want us to have two - he wanted them to be integrated. And there's a whole bunch of problems associated with that, because they're written in different languages. I don't know where that stands today - I know it didn't happen during the war.

Comment: Yes...because there's a complicated passage which follows about "requirements cells, MLS..."

LtGen Kondra: Well, the "MLS" is the Multi-Level Security. Let's see..."GDSS operational 24 November at the wings, 21 AF is training ALCE locations, have more

<sup>52.</sup> *Al Kharj (also known as Asad Military City) is located just southeast of Riyadh in central Saudi Arabia.*

capability, security concerns... going to have them at Forbes (AAF, KA), at Volk Field (WI), Cherry Point (MCAS, NC). ADANS doing unclassified channel work for 21 AF"...and they (21 AF) were using it to do notional flows. Oak Ridge (Laboratory, TN) did the development for the ADANS. The Oak Ridge folks were super. They sent a group of civilians to Scott, and they worked around the clock getting the ADANS up to speed. They literally took a program that was scheduled to be introduced two years down the road and brought it up in two months. That took an awful lot of effort on the part of the programmers....they really put in some long, long hours. And these were management types; they weren't getting paid by the hour.

Question: Are you talking about program (software) changes, or hardware?

LtGen Kondra: Writing the program, making the whole thing work.

Question: A "yeoman effort," eh?

LtGen Kondra: Oh, yeah...as a matter of fact, after the war, I went down to Oak Ridge and presented them with a special plaque from MAC, to express our appreciation. We wanted to make special recognition of these folks.

#### 29 - 30 November Entries:

##### **Foreign CRAF Carrier Listing, Approval for Their Utilization, Involvement**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Let's see, on the 29th..."Foreign CRAF carriers...Air France, Lufthansa, Condor, Martin, KLM, British Air..."

Question: "All to be approved by 10 December"?

LtGen Kondra: Yes, they were supposed to be approved by then, so they could participate.

Question: Did they get approved?

LtGen Kondra: Martin did...I think they may all have been approved at one time, but Martin was the only one that really got involved; they did some work for us.

Question: Where are they from?

LtGen Kondra: They're out of Holland.

Question: Were they hauling mostly cargo, or were they passenger carriers?

LtGen Kondra: To be certified, they had to carry passengers.

Question: That brings up the question I'd jotted down here - "How heavily involved were the foreign CRAF?"

LtGen Kondra: They were not heavily involved. We got into a dialogue with the carriers so that later on, when we really got into this...you see, we hadn't really started the (movement of) the 250,000 (additional troops) yet; we're about a week away from that.

### **Search For All Available Airlift - Delay In Start-Up Of Troop Moves Causing "Compression"**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): But we were looking for everything we could get, because we know it's gonna happen. Originally the announcement was made somewhere around the 5th of November, if my memory is right, that said we were going to move them around the 15th?<sup>53</sup> Well, here it is the 29th, and we still haven't started. We really started around the 5th of December - but the end date of 15 January was still the same, so we were being compressed. Every day that we didn't do something, we in effect lost - I think we figured out - somewhere around 140 C-141 equivalent flights that we didn't launch and were going to have to make up someplace along the way.

### **Doubt That Similar Airlift Operation Will Ever Recur**

Comment: Did a helluva job, considering the compression that you got, moving that many people in that short a period of time.

LtGen Kondra: Oh, I think so.

Question: I wonder if it could be done again?

LtGen Kondra: Well, I've made that comment before...I don't think it'll ever be done again.<sup>54</sup>

### **Airflow Into Dhahran, MHE, MOG Considerations - Tankering of Fuel**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Here's where we're starting to talk about Dhahran's MHE problems, and that the "MOG there is 40 versus 60, limited by fuel." Originally, we were planning on putting 60 aircraft a day through Dhahran; they're talking about it being 40 here, but we did get up to 60.

Question: Did they have to tanker fuel in there? You were saying that you were limited by fuel considerations.

LtGen Kondra: Well, we tankered fuel in every place we went.

### **Airevac Capability Determination**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): We're also talking here about finding out about our airevac capabilities here. We were looking at 2,600 - 3,000 per day, and we needed to start thinking about calling up airevac assets.

53. LtGen Kondra's memory was correct; see 5-7 Nov 91 entry, p. 56.

54. See also comments on p. 147.

Question: That's 2,600 to 3,000 patients a day?

LtGen Kondra: Yes. "Thirty stanchions on a 141..." I'd been asking the question, "How many do we have on every 141? What do we have available?" And, supposedly, it was 30.

Question: Thirty patients on any 141?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...without having to configure the whole thing.

### **European DESERT EXPRESS Mission, Reluctance (by General Kondra) to Initiate Eventually Overcome**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Here on the 30th we're talking about doing a European DESERT EXPRESS, just like we were doing out of Charleston. I kept fighting that, because we had missions going down there every day, and I couldn't figure out why we needed a European DESERT EXPRESS. We eventually ended up having to do that, though.

### **The BLU 82 Bomb**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Talking here about the "BLU 82."

Question: What's that?

LtGen Kondra: It was a 5,000 pound bomb, dropped out of the back of a C-130.

Question: A 5,000 pound bomb, out of a 130? (Yes) This was a plan, to do so?

LtGen Kondra: Yes, and we did it.

Question: Oh...was this that air-burst thing, where gasoline vapor is dispersed in the air, then ignited? (Yes) And it does some terrible things to people down below, with its extremely high down-pressures? (Yes) Did they actually use this over the Iraqis?

LtGen Kondra: Yes. As a matter of fact, they dropped leaflets first to warn them, "Give up now." Then they dropped more leaflets and said, "You think this is bad? Wait until the next one comes along."

Question: A 5,000 pounder...how big an area does this cover?

LtGen Kondra: They used it in Vietnam to clear helicopter landing zones.

Question: With a *whoosh*, in a large circle, eh?

LtGen Kondra: Yes. It'll give anyone beneath it a severe headache, that's for sure.

### **Westover AFB Protesters**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): This is of interest...on the 30th of November, I'm talking about the 600 people protesting at the gates of Westover. They threatened to block

the entrance for awhile, but there was no impact. They had 85 state troopers there to help handle the crowds, and some of the locals helped outside, too.

Question: We didn't see a great deal of this sort of thing though, did we, around the country?

LtGen Kondra: No, we didn't. As a matter of fact, this (Westover) was about the only place we had any of it. The "republic of Amherst," Amherst University, or College, whatever it is. It's amazing, you know? That was some of the best volunteerism we had in the country, there at Westover, and yet we still had a faction there that was trying to rabble-rouse. It was interesting.

## 2 - 7 December Entries:

### **European Express, Rhein Main Vs. Ramstein**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "European Express..." we're still talking about it here on the 2nd of December, Rhein Main vs. Ramstein...

Question: Where did it eventually originate from?

LtGen Kondra: Rhein Main, eventually.

### **20 KC-10s From SAC**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): On the 7th of December, here, we finally got 20 KC-10s from SAC

Question: Was that the first increment?

LtGen Kondra: That was all we got, 20.

### **Bob Hope Tour**

Question: You mention the Bob Hope tour there (on the 7th), and you said something about "need to bunk Altus crew," and "A/S tasking?"

LtGen Kondra: "Air Staff tasking." It needed to be tasked from the Air Staff level.

Question: That went pretty smoothly, didn't it?

LtGen Kondra: Yes, we did it, and he went over, did his thing.

### **Bob Hardy (KMOX), Congressman McCurdy Visits to AOR**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): We had Bob Hardy from (radio station) KMOX (St. Louis) go over, and (LtCol) Doug Cole met him at Dhahran, took care of him.<sup>55</sup> Congressman McCurdy from Oklahoma was going to travel as an MMO...<sup>56</sup>

55. LtCol Cole was the ALCE Commander at Dhahran.

56. MMO = MAC Mission Observer.



Question: With Hope?

LtGen Kondra: No, separately. McCurdy went on a C-5, and traveled as an Army captain. He was flying on his two weeks' active duty stint, and he "didn't want to be treated as a Congressman," he said, but rather as an Army captain. But he did fly upstairs (in the C-5 cockpit), after the first crew was briefed that he was on board. Then, when the crew changed, he stayed with the airplane...and when he went to go upstairs again at first they weren't going to let him up. Then, after takeoff, he asked something about getting a lunch, and one of the crewmembers said they were sorry, they didn't have a lunch for him, because "some (*deleted*) Congressman was supposed to be come and the only lunch they had was his, but he never showed up." (*laughter*)

Comment: Oh, that's funny!

LtGen Kondra: (*agreeing*) So he introduced himself.

Comment: To the great embarrassment of the crewmember, no doubt!

LtGen Kondra: Yeah, I suppose.

#### 9 - 10 December Entries:

##### **Joint Transportation Board Talks Re Dover Gridlock**

Question: On the 9th of December you've got the comment, "JTB discussion, Marines"?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...that's the Joint Transportation Board. This was about Dover, which was approaching gridlock. So much stuff was coming in there we couldn't handle it all, and we said, "You've got to do something. We've got to get some discipline in the system; there's just too much stuff coming in that shouldn't be going (to the AOR) by air."

##### **Sea Express For Army - FORSCOM's 60-Day Requirement Not Realistic**

LtGen Kondra (*continuing*): "Sea express for the Army..." - I'm talking about 2,700 to 4,000 containers there. The FORSCOM requirements were not realistic. The issue was, "what do we need 60 days' worth of stuff in country for, even by ship, if you've got a 30-day pipeline?" What do you need 60 days' worth for? But yet, that's what we were building to, a 60-day requirement.

Question: By air?

LtGen Kondra: By air and sealift. The FSS<sup>57</sup> was available to do the second lift.

57. FSS = Fast Surface Ship.

**General Kondra Briefs JTB On Options - CENTCOM "Swat Team" Visits Ports - Imposition of Daily Quotas on Service Branches - First "Real" Activation of JTB**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): We actually went to Washington and convened the JTB, which is made up of all the services, and I briefed them on what the options were. The bottom line of that whole thing was that CENTCOM had to put together what we called a "swat team" to go into the ports and identify the stuff that didn't need to go by air - and throw it out of the port, make it go by sea.

Question: Did they do this?

LtGen Kondra: Yes, this happened.

Question: At Dover?

LtGen Kondra: Yes, at Dover. And we also made them go to Mechanicsburg (PA), where it was coming out of the DLA,<sup>58</sup> to shut it off there. We also gave each of the services a quota of how much stuff each day they could bring into the ports. Anything over that was to be automatically kicked out and shipped by sea. That's what I wanted, but we never did quite get to that. But we had to get some discipline in the system. The was the first time that the JTB had ever been called up, in reality. It had been done for exercises, but never for an actual conflict before.

**CINCCENT Decision, All Mail To Go By Air**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Here on the 10th of December...we had originally talked about some of the mail going by ship...but here the decision was made by CINCCENT that all mail would go by air. Mail became a very high priority.

**Army, Air Force Air Shipment Validation Disparities**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Oh, and here we're talking about the "swat team" again; on the 10th they were at Dover and Tinker, with an O-6 in place to handle things. The Army had their own validation process...that if something came in at less than 10,000 pounds, they validated it for shipment by air. They cut that down to 5,000. The Air Force (validated for air shipment) if it was something less than 250 pounds; anything less than 250 was validated by air.

Question: A rather large disparity, eh?

LtGen Kondra: A big disparity.

Question: Did you get that ironed out, finally? I mean, in some future move, can you expect the same kind of problem to crop up again?

LtGen Kondra: Probably, sure. I think it will.

<sup>58</sup>. DLA = Defense Logistics Agency.

Comment: Another argument for a unified service.

### **Army Reluctance to Use King Fahd Airport - "Airlift 101" Course For Army**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Also on 10 December..."King Fahd Airport, joint movement control directed to go Dhahran, ARCENT can't do, no download..." They (the Army) didn't want to use King Fahd; they wanted to go into Dhahran.

Question: Did they give a reason?

LtGen Kondra: The reason was...because of the port near Dhahran, they wanted to bring all their troops in there to marry up with the stuff coming into there. It's a classic case. It's "Airlift 101" for us, but it's a PhD for the Army. Go back to the slot times we talked about earlier. If you put 60 a day into Dhahran, and 40 a day into Riyadh, or whatever the number might be, and so many into Jubail, and so many into King Khalid, etc. That allows you, in the aggregate, to handle "X-number" of missions a day *into country*. And that's what we needed to do to get everything there, OK? Remember I talked about our needing to get other fields besides Dhahran and Riyadh? Well, we got them. We got Fahd, we got Jubail, King Khalid. But the Army, here on the 10th of December, is validating 75 percent of all their cargo to go to *Dhahran*. Well, if we've already scheduled 60 missions a day in there...you can schedule 75 percent of your missions to go to Dhahran, but when you can only take 60 a day, there's only one thing that can happen - it has to be stretched out over a longer period of time. So we kept trying to say (to the Army), "You *must* go to Fahd. You've got to set up offload capability at Fahd and drive overland to get to Dhahran."

Question: How many miles were you talking about?

LtGen Kondra: It's not that far.

Question: And they resisted this?

LtGen Kondra: They resisted and resisted it.

Question: Did they get their way, or what?

LtGen Kondra: No, we finally convinced them...otherwise we couldn't have gotten everything there. But that's "Airlift 101." And as I said, for some members of the Army that's equivalent to a PhD in airlift.

### **11 - 13 December Entries:**

#### **Call From 7th AF Commander Re "Backlog Of Seoul Mail" in Alaska**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): On the 11th of December, the Commander of 7th Air Force in Korea called me. He was concerned that the "wife's club has heard that

there's a backlog of mail in Alaska." His mail. This has come to him through the wife's club. FedEx<sup>59</sup> was the carrier. It was cleared out on Sunday, two 747s, inbound to Seoul. They had already arrived, and the majority of the mail was for Manila, not for Korea; there were only two pallets for Seoul, 15 for Manila.

Question: How did the wife's club get in on this?

LtGen Kondra: Beats the hell out of me; I have no idea. But that was a flap...it's getting close to Christmastime now, see? And the rumor was there was all this Seoul-bound mail sitting in Alaska.

#### **Attempts to Get King Fahd Airport Operational**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "King Fahd...get up to speed.." The airport there still isn't up to speed. We've been trying now for a couple of weeks to get a VASI and some radar in there, and a nondirectional beacon so the civilians can get in there. This is on the 11th, and the NDB is supposed to be flight checked on the 13th, and the surveillance radar was to be flight checked on the 18th of December.

Question: Were you talking about opening Fahd up for night operations?

LtGen Kondra: Yes.

#### **JTB Message Re Services Quota - Requirements Allocations for CENTCOM Mail, Plus Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, DLA (Total of 1250 Tons Daily)**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Here's the allocation message I talked about, that was going out to the services to tell them what they could do. "CENTCOM allocation is: mail, 300 tons a day, Europe gets 150 tons a day, the Army will get 425 tons a day, the Navy 105, the Air Force 190, the Marines 40, and the DLA, 40." A total of 1250 tons a day was allocated to be moved.

Question: This is not just out of Dover, though, or Charleston?

LtGen Kondra: That's everything. Those were the requirements, and that's how we allocated the capability to them. The mail was coming out of Tinker and McGuire - 150 tons a day into Europe. The rest of it was coming out of the U.S., predominately.

#### **Return of Pallet Assets**

Question: There on the 13th you made a reference to "returning pallet assets"?

LtGen Kondra: That was a continuous problem.

Question: Did it ever become a critical one?

59. FedEx - = Federal Express.

LtGen Kondra: It never became critical. We had to go to some manufacturers and get new ones made. We never ran out of pallets. We threatened, a few times, to go back to the procedure we used in Vietnam that I remembered: that if you took an airplane with nine pallets on it in (to an airfield), you didn't leave until you had nine pallets with their straps and chains, out. We never did do that, but we were getting to that point where we thought we might have to.

### **Policy On Air Medals**

Question: There's also a comment on the 13th, "15 C-130 missions equals a medal." Presumably the Air Medal?

LtGen Kondra: Yes. There was a lot of discussion about the policy on medals. This is a little early...

Question: Yes, well, I jotted down the question, "Did MAC follow SAC or TAC's lead on this one?" Or were those 15 missions MAC's criteria?

LtGen Kondra: No. Eventually it was laid out by CENTAF, so that everybody was the same.<sup>60</sup>

### **14 - 16 December Entries:**

**Landline for King Fahd - Responsible Parties for King Fahd Certification - Reasons for Airfield Certification Delays Unknown**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Here on the 14th, King Fahd's approach radar is "still being checked. The land line is due in by the 17th." The reason we had to have a land line was because you couldn't land in there with the commercials until you could hand off from Riyadh to King Fahd...we needed to do that.

Question: Who was doing this airfield surveying? Was this the FAA guys?

LtGen Kondra: Some of ours, and the FAA. I think our own people were probably doing the flight checking.

Question: Why does it take so long to get an airfield VASI set up, or a beacon, or whatever?

LtGen Kondra: I don't know what was causing that. We were working this almost every day, and it seemed to take forever.

Comment: Gee, you'd think to put a beacon up all you'd have to do is stick it somewhere, plug it in, and turn it on.

*60. According to Capt. J. Simmons of the 39th TAS, Pope AFB, "20 points were required to earn the Air Medal. Noncombat missions (shuttles) with the same mission number counted for one point each, while combat missions counted for two points." Per telecon with Capt Simmons 13 Jan 92.*

LtGen Kondra: You'd think so, but there's more to it than that...you've got to flight-check it, and other things.

### **The "Nameless Major" Refusal to Fly Incident**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): On 15 December, we had a Major - who shall remain nameless - whose pubs (publications) ran out of date on the 13th of December, as did everybody's, because DMA sent them over by mail. Well, we were hauling the mail. They got over there and got stuck in a warehouse someplace, didn't get distributed. I'd gone to work early that Saturday morning and I got a call saying that there was a Reserve crew at Rhein Main that would not fly down range because the pubs were out of date. And, because this Major's real job was that of an airline pilot, if he committed a violation he'd lose his airline license.

Question: By flying in with incorrect pubs?

LtGen Kondra: Yes. So I called him up, got him on the phone there at Rhein Main. I said, "I've heard one side of the story, let me hear yours." And he said, "My pubs are out of date, and I'm not going to fly." I said, "There's going to be 107 missions that are going to go down range today, and I'll bet you every one of those crews finds their way to Saudi Arabia and back. We're trying to get the updated pubs," I said, "but there's not going to be any major changes."

Question: That's what I was going to ask. What sorts of things was he worried about being changed?

LtGen Kondra: He was going to make the point. His quote was, "Are you ordering me to go fly?" I said, "Nope, I'm not ordering you to do anything." His next comment was, "I'm going to write an operational hazard report on you for making us go fly without the right pubs." I said, "Be my guest. But in the meantime, check out of the hotel at Rhein Main and get your ass home. I don't have room for you to take up good bed space if you're not going to be productive."

Comment: Not only that, he was being a 'guardhouse lawyer' over there, no doubt.

LtGen Kondra: Maybe he was. So we sent him home...and that went around like wildfire.

Comment: I'll bet. Did you hear about it later?

LtGen Kondra: I heard different versions of it later on, as I traveled over Christmastime over there - the "different reasons" why I sent him home.

Question: He was the only one you had to discipline like this?

LtGen Kondra: He's the only one I ever sent home.

Question: Did you hear of any other 'refusals to fly' cases?

LtGen Kondra: I heard of one, since I got here (in July 1991), that a deadheading crew had called up and were "declaring crew rest in the interests of flying safety." (LtCol) Ralph Hooker happened to be working the desk, and I was told he got on the phone and told that crew to get their butts on the airplane...they weren't even crewmembers, they were *passengers*....and he told them to "Get movin', fellows."

Question: This was during the war?

LtGen Kondra: Yes. And I concurred with him (Hooker).

### **German Holidays Interfere With Flow**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Here was an interesting thing, on the 16th of December, where we're talking about moving people out of Europe down to the AOR...that there'd be three German holidays, on Christmas Eve, Christmas Day, and New Year's Day...and 'ain't nothing going to move,' because they don't have drivers, buses, etc. to move the troops, etc. We could not afford to 'stand down' for three or four days, and they needed to do something to get drivers. If they had to, they needed to get American drivers to drive German buses. I didn't care what they did, if they moved the people. Things could not come to a stop.

Question: Was that resolved? Did they use Americans to drive the buses?

LtGen Kondra: I think they got Germans to do it, finally.

### **18 - 20 December Entries:**

#### **King Fahd Radar, Landline Checked Out**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "18 December - King Fahd, surveillance radar, ops OK; landline due today." It had been promised on the 17th, and we were finally getting it done.

#### **Continental Airlines Flight Into Rhein Main - Northwest Refusal of Mission**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Let's see...on the 20th of December...

Question: Yes, I've got a good one there: "Problem with Continental Airlines flight from Stuttgart"?

LtGen Kondra: Yes. A Continental Airlines flight landed at Rhein Main after a flight from Stuttgart with insufficient fuel. They tried to refuel at the *Flughafen*, but they couldn't do so due to back bills which hadn't been paid. They came over to the Rhein Main side and departed 20.2 versus 18.2 (hours). This business about their bill not being paid was supposedly because the MAC/AC (Comptroller) had not paid the bills that had come in.

Question: So it was MAC's fault?

LtGen Kondra: Well, that's what the allegation was - and it may very well have been.

Question: You also have something there about "Northwest refuses mission based on 10-hour crew duty day"?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...they weren't getting their utilization per day. We were having some problems with Northwest, but I don't exactly recall that particular mission.

Comment: This is why it's so difficult to piece things together at this late date.

### **C-141 Incident At Torrejon - Comment On Remarkable Safety Record**

LtGen Kondra: Yes. Here's something about a crew, landing at Torrejon, where they scraped a wingtip during a circling approach...

Question: "Circled a little low," eh? A 141?

LtGen Kondra: Yeah...they caught a wing. I saw it at Christmas. They dinged it pretty good.

Question: Scared them a little, I suppose?

LtGen Kondra: If I remember right, I'm not sure they even knew that they'd done it. But it ground off the end of the wing pretty good.

Comment: We were so fortunate, with all of these missions that flew, and all the weather, and all the tired crews, everything like that...that nothing crumped.

LtGen Kondra: Yes, we sure were.

### **21 December Entries:**

#### **In-Commission Rate Figures, C-5s, C-141s - "Belly Button" Needed For ADANS**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "21 December...C-5s 92 percent reliable, C-141s 94 percent." That's the in-commission ones. Pretty damned good.

Comment/Question: That's amazing, indeed. You've got something else there on the 21st, something about needing "a functional manager for the ADANS systems, a 'belly button'?"

LtGen Kondra: Yes, a 'belly button,' somebody who's responsible. Current Ops became the 'belly button.'

### **Airevac Requirements Forwarded**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "Airevac requirements...assets forwarded to Rhein Main, Torrejon." In other words, we're getting the stanchions, oxygen, masks, litters, all that stuff. And we're trying to figure out what we'd need at Dhahran.



**General Kondra's Christmas Trip: Talks With Army Officials in Nuremburg - Question Regarding Need For Continued Air Refueling Into AOR - Bringing Crews Home to "Build Time" - Threat Of Madrid Center Slowdown**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Then there are some notes from my trip over Christmas. I went to Nuremburg, where I note here their "positive attitudes," and talked to the people down there...

Question: About what?

LtGen Kondra: About how they got their loads, how they did things...just to show the flag...customer relations. Oh...this is at Torrejon. I'm there, and asking this question, "Why are we still air refueling into the AOR?" Torrejon was telling me that we're still doing that, and I'm asking the question "Why?" The answer I got was that they (21 AF) "wanted to keep the system lubricated." Well, that caused an awful lot of problems. They had them on a 12-hour, one day cycle where they were told to be ready for alert, versus six hours...plus a three-day sit down to build time. That was too long...why sit people down there for three days? I thought we ought to be sending them home and let them build time there, not out in the system. In other words, they were reaching their 150 hours in 30 days, or their 330 in 90 days...and because you were running out of time you had to sit them down to drop time off. It didn't make sense to me to have people sitting down out in the system. We had airplanes coming back every day...why not send them home and let them stay there, building time?

Question: Did you get this point across (to 21 AF)?

LtGen Kondra: I think we finally got some of that squared away.

*(continuing)* "The Madrid center slowdown..." There was a possibility that the Madrid (ATC) center was going to do a slowdown because they were going to be moving into a new facility. But that was worked out, and (the slowdown) didn't happen.

**24 - 25 December Entries:**

**Zaragoza Stopover: Inbound Flow Control, Lack of GDSS**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): On the 24th of December I was at Zaragoza (Spain), where, according to the people there, the inbound flow was not being controlled by 21 AF...and that they were being inundated with airplanes. We needed a better job of flow control into Zaragoza. Also, they didn't have a GDSS terminal, and "when were they going to get one?" These are questions that I'm writing down for myself.

### **Extending Stage Manager Assignments - Rumor About Crews Arriving Europe Without Enough Hours to Go Down Range**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "Stage managers need to be 45 days versus 30 days," because it takes too long to train them...and then (after training), you only get them productive for a short period before sending them home. I felt we ought to be leaving them there for 45 days, not 30 days...I mean, if we had people in the desert "forever," why couldn't we keep the managers there for 45 days TDY? As for this "crews arriving without enough hours to go down range," the allegation was that some units were playing a game, sending out crews with a high-time person on board so that the crew would get to Europe and not have enough time left to go down range...and the only thing they could do was come back westbound (to the CONUS).

Question: Did you ever determine if any of these allegations were true?

LtGen Kondra: I couldn't really prove it anywhere.

Question: Some people trying to "game" it a little, eh?

LtGen Kondra: Well, that was the allegation.

### **Divert Procedures, Definition, Control Over**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "Divert procedures, routes, spaces...how are they defined, how do we control them from the 322nd?" This is where we're starting to think about going to war, and if have problems in country (Saudi Arabia), what kind of procedures have we set up so that, if a field comes under attack, where does that (incoming) airplane go? All that had been worked and was in the Information To Crews folders that they were getting...but evidently it wasn't as clear as it needed to be. So we worked that issue and got some of that stuff clarified.

### **Continuing Questions About Airevac Capabilities, Lack of Airlifter Search And Rescue Plans**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "Airevac capability...what is the final concept, status of the assets?" This is a question I made to myself to ask when I got back. Did we have the assets? Have they been prepositioned? Is everybody comfortable with the concept of operations? Do we know how we're going to get them (the casualties) out of country, through Europe, to the East Coast, and distributed from the East Coast to the different bases? Search and Rescue (SAR) plans...do we have a SAR plan for the airlift guys? Probably not...I doubt if there was one. We had one for the

fighter guys going into Iraq, but our people didn't know, if they went down someplace, how they would contact Rescue, what procedures they'd use.

#### **Visit to Rhein Main, Nuremburg**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): OK, on the evening of the 24th I got to Rhein Main...Christmas Eve. The next day I went down to Nuremburg with General Hobson, where I met with BGen John Heldstab and Col McGuire, Army folks. They took me through their facilities, showed me how their loads and units were being identified - and they really had a pretty good system, and I felt very comfortable with it. They showed me how they notified the units, tracked them, how their loads were going to go out, when, and where to. They had it all the way down to managing the buses that picked up the troops...including radio controlled buses, in case they got into fog problems or other things.

Question: What division or segment of the Army was this you're talking about here in Nuremburg?

LtGen Kondra: This was an Army Movement Control Center...it was moving whatever came out of Europe.

Question: You'd mentioned earlier that you didn't think the Army guys in Europe were really ready to pack up and fly down to the desert, because they'd been sent over there to fight a war in place.<sup>61</sup>

LtGen Kondra: Yes...my concern was whether they'd be ready to move and had been through the mobility exercises to be able to do that. They ended up with a pretty good system, though.

Question: So these folks (in Nuremburg) eased your mind a little bit?

LtGen Kondra: Yes, they did.

#### **Navy C-9 Allocations, Use Of**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Let's see..."Navy C-9s." We got, as I recall, nine of them, and we decided to use them in EUCOM to haul passengers around in Europe.

Question: Oh, not for aeromed evacuations, necessarily?

LtGen Kondra: No, just for hauling passengers; as I said, we were scraping around for everything. Six of them were for common users, three of them for (*garbled*)...just in Europe, because of the short legs they have. They wound up being operated out of Sigonella.

61. See p. 57.

## 27 December Entries:

### **Use Of The Trump Shuttle**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Team travel...here's an interesting entry..."Use the Trump Shuttle, instead of C-22s and C-43s."

Question: The Trump Shuttle here in the CONUS, you're talking about?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...and what we eventually ended up doing, because we were having to shuttle the crews from the East Coast to the West Coast, was contract for the Trump Shuttle to do that.

Comment: Yes...I had that covered in the last (21 AF) history, quite extensively.<sup>62</sup> Worked pretty well, didn't it?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...it worked very well, and the crews loved it, and really thought that we'd done something special for them. The CINC thought that I was going to go jail, but...(laughter)

Question: Oh, were you the one who arranged for this?

LtGen Kondra: Well, I really didn't...actually, Dave Morely did.

Question: Dave Morley?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...Col Dave Morely; he was my TR man. His folks were the ones who came up with the idea of using the Trump Shuttle.

Question: I never did find out what that contract was worth...do you have any idea?

LtGen Kondra: I heard once, but I don't remember. No more than what you'd be spending otherwise. It was a helluva lot better than using 141s, which we could use for something else. It was just part of the price of doing business...and as I said, the crews loved it.

### **\$36 Million Provided By Japan**

Question: There's also the entry, "\$36 million from Japan to buy new assets"?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...that was used to buy new pallets and nets.

Question: That's a lot of pallets and nets! You did, in fact, use the money for that purpose?

LtGen Kondra: Yes.

### **Airdrop Considerations Cease**

62. See 21 AF history, CY1990, pp. 67-69. The Trump Shuttle ferried MAC aircrews daily, originating at LaGuardia Airport (NY), and flying to Dover-Charleston-Norton-Travis-McChord-Kelly-Dover and back to LaGuardia for an airplane change before repeating the cycle.

LtGen Kondra (continuing): And, finally, we got the word this date (the 27th of December) not to worry anymore about airdrop. We'd been working that issue...what we would have to do if we were going to be called upon to airdrop the 82nd (ABN).

Question: Behind the lines, for example?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...but they decided not to do it.

Comment: Thank goodness.

### **Army Posturing for D-Day - Need For More C-130s**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Let's see..."D-Day, Army posturing, hundreds of sorties to meet, need 32 more C-130s..."

Question: Over the 150 already there?

LtGen Kondra: There's not 150 there yet...but they're needing 32 more.

### **Use of Strategic Aircraft For Intratheater Shuttles - "Jackpot" C-141s**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "Use strat C-141s and C-5s, eight aircraft." They were talking about putting them in theater and using them for intratheater shuttles.

Question: Did that ever happen?

LtGen Kondra: We did use some 141s, yes.

Question: You also had something there about "C-141 Jackpot modifications"?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...I needed to know how many there were, and where they were, in the event we needed them.

Question: What's a "Jackpot"?

LtGen Kondra: Jackpot is a communications package that goes along with the SATCOM and other communications systems. It takes a special hatch and some special equipment to go on a 141.

### **Bob Hope Returns to Andrews 28 December**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Let's see, on the 27th..."Bob Hope due at Andrews at 0100Z on the 28th.." This is when he came back.

Comment: I noted in the (21 AF) history something interesting about him...that he was actually entertaining some of the *grandchildren* of troops he entertained during World War II. Think about that...that man's been around a long time, doing his thing.

### **Full Utilization Of C-5 Seats Desired**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Yes. "C-5 seats out of Europe." The issue there was that we needed to make sure all 75 seats on the C-5s were used; we couldn't afford to have those things flying empty.

Question: You mean into country?

LtGen Kondra: Yes, that's right. The problem there was...the Army has it in their mind that they will move *units*. Their equipment downstairs, and their people upstairs (in C-5s)...and if they only had 20 people to go with that, that's all they would move. Our view was, you've got this pool of people and there are X-number of people who are going to go to Saudi Arabia...now, dammit, you've got to use every seat that you can, because otherwise you're wasting assets. Again, that's "Airlift 101," but a PhD for the Army to understand.

Comment: I recall your mentioning this issue when you gave your "First 100 Days" briefing here at 21 AF, back on 4 December 1990.<sup>63</sup>

LtGen Kondra: Yep...and it was tough, getting it through to them.

Comment: Not only from Europe down to the AOR, but from here (in the CONUS), too, apparently.

LtGen Kondra (agreeing): Everywhere.

### 31 December - 1 January (1991) Entries:

#### **Chemical Warfare Gear For Commercials**

Question: OK...you're on the 31st, now? (Yes) "CW gear for commercials" again?

LtGen Kondra: Yes..."COMALF must fix with the ALCEs." The ALCEs had to get their procedures down, because we were getting complaints that they don't have the gear for the commercials...

Question: That was resolved, you mentioned earlier, but it took awhile?

LtGen Kondra: Yes, eventually...it took awhile.

#### **EUCOM Passenger Requirements To Close 8 January**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "EUCOM passenger requirements...estimated to close on 8 January." You see, we're shooting for the 15th, to have everybody there, and we're saying we'll have the EUCOM folks in by the 8th.

63. See *hist 21 AF, CY1990, Vol. II, "DESERT SHIELD - The First 100 Days" briefing (by MGen Kondra, then the MAC DCS/Ops), pp. 32-33, and Vol I interview with MGen Landers, same hist, "Use Of C-5 Aircraft For Passenger Carrying," p. 67.*

## **Consideration Of Use Of Southern AOR Bases For Commercials During Hostilities**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): I'm also talking to Mick Hardin here about the possible use of some southern AOR bases for the commercials in case of hostilities..."will advise." The idea there was to figure out which bases we could operate into away from the air and missile threats. run the commercials in there, offloads and transship forward, using military air - if we had to.

Question: You worked out these routes?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...but we did not do that; we just talked about it. But I wanted them to look at the possibility, to see if that was how we wanted to operate.

## **Al Kharj Gets Fuel 1 January**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): And I see here, on the first, "Al Kharj finally has fuel, 1 January."

Question: What were they...fuel bladders that they moved in there?

LtGen Kondra: Yes.

## **4 January Entries:**

### **Air Italia Offer Of Free Lift - Evergreen Insurance Considerations - Commercial Insurance Cancellations**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "4 January - Air Italia, free, one week, Germany to the AOR." We were supposed to get free lift from Air Italia, but that never did happen, for some reason. "Evergreen - premium title 13 from the FAA." That's the insurance they were getting. And "Tower, British Airways, TWA, Pan Am - cancel flights to the Mideast." Oh, I know what's happening here...this had to do with the insurance companies - Lloyd's of London, etc., and the others that handle airline insurance, are now starting to cancel them out, if they're going in (to the AOR) strictly commercial, on their own. Now, if they were flying for us, the (U.S.) government provides the insurance. Let's see if I can remember the numbers...they won't be exact, but...for a 747, flying to the Mideast prior to DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, the insurance for a trip there was something like \$50,000.

Question: That was the cost of the premium?

LtGen Kondra: Yes, for a 747, into the Mideast and out. Then it went up, until it finally reached \$1 million a flight...and then finally it was cancelled. You couldn't even get it.

Comment: Somebody once said that "insurance companies will be the last things to go broke." I think that's probably right.

LtGen Kondra: Yes...and this is about the time now, the 4th of January, when they started canceling out.

Question: Did *all* the insurance companies do this?

LtGen Kondra: Yes, all of them.

Comment/Question: "Really in there backing the war effort," weren't they? Yeah, I know - it's 'strictly business.' So now the government of the U.S. is the sole backer, if anything happens?

LtGen Kondra: Yes, if they're flying CRAF missions, we're covering them, providing the indemnification.

Question: Prior to this, were they getting *double* indemnification...in other words, we (the government) were covering them, *and* the insurance companies?

LtGen Kondra: No...why should they pay that premium?

Comment: Oh, I see.

#### **Kits For B-767 Airevacs**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Let's see..."Airevac....10 kits for the 767s." We were going to use the 767 to be the distributor, not only in the CONUS but also from Europe back here...and they'd prepared some kits to go into the airplanes. After they took the seats out, they were going to put airevac stanchions in, litters, oxygen bottles, etc. The idea was to get 10 kits to do this. We were going to have to use hi-lift trucks or 40-Ks (loaders), because the ramps were too steep, and you couldn't bring litter patients down the stairs. So the issue was how we were going to get the patients off? We were going to use those hi-lift trucks...those things the airlines use to bring out the meals and stuff? Either that, or a 40-K loader that would go up there. We ended up only getting one, tested, to see if it would work.

#### **No Use Of Portugal Air**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "Portugal Air...can't agree on a price." So we never did use them.

#### **CINCMAC Tours AOR, Makes Observations**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Then I've got some notes here...which must've come from the CINC: "Positive on airlift...European theater requirements will probably increase...Ed Tenoso is doing well...Dhahran, people are getting tired...King Khalid



Military City will get very busy...Sharjah still has some attitude problems, but better than what it was before."

Question: What did he mean by that, "attitude problems at Sharjah?"

LtGen Kondra: There was some unit there...Reserves...which had some real problems earlier.

#### **5 - 9 January Entries:**

##### **Mogadishu (Somalia) Evacuations**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): And here, while we're doing all this stuff, we're doing things in Mogadishu..."60-70 Marines landed, 62 American citizens out, 318 more to go, to be done by helicopter."

Question: Any comments on that operation? We (MAC) didn't really get into it very much, did we?

LtGen Kondra: No...it was all done over there, by people out of country. We had some C-130s involved.

##### **Beddown Sites, C-130s - Five C-21s To Run Air Tasking Orders**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): OK..."C-130s...send eight H's to Al Kharj, eight E's to Thumrait, and eight are going to be kept as 'hip pocket' ones." I also note here, need five C-21s to run Air Tasking Orders (ATOs)."

Question: You mean they're to be used as courier airplanes, running the ATOs?

LtGen Kondra: Yes, that's what they did.

Question: You couldn't send that stuff over land lines, or secure communications circuits?

LtGen Kondra: No...the ATOs were all classified, so this was all courier stuff. That's what we brought them over there for (the C-21s).

##### **Air Italia Lift Provided**

\_Then I see here on the 8th...Air Italia is going to operate 747 on 12 January from Rhein Main to the AOR..."

Question: Oh...I thought you said you didn't get any help from the Italians?

LtGen Kondra: Yes, I did...but evidently, we did, after all.

##### **General Tenoso Reports Jubail Fuel Problem Fixed**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Here on the 9th of January, "Tenoso reports Jubail fuel problem fixed."

Question: You must've talked to him just about every day, didn't you?

LtGen Kondra: Oh, yes, I did...every day.

#### 12 - 15 January Entries:

**Fifty CW Masks In Country - King Khalid Military City Fuel Deliveries Stopped - Exodus Of Third Country Nationals**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Here on the 12th, we've got 50 CW masks supposedly in country.

Question: Not ensembles, just masks?

LtGen Kondra: Yes, just masks. "KKMC - fuel critical, deliveries stopped by third country nationals." We're getting closer and closer to (the deadline of) the 15th, and so the drivers - all of them third country nationals - are all cutting and running.

Question: On the 12th, they started leaving?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...because the 15th was the day we were going to go in.

Question: So now you needed more drivers...and fuel? (Yes)

**FAA Desire For Commercial In-Flight Recall Exercise - Use of Aeronautical Radio Inc.**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "FAA wants to do recall of commercial; refer to JCS to work with CENTCOM." What this was about was an exercise they wanted to do to recall the commercials that were flying, to make sure we could communicate with them.

Question: Did you ever do that exercise?

LtGen Kondra: We did it for real, not as an exercise. We did some things with messages through Aeronautical Radio Inc., and that type of thing. We didn't actually recall them, but we did select a couple of airplanes...one was over the Med(iterranean), the other was over Saudi Arabia...to see how long it would take us to establish contact with them.

Question: And how long did it take?

LtGen Kondra: Less than minutes, by voice, and we could get to them by data through Aeronautical Radio Inc. in other ways. It did work. The test "started at 1201, we contacted Continental at 1203, and got to the aircraft at 1221."

Question: Did you ever actually have to use it later on, to divert anybody?

LtGen Kondra: Yes, we did...and I'll talk about that later on.

**EUCOM Priorities - NEO Evacuations**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): The EUCOM priorities on the 13th of January were: "Elusive Concept was first, AWACS was 1A, Patriot was 2, Proven Force was 3, and Gable Shark was 4th." Those were the priorities. I can't talk about what they are, of course.<sup>64</sup> Regarding the NEO evacuations.... "7,000 in the eastern part of the country, to come out of King Fahd, Riyadh has 8,000, and in the western part, 4,000...out of Jeddah, maybe."

Question: Did you ever have to actually haul those people out? (No) I didn't think so.

**Patriot Missile Moves, Taskings - CRAF Divert Message Sent; CRAF To Stop, Organic Continue - Extension of Trump Shuttle Contract - Marines Cancel C-5 Use**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "Patriots...35 C-5s, six C-141s, 16 and 17 January...through the 27th, five C-5s per day."

Question: You've got something there, "CRAF to stop, organic to continue"?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...if we went to war, that's what would happen; we'd have to stop the CRAF. We also extended the Trump Shuttle contract on the 14th. Then I have a note, "Marines cancel 17 of 21 C-5s for 16 January." That helped other requirements, but it sure caused a lot of turbulence.

**Coleman Andrews, World Airlines - CRAF To Be Contacted Primarily Through ATC - No CRAF Into King Khalid Military City**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Then I spoke to Coleman Andrews, of World Airways, on the 14th, and talked to him about chemical warfare gear, divers, and how the system worked...we had a very cordial, good discussion. Then Ed Tenoso..."CRAF primarily to be contacted through ATC," and "no CRAF into KKMCC." We didn't want any CRAF on the ground there, because it was too far north.

**91 NEOs Evacuated From Dhahran**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "91 NEOs out of Dhahran tonight."

Question: So you did haul some out, after all?

LtGen Kondra: Yes. Some Army folks.

**CalTex Lacking Insurance - Boeing People Stranded In Country**

*64. To permit the widest possible dissemination of this document, all details of classified operations - those which remained classified as of the date of this transcription - have been deleted. However, it should be noted that, in actuality, only a very small portion of General Kondra's notes touched upon classified material.*

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Then there was this, "Fuel contract...CalTex has no insurance." That was the company that was pumping fuel at Dhahran - they didn't have insurance, so we were having trouble getting fuel again. We finally got that resolved, too. And then there were some Boeing people who'd stayed in, and then couldn't get out...because there weren't any commercials scheduled, since they had no insurance. So we had to haul some Boeing people out, too.

#### **CRAF Fuel Problems, Ingress, Egress Routes**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "CRAF fuel problems, our men will drive as required." In other words, they'd do the driving that those third country nationals had been doing at Riyadh and Dhahran. I was just going through a whole list of things we'd have to do, if we went to war.

Comment: And we were going to go to war the next day!

LtGen Kondra: That's right...this is my "to do" list, to make sure; these are the "last minute" things being considered. "CRAF cell augmentation, extension on commercial inspections." We needed to do that, to get them out. Also talking here about the "CRAF II activation," and their divert procedures, ingress, egress routes, to avoid the hot spots.

#### **Importance of Maps- Fuel Problems, Pipeline In Spain - "Let The Games Begin!"**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "Move maps..." maps were always important. There was a possibility of using two C-5s out of Norfolk, just to move maps to the AOR. And Zaragoza was running out of fuel, because of a new pipeline coming on line on the 18th. SAC had agreed they'd use minimum fuel there. What the problem there was...there's one major pipeline that supplies Spain, and it's used to move heating oil as well as (jet) fuel. And they have to purge it, if they're pumping heating fuel - they can't pump JP-4. Here I note, "MAC limited to 300,000 gallons." We'd used 500,000 a month, previously.

Question: What about at Torrejon?

LtGen Kondra: We had fuel at Torrejon, but you had space problems there.

Comment: And then your note, "Let the games begin!" Why don't we pick this up on the 16th, when the war begins, in the next session? This seems like a good place to break.

LtGen Kondra: OK...yes...I see, "16 January - let the games begin - activate the diversion." Yep..."the fire sale is over, salvage sales soon...dates to be announced."  
(laughter)

## END OF FOURTH SESSION

### SESSION 5 - ENTRIES OF 16 JANUARY - 28 FEBRUARY 1991<sup>65</sup>

#### 16 January Entries:

**"Things To Do" List: Ingress-Egress Safe Passage Routes; DESERT EXPRESS Backlog At Charleston; Evacuation of NEOs From Turkey, Saudi Arabia**

Question: OK...here on the 16th of January, you've got the entry, "Let the games begin!" And you've got a note about "Turkey dependents, Altus classes..." Those are the things I picked up on.

LtGen Kondra: Yes, let's see what I've got here...I've got a "to do" list. "NEO update, no firm tasking, CRAF Cell augmentation, CRAF fuel problems, ingress-egress routes, safe passage, Charleston backlog." These were all the things that I had put down "to do" prior to when I thought we might get into the shooting...things that I was concerned about. "Charleston backlog" - we evidently had a backlog on the DESERT EXPRESS. We had added another aircraft on the 15th...

Question: Didn't you go to two airplanes a day out of there, for DESERT EXPRESS?

LtGen Kondra: We did, at one time...if we required it, we would fly two. "NEO update..." we were concerned about getting the NEOs out of Saudi Arabia...or out of the AOR, not just Saudi. Part of that was interesting. A number of Boeing folks had stayed there, as had other civilian contractors, figuring they would get out at the last minute on commercials. The thing that they didn't plan on, and didn't foresee, was that there were *no* commercials. The reason there weren't any had to do with what I talked about earlier...that their insurance had been cancelled, and there were no commercial flights being flown into the AOR. So now there was no way out for them. We thought we were going to end up being tasked to bring them out - which would not be a problem, we could handle it.

Question: About how many are we talking about here?

LtGen Kondra: Well, it was in the hundreds, but I don't remember the exact number. Maybe later on I'll have the number, where it talks about how many there were.

#### **CRAF Cell Augmentation**

*65. The taping of this session took place on 4 Feb 92.*

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "CRAF cell augmentation"- That was (a program) to get commercial representatives to come in (to the MAC Command Center) and augment...and it was really an education process. We would have representatives from separate airlines come in for a week or two, sit with the CRAF Cell, and help us work issues. They wouldn't work just their company issues; they'd work *all* civilian issues. And the real value of it was that it was an education program for them to understand what we were doing, and the things that we were having to go through. Then they could go back to their companies with a better understanding of what it was that MAC was doing so that things that, on the surface, might look like they didn't make sense...they would know the background, and understand what was happening. That was something that General Johnson inspired.

Question: Did you do this throughout the war? (Yes) Like having "circulating teams," as it were?

#### **Refueling Problems Caused By Foreign Nationals "Cutting and Running"; CRAF-II Activation, Divert Procedure Concerns**

LtGen Kondra: Yes. We were having problems getting fuel for the CRAF because the foreign nationals that ran the contract fueling services (in the AOR) were cutting and running. We had two problems. We had foreign nationals leaving, so we didn't have people to do the fueling. We also had an insurance problem, in that these companies were losing their insurance coverage during fueling operations - so there was a reluctance to provide services for commercial carriers...in case something went wrong, they didn't have the insurance to cover them. We had worked it out that the Army would do it (refueling), if we had to, at Jeddah, Riyadh and Dhahran.

Comment: You also mentioned before that you had to get drivers for the fuel trucks, etc., because all the foreign nationals had cut out.<sup>66</sup>

LtGen Kondra: Yes, there had been some cuttin' and runnin'. We talked about CRAF-II activation...I'll find in here somewhere what date that actually took place; we'll come to it. As for the divert procedures...I wanted to make sure that, if the war kicked off and we had this stream of airplanes 20 minutes apart, that we had a procedure in being and everybody understood what it was. And we did, and it worked.

#### **Biggest Personal Concern As War Nears: "Patience" Required of Ground Forces**

<sup>66</sup>. See comments on p. 83.

Question: I wanted to ask you something...it's not in these notes you kept, it's a personal kind of thing: how did you, or what did you feel, the morning of the 16th of January, when the (UN) deadline had been reached and now you knew the war was going to start?

LtGen Kondra: Are you talking about before or after it started?

Comment: After it started. Were you holding out hope that we were somehow going to be able to work around this without having to start shooting, do you remember?

LtGen Kondra: My biggest concern was...and this may sound a little strange, Clay...were the ground forces going to have the patience? That they didn't have a "charge the hill" mentality? Were the ground forces going to allow the air forces, and the bombardment forces - because that includes the Navy ships and all the other things, like the cruise missiles, etc. - were they going to allow them to do their thing, so that we wouldn't have Marine and Army forces charging entrenched positions and winding up in a bloody bath? My single biggest concern was, would our forces have the patience to let the air bombardment do what it had to do so we could cut down on the casualties? Or would we get into the mentality, "Well, that's just the price you have to pay"? I don't mean to be derogatory towards the ground commanders, because I have no idea what thought processes they were going through; I was a long way removed from them. But that, I think, was my single biggest concern.

### **Altus School Training Cutbacks**

Comment/Question: OK, I just wanted to get that in here somewhere. Are you still on the 16th (of January)?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...I'm still going down this list of "things to do." The Altus school drawdown...we did that. We did away with A/R, IP upgrades, and airdrop (training), and just kept the basic school going. We would have, at any given time, three or four 141 crews and a couple of C-5 crews, and airplanes, flying in the flow as a result of doing that.

### **C-5 "Map Missions" To AOR**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Here's another one of those "possible map missions, possibly two C-5s going out of Norfolk, ASAP." I was talking about charts and maps they needed (in the AOR) here; those became very high priority items.

Question: Did you actually do that, lay on a couple of C-5s?

LtGen Kondra: I'm sure we did, before it was all said and done.

#### **Zaragoza Fuel Pipeline Purged, Restored To Use**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "Zaragoza fuel" was an issue. We also talked about this before...that major pipeline that goes up...

Comment: Yes, the one that had to be purged.<sup>67</sup>

LtGen Kondra: Yes, because it is used to haul either aircraft fuel or heating oil. That had been fixed, and on the 18th (of January) it would be back pumping (jet) fuel. Meantime, SAC was going to use minimum fuel to conserve the fuel for us. MAC was limited to 300,000 gallons; we had been using up to 500,000 gallons...

Question: Is that *per day*?

LtGen Kondra: Yes, per day.

#### **AN-224, IL-76 (USSR) Aircraft Used By Dutch**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Here was an interesting one. Supposedly, there was going to be an AN-224...Russia's big airplane...and four IL-76s were going to haul Dutch Patriots to Saudi Arabia.

Question: Patriot missiles?

LtGen Kondra: Yes. US-made, Dutch-owned Patriots to Saudi Arabia on Soviet aircraft! (*laughter*)

Question: Did it happen? (Yes) Well, there was an example of the Soviets' cooperation with us, I guess.

LtGen Kondra: They had nothing to do with us; it had to do with the Dutch, the movement of their forces.

Comment: Oh, OK...but it was part of the whole coalition force containment program, I meant.

LtGen Kondra: Yes, it was part of the coalition effort.

#### **Move Of Dependents From Turkey Authorized To "First Stop" Only**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "Dependents from Turkey..." we were authorized to move military and civilian dependents, but no household goods would be moved out...

Question: You did that?

<sup>67</sup>. See p. 85.



LtGen Kondra: Yes, we were authorized to do that, and we did move some. "NEO from the AOR"...we could take them to the first stop only. Evidently, there were still some questions about military vs. civilians and the insurance issue I talked about.

Question: The "first stop" being where? Germany?

LtGen Kondra: Wherever it was...it might be anyplace, Italy, Belgium, Germany. We could only take them to the first stop.

#### **Cost To Convert Pan Am 747s: \$250,000-\$300,000 Each**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "Pan Am conversion...\$250,000 to \$300,000 to convert from a passenger configuration to a cargo." I'm trying to remember now, Clay, if it was from pax to cargo or cargo to pax; but we were going to have to pay Pan Am \$250,000-300,000 to do that.

Question: How many Pan Am airplanes are you talking about here?

LtGen Kondra: We ended up converting two, I believe. They were willing to do more but they wanted a long term commitment, and we couldn't give them that commitment.

Question: You're not talking about \$250,000 for one airplane, are you?

LtGen Kondra: Yes, I am. That's what it cost to do that.

Comment: That's outrageous! Good Lord! I can't understand why...I mean, just taking the seats out of the things...or putting seats into them...

LtGen Kondra: Well, you're taking them out, and then you've got to put the rails in, and do all the other things. It's about a week-long process.

Question: 747s? (Yes)

#### **More Concerns Expressed By CRAF Carriers Regarding Chem Warfare Gear**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): We're having problems here again with chem gear at Riyadh and Dhahran...this was a call I got from Coleman Andrews, the President of World Airways. They weren't meeting the crews with the gear, and the crews wanted to have their own. I called people out there and finally got it squared away; we ended up giving them some of their own (gear to keep). Same thing with Del Smith from Evergreen, chem gear...we even had Senator Packwood (of Oregon) involved.

#### **C-141s Used To Airlift M-117 Bombs, Hill AFB To AOR**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "CINCCENT, M-117 bombs, 110 short tons of bombs, Hill AFB (UT) to the AOR."

Question: This was a tasking, to airlift these?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...we're going to move iron bombs on 141s.

### **INS Sets Shipped Via DESERT EXPRESS For C-21s In AOR**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Here, we've got "nine sets of INS for C-21s" that we were going to put in; we're going to ship them on DESERT EXPRESS on the 17th of January.

### **FAA Grants CRAF Inspection Extensions**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Let's see..."Coleman Andrews, World Airways...FAA extension." That was done, they got approval.

Question: Meaning what?

LtGen Kondra: They (the FAA) were going to give them some hour extensions on their (mandatory) inspections.

Question: You mean "iso-type" inspections?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...they call them "Type A, B and C inspections," and I don't remember what the differences are.

Question: So many days between them, that sort of thing?

LtGen Kondra: It's hours...and they got an extension.

### **"Games Begin" At 0001Z, 17 January; Awaiting Divert Call From BGen Tenoso; Order To Divert Issued At 0005Z, 17 January (No Call From AOR)**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Here I've got, "Ed Tenoso, on the 17th...he's got two aircraft inbound, two on the ground." He's called me and told me when it's going to start, and as of right now that's what we've got inbound and the divert procedures are established. "CRAF - keep in Europe...16 January 1991, the games begin at 0005Z on the 17th." That's when we would activate the divert. I got a call about two hours prior that told me the air war would start at 0001Z, and that they would call me and let me know to activate the divert...and that *all* aircraft, commercial and military, would be stopped from coming in. I waited until 0005Z and didn't get a call...so I called the CAT and said, "Activate the divert procedures."

Question: At that moment, after General Tenoso had said there were four aircraft inbound...you only had to divert those four?

LtGen Kondra: No, we had to divert more than that. We had four that were actually going to be in the AOR, but we had a whole string of them behind that we had to cut off, which we did.

**Somber Atmosphere In MAC Command Post, Watching CNN Coverage; ALCE Cadre Provides Dark Humor**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): There were a couple of interesting things involved here, and I don't think we've talked about them yet. We had the CINC's daily update at 1700L. We came out of the update at about 1740L in the Crisis Action Room. Up on the screen, when we came out, was CNN<sup>68</sup> reporting bombs falling on Baghdad...and there were 50 or 60 people in the room, watching the CNN coverage, seeing tracers, bombs falling, etc. - and nobody is saying a word. It really was very quiet.

Comment: I know...I was watching, too; it was a scary time.

LtGen Kondra: Yeah...I remember what my personal thoughts were...you see, I was not involved with Panama - I was the (MAC) XP then, and had no involvement. This was the first time in my 30-year Air Force career that I actually saw us go to war that I was involved in, and I had some very somber feelings, as this was going on. So we're sitting there watching it all, and *nobody is saying a word*. Nobody is asking about the divert, nobody is making the obvious statement that the war has begun. For literally 25 minutes I sat there and watched it on TV, waiting for this call that says, "start the divert."

Question: And who was supposed to make that call?

LtGen Kondra: General Ed Tenoso, the COMALF, at Riyadh. But he had already told me what they wanted us to do, so I waited, until about five after the hour.

Question: Was there some reason why he didn't call?

LtGen Kondra: They just got too busy over there...there was too much going on.

Comment: He probably figured you were watching it all on CNN and that you'd figure it out for yourself! (*laughter*)

LtGen Kondra: I don't know...but we had already established the procedures, so we did it. The routing of the CRAF and the organic was working. I got a call sometime later...I didn't mark down the time...that the organic would keep going. Then we were put on a two-hour hold. There were six aircraft diverting within the Egyptian FIR,<sup>69</sup> there were 20 or so coming down (towards the AOR) en route that we had to divert, and it says here there were "17 aircraft going to Upper Heyford" (UK). Later, we got a call that said that Dhahran, Riyadh, Fahd and Al Kharj were open again to organic...

68. CNN = Cable News Network.

69. FIR = Flight Information Region.

Question: When you say "later" you mean...?

LtGen Kondra: That night. One of the things that I had written down was that the ALCE guys...are a special breed of cat. You know how they're used to going out and "doing it in the dirt." They had a plasma reading board which they used to put up little signs. At about 1755L, while all this (CNN) stuff is going on the big screen, I looked over at the plasma board...

Question: Are you talking about in the CAT?

LtGen Kondra: In the CAT, yes...and the signs had changed. They had put up, "The games have begun, it's show time, let's rock and roll." And on another board it said, "Fire sale is over, salvage sale soon, dates to be announced." (*laughter*) There is a sense of humor, always...

Comment: Yes, even in the most tragic of times, there's always some humor being generated.

LtGen Kondra: Yes, they come through.

#### **BGen Tenoso Advises Airfields Reopened To Organic Flow; CRAF Still On Hold**

LtGen Kondra (*continuing*): Then I've got an entry here, "Ed Tenoso...all bases open."

Question: What time is this?

LtGen Kondra: I don't have a time written down. Several hours later, though...the bases are open, and they want us to start the organic (flow) back up. There's no fuel at KKMC, Al Kharj, or Jubail...so they'll have to go to (King) Fahd in Bahrain for fuel. "Ingress route is being used...max(imum) tankering of fuel..." Which we had been doing...

Question: So the organic is OK to proceed now, but what about the CRAF?

LtGen Kondra: They're still stopped.

#### **Col Carpenter, IMA, Makes Circuit Tour Of Eastern CONUS Bases; UTC Vs. Unit Activation Discussion, Still An Issue**

LtGen Kondra (*continuing*): Let's see - (Col) Sam Carpenter had gone out; he's the CINC's IMA; 70 he'd gone to Dover, McGuire, Charleston and Andrews...

Question: To do what?

LtGen Kondra: He was going out to get a sense of how the Reserves were doing. "Training proficiency, downhill," he said, but he didn't explain it or say why. There was also a "UTC vs. unit activation" discussion - in other words, taking part of a unit 70. IMA = Individual Mobilization Augmentee.

as opposed to a whole unit. That had been an issue through the whole thing, and it's still an issue today, still being worked...whether we'll take parts rather than a whole unit - and if you take parts, who do you assign them to? Because you don't take a command element - first sergeants, commanders. We didn't do that very well. In some cases we didn't assign them to any real unit for command, just for action, or operations.

Question: And that's still a problem?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...it's still being looked at, and we're still trying to figure out a way to do it.

### **Allegations Re "Double Dipping" CRAF Crewmembers Flying DESERT SHIELD Missions And Commercially**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Then there was an allegation that we had some crewmembers who, even though they'd been activated, were still flying commercials. That is, when they weren't flying DESERT SHIELD-DESERT STORM missions, they would come back (to the CONUS) and, if they got some time off, they went back to flying commercially to maintain their currency.

Question: And that's a no-no, eh?

LtGen Kondra (agreeing): That's a no-no. To this day I don't actually know that that happened, but there was a rumor...

Question: They were supposed to be resting, you mean?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...not out there flying 150 hours for us and then going off to fly commercial airplanes. I mean, they're limited by the FAA to 80-some hours a month in the commercial world, so you can't just disregard this 150 hours a month that they were getting with the military. I don't know if that ever really happened, but the allegations were there. A stop was put to it, and I never heard (the rumor) surface again.

Question: You put the word out to "cease and desist?"

LtGen Kondra: Well, they (the commercial carriers) did, through me.

### **17 January Entries:**

#### **Controversy Over Actives Going On Leave, Attending School After Reserve Call Ups; Continuing "Mistreatment" Complaint From AFRES Member - Allegations Re Holding High Time Members In Stages**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): There was a question about Reserves vs. the actives, schools, leaves, etc., that the actives were still going to school, still taking leave,

after the Reserves were being activated. It's interesting...here was an issue on the 17th of January 1991, and this past Saturday (1 February 1992) at Charleston, with the Reserve Associate there,<sup>71</sup> I had a major who was *still* grinding that axe...that the Reserves had been misused, mistreated, mismanaged, and that there was "absolutely no reason for them to be called up when we had captains going to SOS, and people were on leave." He even stated that we had people with feet on the ramp,<sup>72</sup> and I told him that we did not have people with feet on the ramp in January-February-March; we didn't start feet on the ramp until later in the summer. It was also his opinion that we should have stopped SOS and leaves...but policy-wise the Air Force didn't agree with him, so we agreed to disagree. We got into some rather emotional discussion down there, though. There was also an allegation that they were holding people in the stages to build time...otherwise a guy would, say, run out of his 150 (hours maximum per month) time. So they were being held in the stage for three-four-five-six-seven days, because each day they would drop anywhere from 5-10 hours flying time, and then they'd be able to make another trip. If we were doing that, that was dumb - they should have been sent home.

Comment: Yes...you mentioned that before.<sup>73</sup>

#### **Reserve Mobilization Restrictions "Stupid," As Are Laws Regarding Reserve Benefits In Volunteer Status; Call For DOD Reserve Affairs To Resolve Issues**

LtGen Kondra:(continuing): Yes..."AFR 28-5...people TDY at the time of mobilization of their unit are not mobilized." A guy could be in SOS, in flying school - and if his unit was mobilized he, because he was not there at the time, was *not mobilized*, and could not be mobilized. It's a *stupid* law, and it needs to be changed. There were a whole bunch of stupid laws that govern the Reserves. For instance, if a Reservist is in a volunteer status - and we had an awful lot of them over there in the AOR, in the beginning, in 30-day volunteer status - if they got killed, their families got no benefits, because they were in a "volunteer" status. If they were *mobilized*, they did. Now, dead is dead, and that makes no sense. And we got into that discussion this past weekend down at 14th Air Force (AFRES headquarters, Dobbins AFB, GA) - that *somebody has got to change these rules*. There were a lot of stupid rules governing the Reserves that surfaced, and they used to make my head hurt, to

71. *Speaking here of the 315 MAW Associate.*

72. *"Feet on the ramp" referring to a mid-1991 program introduced in MAC to take pilots with established dates of separation (DOS) out of the cockpit to permit other pilots with firm AF commitments access to said cockpit seats.*

73. See p. 74.

have to listen to some of these things. I'd find myself saying, "You've got to be kidding...I cannot believe that we are operating under these kinds of things." I'm hoping - and I don't know who it is - but somebody in the DOD Reserve Affairs office needs to take those issues on and resolve them. And I hope to hell they are doing so; I mean, it's *really* dumb.

#### **Embargo On Mail Shipments Denied; Mail A High Priority Item**

LtGen Kondra: *(continuing)*: We were talking about a mail embargo. A message was ready to go out to ask for an embargo on mail. That didn't happen.

Question: What was the reason for that?

LtGen Kondra: Because either the Chairman of the JCS, or the CENTCOM, decided that the mail was important and that we needed to commit to carrying it...so we were allocating somewhere around 200 tons (of lift) a day.

Question: But you never did impose an embargo on it, did you?

LtGen Kondra: No, but we were going to try to do that; we were going to try to cut off the mail, by air, because we just didn't have enough lift. But the decision was made that the mail was important, so we took it on.

Comment: Yes...and I remember there was a helluva lot of mail moved through McGuire here.<sup>74</sup>

#### **CRAF II Activation, DESERT EXPRESS II Initiated**

LtGen Kondra: Yes. "First CRAF-II..." we activated CRAF-II on the 17th, and UPS would have the first CRAF-II mission. Also, "DESERT EXPRESS II starts on Saturday (19 January)."

Comment: Yes...and from there on they flew twice a day for quite awhile, didn't they?

#### **Shipment Of Wood From Pusan To Guam For Ship Shoring, Bomb Sealift**

LtGen Kondra: Yes.<sup>75</sup> This entry, "wood to Guam, from Pusan.." that's

*74. During the 22 Oct 90 - 18 Apr 91 time frame, MAC aircraft flying out of McGuire AFB carried more than 35 million pounds (17,500 + tons) of mail to the AOR. From report, 438 APS/TROA, 10 Feb 92.*

*75. The twice-daily DESERT EXPRESS missions out of Charleston continued until 14 March, then reverted to once-daily flights. On 15 Apr 91, the DESERT EXPRESS operation moved to Dover AFB, where it continued until 19 May. A total of 235 DESERT EXPRESS missions were flown which carried 63,103 shipments (2,700 tons of cargo) to the AOR during the 30 Oct 90 - 19 May 91 time frame. From 21 AF/HO notes, 22 May 91 briefing, Capt. Herrity. Additional details in CY91 21 AF history.*

interesting...

Question: "Wood"?

LtGen Kondra: Yes, wood was shipped to Guam from Pusan, Korea. Remember I told you we were hauling iron bombs (M-117s) out of Hill to the war zone on 141s? (Yes) Eventually, we were going to move M-117s out of Guam by ship. The problem was there was no shoring in Guam to line the holds of the ships - which you must do. So we had to haul wood by C-5s from Korea to Guam for this purpose. To me that's interesting...one of those things nobody had thought of beforehand, that there was no shoring available in Guam. So while we were hauling wood so they could line the ships, we were hauling iron bombs by air. And it took a lot of 141 and C-5 missions to haul them, compared to what a ship could handle.

Comment: Sounds like a good case for the use of scrap styrofoam.

#### **Coordination Between MAC - SAC/DOs**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): (MGen) John Borling was the SAC/DO (regarding the "trade of intel between commands"). We talked with each other daily...and we're not talking about just "intel" intel here, we're talking about any useful information we could share. We were talking this day about tankers or their crews, I'm not sure which, what they're going to be doing.

#### **Airlift Of HMETs, HETs**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): And here's where General Vuona (CSAF) wants us to move his "HMETs and HETs" on 747s vs. C-141s. First of all, HMETs and HETs won't fit on 141s...

Question: What are "HMETs and HETs"?76

LtGen Kondra: They're big vehicles used to haul fuel and tanks. And there's no way to move them on 747s, because you can't get them up and get them in. We did haul them on C-5s, though, and they became very critical in the movement of the tanks out of the port at Dhahran and getting them up to the front. We were picking them up right at the factory in Peoria (IL), where they were being made, and hauling them direct over to the desert.

#### **18 January Entries:**

*76.Per Maj Pat Glovas, US Army GLO, 21 AF: HMETs = Heavy Mobility Equipment Transports; HETs = Heavy Equipment Transports. Both are trailer-type vehicles used to transport heavy equipment, such as tanks, fuel trucks, cannons, etc.*



### **Commercial Airlines Balk At Flying**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Here's where we get into the commercials again, on the 18th. "FedEx and American Transair (AMT) diverted to Zaragoza; Continental Airlines, Northwest Airlines are calling. Northwest not flying - corporate decision. World (Airways) will go to Europe, FedEx will go to Frankfurt."

### **Closing, Reopening of Saudi Airfields - Change In Divert Procedures, Initiation Of Holding Patterns To Be Used During Scud Attacks**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Let's see...on the 17th, at 0236Z, Jubail was 'red' (closed), at 0238Z, and Fahd, Dhahran and Jubail were 'red.' I think that what ended up happening here was...initially the fields were closed, and then they turned right around and reopened them. This is when we decided to change the divert procedures, on the 18th. Because what was happening was...every time there was a Scud attack we stopped the flow when the fields went 'red.' What we did the first time was stop everything all the way back to the CONUS. But the fields would only be closed for a very short time, and the first time we did this we had 30-some airplanes spread out all over the eastern half of the world...and I said, "This doesn't make any sense...closing it (an airfield), then, an hour later, we're gonna reopen it?" So we got together and came up with another divert procedure where, if a plane was airborne, it continued. If it was on the ground, it stayed there, but if it was in the air it continued to come on down. We picked a point south of Riyadh where the incoming planes would set up in a holding pattern. We would plan on holding them there for an hour, and we had them bring enough fuel to do so - even if that meant that we had to cut down on the ACLs.<sup>77</sup> We would have enough fuel on board to continue the flow, come to a holding fix south of Riyadh, hold there for an hour...and during that time get clearances in either to their original destinations, or if they had a predetermined alternate outside of the range of the Scuds, they'd go there. I felt we could not disrupt the flow, stopping things all the way back to the CONUS. From that time on it worked great...and that's exactly what we did.

Question: Are you talking strictly organic here, or also the CRAF?

LtGen Kondra: Both. We went into that procedure on the second night (after the air war began). We had to make the adjustment quickly, because it made no sense at all - we'd never have gotten anything done. When you've got airplanes spread out all over, it can take you three days to get them back into the flow - by the time

<sup>77</sup>. ACLs = Allowable Cabin Loads.

the guys go into crew rest, or you need different crews, or you might not have maintenance where some of these planes are, etc.

### **Some Commercial Lines Continue Flying Into AOR**

LtGen Kondra(continuing): Here, on the CRAF...the airlines that would continue to fly into the AOR were "AMT, Tower, Continental, FedEx, and World. Northwest would go to Europe only, Hawaiian was still questionable."

Question: Did it stay that way throughout the war?

LtGen Kondra: No, it changed...but at this point that's where we stood.

### **Move Of Patriot Missiles, Batteries To Israel From Rhein Main, Demands On 435th TAW - First & Only Waiver To 330 Hour Limit Given**

LtGen Kondra(continuing): Let's see..."Patriots to Israel, two batteries...onloads and offloads, be ready in 12 hours, four hour load time...Chairman, Joint Chiefs. Patriots will be ready on the 19th at 0500Z, Rhein Main to Ben Gurion (IAP, Israel); 35 C-5s, nine C-141s."

Comment: That's a lot of planes.

LtGen Kondra (agreeing): This became a real bitch. I started writing down the numbers here on the 18th. Originally, they were supposed to be ready on the 19th at 0500Z. Now, as of 2230Z on the 18th, they're supposed to be ready "ASAP."

Comment: Like "now," eh?

LtGen Kondra: Right now. The 21st (AF), 322nd (ALD) and 435th (TAW) are working the problem. What I did was call (Col) Tom Mikolajcik, the 435th TAW Commander, at about 1800L Scott time - midnight in Germany. I got him out of bed and said, "Tom, go out on the ramp and find every last C-5 you can. If it's loaded, unload it. If it's broke, fix it. And stand by for ram, because you're going to start having Patriot missiles showing up, and you're going to start loading them and moving them to Tel Aviv. They've got to be down there and operational in less than 24 hours. You're gonna have 35 C-5 and nine 141 missions to do this."

Question: And they were all coming out of Rhein Main?

LtGen Kondra: Yes, all out of Rhein Main. The units were coming out of Germany.

Question: So all these missiles were already in Germany?

LtGen Kondra: The launchers were. There were some missiles there, but we also had to pick up some missiles in Little Rock. We were given the task to have the missiles in place within 18 hours. Now, you can't get from Little Rock to Israel in that time, even if you had an airplane sitting there - and we didn't. We had to move airplanes

around, identify them, pull them out of the system, send them to Little Rock, load them, and run them through the system to get them there. We found two airplanes en route to Saudi Arabia that we diverted in flight and sent to Tel Aviv, so we made good our closure time...but only because the guys were able to find two that were in flight; they brought in the first batteries. There were 14 missiles at Ramstein, eight at Little Rock. Tom Mikolajcik called me back...I don't have the time written down...and told me he had five aircraft cocked, the first at 0700Z...with the first load in 1-2 hours at 0145Z to 0245Z. He had a 10-man maintenance team put together, and an en route ALCE that they were going to pick up in England and send down (to Ben Gurion IAP) to assist in the offload. This (occasion) was the first and only time I gave a waiver to the 330 hour flying time limit. I had an aircraft commander who had 328 hours, and he was going to run out of time coming back from Israel...and there was a flight engineer, too, who needed a waiver. I said that they could send them down, but when they came back they had to replace the crew.

#### **19 - 20 January Entries:**

##### **Movement of Patriot Missiles, Airlift Requirements**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): OK, here on the 19th..."At 1800Z, 30 missiles will arrive on 141s, from 19-23 (January) 37 C-5s will arrive; we close on the 21st at 0915Z." Let me see here...because this just keeps going on, about the missiles. We've got two (missions set up) at Ramstein, two at Cape Canaveral, two at Little Rock, two at Fahd, for a total of something like 64 missiles. There'll be 37 C-5s, eight C-141s, and we were going to have to take six missions away from Proven Force to do it.

Question: What was "Proven Force"?

LtGen Kondra: That had to do with the forces we sent into Turkey.

##### **Stage Two of CRAF Activated; Studies & Analysis Conclusions: Commercial Onload Times High - TQM Principles Applied To Examine, Shorten Ground Time Requirements**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): On the 20th (of January) we had basically concluded we had all the airplanes we were gonna get; all the 141s, all the C-5s, and all the commercials we were going to get - and we've activated Stage II of the CRAF. Now, how are we doing? How do we get more out of what we have? We now have our final pot of airframes, and I'm concerned about getting the most out of it. Our Studies & Analysis people had been running figures as to what the onload times, en route times, offload times were for the 141s, C-5s, narrow-bodied commercials, and

wide-bodied commercials.<sup>78</sup> What we found was that the offloads were running at the planned times - we were in good shape there. En route time was a little higher than normal, and onloads were considerably higher - particularly for commercials. The gist of that whole thing is, time on the ground is wasted time; airplanes are not productive sitting on the ground. So you've got to minimize that ground time. We literally did a TQM job, a "fishbone" chart, and asked, "What is the process? What are the things that we can control?" I put together a group of folks and asked them to consider all the things that go into making up this ground time: materials handling equipment (MHE), numbers of people, refueling, parking, maintenance, air traffic control, weather...any number of things. And I asked them what things could we control, and what things can't we? So the guys went to work on that, and in a matter of a day - less than 24 hours - we'd analyzed it all. It wasn't an in-depth analysis, but it was pretty good, really. They showed me the things we could control, by station. And we said, "Maybe what we need here are some more people; here, maybe some more MHE, and maybe here what our problem is that we're gridlocked with too many airplanes. We've got too many planes moving in here, and it's too difficult to get around; we're having to tow airplanes to park them, all of that takes time," etc.

Question: What base was that last, do you remember?

LtGen Kondra: I can't recall exactly...but what we did was change Ramstein and Rhein Main, and we opened up some things at Mildenhall and Lakenheath, as well as changing some other things at Zaragoza and Torrejon. We changed the makeup of the airplanes. We downloaded some things from C-5s, from 141s, we shifted it to other bases, had C-5s operate just from this base rather than through two bases.

**Dr. Juran, Blanton Collier Impressed During Visit To Scott - "Impro '91" Conference In Atlanta, MAC Demonstration Of Applied TQM**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): The interesting part of this whole thing is that Dr. Juran, from the Juran Institute, and Blanton Collier, who's his number one guy at the Institute, happened to be at Scott for briefings and talks on TQM, and they happened to see the fishbone chart we'd put up on the wall down in the CAT. They were fascinated by that. The upshot of that whole thing was that this past Fall, down in Atlanta at Juran's "Impro '91" convention, General (H.T.) Johnson became the keynote speaker for TQM...and hundreds of company reps came to this thing. I

*78. "narrow-bodied" such as DC-8s, "wide-bodies" such as 747s, DC-10s.*

gave a briefing on how we used this matrix that we put together to solve this particular problem...and they were very impressed.

Question: An example of TQM in operation, eh?

**DESERT EXPRESS Plagued By Problems With Bar Coding Of Shipments, Incomplete Computer Files, Antiquated Systems**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Yes, it really was. Let's see what else we've got here..."DESERT EXPRESS..." We had some problems with bar coding there. Packages, when they came in, have bar codes on them, and we've got code readers that are supposed to tell you what's in them. We had a couple of problems with the system. One was, the bar codes themselves were inaccurate - either because of dirt, or whatever, they weren't always readable. The other problem was, because of where this stuff was coming from...such as the Defense Logistics Area (DLA)... it was getting to the port before they were able to get it loaded into the computers. So we were getting all these "no hits," as they termed them...which meant they would have to go through and manually write down what the stuff was - and that was slowing down the process. That became critical on the DESERT EXPRESS mission, because we'd said that stuff that arrived (at Charleston AFB) before 1000L would be shipped out by 1230L, or whatever it was. And sometimes a lot of stuff would come in at the last minute, and it would all have to be cataloged by hand, rather than through the automated systems. They're still working this issue.

Question: Is it mainly a problem with the DLA, or what?

LtGen Kondra: It's really a problem with the system itself...the quality of the automation system that we have. Ours is old and antiquated and really needs to be updated. But it also had to do with the DLA and the information getting bogged down in the system.

**21 - 22 January Entries:**

**Jackpot Tasking**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): OK, here on the 21st..."Jackpot tasking - Brian O'Dell" "Jackpot" is a communications package, and Brian O'Dell was a LtCol in Current Ops who was going to take care of that.

Question: Is this system on board 141s, or what?

LtGen Kondra: Well, this Jackpot tasking was for a 130; it can go on 141s, too.

## **Five Returning C-5s Per Day Switched To Polar Route; Use of Upper Heyford Complicates Crew Management**

Question: You say something here about "download Dover, five departures a day, Travis - use polar flights"?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...what we're doing here - this is part of that process we looked at to reduce the onload and en route times. We figured that five (C-5) departures a day coming out of Europe, instead of coming back through Dover, they would fly the polar route and go back to Travis direct. We also decided to use Upper Heyford (in England); this would all help to smooth out the flow into Dover and Charleston.

Question: There was some problem mentioned here about first pilots and crews?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...by setting up to use Upper Heyford, we were going to have a problem because we'd have to shuttle first pilots up there, if we decided to do that. It was going to complicate the crew management business, because you'd be spread out a little more. It was "do-able," but it was going to create some issues.

Question: You actually did do this, though?

LtGen Kondra: We did do the polar flight returns to the CONUS.

Question: Did you ever fly over the Pole, to get from "here to there"?

LtGen Kondra: No...and we never really went that far north, not all the way up. But we were going up and coming down over Canada, then down over the Montana-Wyoming area, into Travis.

## **Redistribution Of Aircraft Flow Through European Bases**

LtGen Kondra(continuing): Here's where we were changing the way we were going to operate (aircraft per day operating through):

| <u>OLD SYSTEM</u>                | <u>NEW SYSTEM</u>  |
|----------------------------------|--------------------|
| At Zaragoza - 30 C-141s, 0 C-5s  | 28 C-141s, 0 C-5s  |
| At Ramstein - 40 C-141s, 0 C-5s  | 36 C-141s, 0 C-5s  |
| At Frankfurt - 6 C-141s, 24 C-5s | 16 C-141s, 16 C-5s |
| At Torrejon - 44 C-141s, 32 C-5s | 20 C-141s, 40 C-5s |
| At Upper Heyford - Nothing       | 20 C-141s, 0 C-5s  |

That was the redistribution that we performed to try to unclog the airfields. We also downloaded Dover by five (C-5) missions a day - the ones that went the polar route to Travis, and at Westover we went from three (C-5) departure originators a day up to eight, to download Dover some more. And that seemed to work pretty well.

## **Concepts Of One-Stop Crew Shopping, Concurrent Fueling, "Hot Turns" Introduced**

Question: Here on the 22nd you've got an entry, "One-stop shopping"?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...one-stop shopping was for the crews, where they could do all their (flight plan) filing, get their weapons, intel briefs, all that kind of stuff. "Concurrent fueling" meant working the issues so that as we were offloading and doing maintenance we could also handle refueling.

Question: Do you have to have some kind of a waiver to do that?

LtGen Kondra: The permission-authority to do that was always there; we just had to make sure we had the right people.

Question: Something about electrical equipment being powered up while you're refueling, and so forth?

LtGen Kondra: Yeah...and there's also some reluctance among some people to do that. "Hot turns"...what I was looking for there was, rather than taking four hours to preflight a C-5, or two hours to do a 141, we'd have the inbound crews met by the outbound crews. Then they could have a face-to-face transfer there, and they wouldn't have to go through all that business.

Question: With engines running and all?

LtGen Kondra: Well, not necessarily with engines running, because you had to refuel. But you ought to be able to have a "passing," where the two crews sit there and discuss any problems with the aircraft.

Comment: This "hot turns" idea was one of the things I asked Col Clay about in an interview session for the 1991 history. He told me that "hot turns" were commonly employed by MAC during the Vietnam War, and that the program "worked pretty well" when they put it into effect again during DESERT SHIELD.<sup>79</sup>

## **Balancing Eastbound-Westbound Flow**

LtGen Kondra:(continuing): Yes...I also put down here "no delay for home station." In other words, you don't delay departures to match up crews that were returning to their home stations...you move the airplanes, get them out of there, and then we'd shuttle the crews around afterwards, if we had to. "NAF (21 AF) has to adjust the flow - eastbound vs. westbound emphasis..." We were putting so much of the

<sup>79</sup>Referring to Col Michael T. Clay, then the 21 AF DCS/Operations. The interview in question took place on 17 Jun 91; a transcript of it may be found in Appendix XII of the 21 AF CY1991 history.

emphasis on everything going eastbound, and we had to be just as conscious of the stuff going westbound because it's a total system. You can't just concentrate on sending them to one place and not worry about getting them back through, to get them to the onload points again.

Question: Were the westbound planes carrying much on the way back?

LtGen Kondra: No, they were basically empty. There was some retrograde stuff, but not much.

### **"Plywood CRAF" For 22 AF Channel Airlift**

LtGen Kondra:(continuing): Oh, here's something: "Call 22nd (AF) on the plywood CRAF." The "plywood CRAF" is where you take a passenger-configured 747 and you pull out the seats. You don't have rails; you cover the floor with plywood and you floor-load it.

Question: How do you secure things?

LtGen Kondra: With nets and rings...but it is a tedious job, and it takes time. The idea was to use this in 22 AF, where the ground times were not critical, and that some (lift) was better than none out there (in the Pacific theater), because we still had users that needed airlift. We didn't want them in here (in the 21 AF area), because we didn't want to increase any ground times...but out in the 22nd area, where they were getting very little lift, they had plenty of people and time. So giving them some lift, even though it was inefficient, was better than no lift at all. We went to the "plywood CRAF," with one 747 and two DC-10s...at least that's what we were talking about doing. But I think we only did one 747.

Question: This was for (22 AF's) normal channel requirements, then?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...because realize that 95 percent of all the available airlift was going over here (eastbound).

### **Concern Over Possible NEO Diverts**

LtGen Kondra:(continuing): "NEO, any diverts?" We needed to be concerned, if there were any diverts, because we needed to make sure that incoming stuff wasn't diverted when we had all these people going someplace other than where they thought they were going. You see, when they were coming into the States they were going to Charlotte (NC).

### **Boeing Seeks \$22 Million Payment From Pan Am**



Question: You've got something here about "Boeing wants court order to pay \$22 million"?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...this was about two 747s that had gone through the CRAF modification and were sitting at Boeing's Wichita plant. Pan Am hadn't paid for them yet, and they're just sitting there...and Boeing wants their \$22 million. We were trying to get those airplanes into the fleet and use them - but somebody's got to pay Boeing first before that can happen.

Question: Did it ever happen, do you remember? Did somebody pay Boeing?

LtGen Kondra: Towards the end, we finally got them.

### **Incident Involving AAVS Crew Entering Spain With Sidearms**

LtGen Kondra:(continuing): This thing on AAVS,<sup>80</sup> at Torrejon... CENTCOM had validated the requirement for AAVS combat cameramen to be on board SAC airplanes. They did that...and they had handcarried weapons on board with them - weapons tasked by SAC and confirmed by USAFE - and when they landed in Spain the weapons were confiscated when they went through a commercial gate, or something. And it caused an international furor, which was blown all out of proportion about the violations, etc. But the bottom line was, the AAVS guys had done exactly what they were told to do.

Question: Did they get their weapons back, eventually?

LtGen Kondra: Yes.

### **23 January Entries:**

#### **BGen Tenoso Request For More C-130 Crews**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): OK, here on the 23rd, a significant thing here is, "Tenoso needs 16 'E' crews and 10 'H' (C-130) crews ASAP for 14 days." What was happening was that he was flying the 130s over there at such high ute rates that he was running out of crews. He didn't need more airplanes, just more crews. We sent them over.

### **Allegations By Army Commander And His Subsequent Visit To Charleston; MAC Adversaries Become MAC Advocates**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Then there's this Army visit to Charleston thing. This started with an Army commander making a lot of allegations that his command

80. AAVS = Aerospace Audiovisual Services; at the time, a subsidiary of MAC.

wasn't being supported, and that things that he needed - which happened to be helicopter parts - were not moving through the system fast enough.

Question: You mean through DESERT EXPRESS?

LtGen Kondra: Yes. The MAC system was "all screwed up." He wrote a five-page, scathing message, within Army channels, about how MAC was screwing everything up.

Question: Did you get a copy?

LtGen Kondra: I never did see it. But I talked to the Army G-4, a two-star, and he went down to Charleston. Actually, the commander went down there first. And after he left he was so impressed with what was going on at Charleston and DESERT EXPRESS and how it was operating, etc., that you would have thought that he thought of it! He in turn asked the Army logistics (G-4) guy to go down there...and instead of having adversaries we ended up gaining advocates who were supportive of what we were doing; they came over to our side.

Question: Changed his tune totally, eh?

LtGen Kondra: Yes.

#### **Two DESERT EXPRESS Missions Daily**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "DESERT EXPRESS, going at 1330, 1430." This was interesting...this is where all of a sudden stuff starts showing up with these big yellow round stickers that say "DESERT EXPRESS" on them, for easy identification.

Question: And you had, by this time, gotten that team out to check and make sure that only the right kind of cargo was being marked for DESERT EXPRESS, hadn't you?

LtGen Kondra: Yes.

#### **LANTCOM Misinformation Problem Re C-141s, C-5s**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): We had a problem with LANTCOM<sup>81</sup> on the 23rd of January, in that somebody in Europe had said that the "141s were piling up in Europe," and that we (MAC) "had big maintenance problems with C-141s and C-5s."

Question: So they told LANTCOM this?

LtGen Kondra: Somebody in EUCOM told LANTCOM that. This was a call from LANTCOM to me, asking "Is this why our carriers weren't being supported?" All of this was nonsense; the planes were not "piling up" in Europe. We had non-airlifters making comments they had no business making.

Question: You must've spent a lot of time putting out these kinds of fires, eh?

81. LANTCOM = Atlantic Command (US Navy); headquartered at Norfolk, VA.

LtGen Kondra: Oh, God, yes.

#### **Navy C-9s Used In Europe To Haul Passengers**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "EUCOM to use C-9s." We were using Navy C-9s over there; I've got here, "three will work per week out of Lakenheath (UK) to Taif," instead of using 141s.

Question: Were these for the high-ranking types, moving around Europe and to the AOR?

LtGen Kondra: Oh, no...anybody who needed to move; this was strictly troop movements. This was part of those nine C-9s we had over there.

#### **24 January Entries:**

##### **MAC Teams To Rome, Brussels, Paris To Assist CRAF Crews**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "CRAF crews, Rome, Brussels..." OK - what we did here was send teams to Rome, Brussels and Paris to brief the CRAF crews, teach them how to use chem gear, and also to give them threat briefings, intel briefings...all of the things that they would need to give them that 'warm fuzzy' that they could get in and out of the AOR without any problem.

Question: This is on the 24th of January? (Yes) The question occurs, why did it take so long to implement this sort of program?

LtGen Kondra: Well, we didn't really think we had a problem earlier. But as the Scuds started coming, they (the CRAF crews) became a little more nervous. Our other system wasn't working, wasn't satisfying them...so we sent people to these places, and that worked very well.

Comment: Well, their concern was understandable; for a long time we were worried that those Scuds could be carrying poison gas, or biological warfare things...

LtGen Kondra: Oh, yes.

##### **Consideration Of MAC, SAC Use Of Fairford (England), Moron, Rome**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): We had talked about using Fairford, in England, as a base. The question was whether we (MAC) were going to use it or SAC was; SAC said no, they were going to send their B-52s to Moron (Spain). They wanted to move some KC-10s into Rome, and that was going to be a problem.

Question: What was the problem with that?

LtGen Kondra: Well, you were going to clog up the area if you did that; we had other things going through there.

Question: Did you actually end up using Fairford?

LtGen Kondra: No, we did not. It had all been pickled and it was going to take too much to get it ready. We (MAC) did not use it; I'm not sure that, before all was said and done, that SAC didn't use it.

#### **Number Of Bravo Alert Crews Reduced**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "Bravo alerts, two to three at each base..." Instead of having all crews on Bravo alert when they came in, we told our bases they could use two or three of them; they didn't have to tie up everybody that way.

#### **Concern Over Pallets, Nets, Straps; Pallet Recovery Teams In AOR**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Then there was concern over the pallets, nets and straps. The pallets and nets were OK, but the straps were a problem. I was working with Dean Rich,<sup>82</sup> who was Chief of Supply at MAC, to get more straps...and we were going to start putting together permanent pallet recovery teams in the AOR to go out and clean, stack and get pallets ready for shipment back (to the CONUS).

Question: So that's one of the things the returning airplanes did carry back, I presume...a lot of pallets and nets and stuff?

LtGen Kondra: Oh, yes, lots of them.

#### **Concern Over Terrorist Threat Prompts Precautions Taken By OSA Crews**

Question: You also say something here about "OSA<sup>83</sup> crews - armed since Threatcon Bravo"?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...when we went to Threatcon Bravo, one (OSA) crewmember was armed, they didn't carry any stars in the windows, we didn't identify who was on board, everybody was in flight suits. We started (the OSA) crews wearing flight suits around this time; before this they were wearing blue short-sleeved shirts. Those crews are still in flight suits today; they love it, and we've never gone back. No visible weapons, no RONS<sup>84</sup> at civilian fields. We were concerned about the terrorist threat, of course.

#### **More Patriot Missile Moves**

82. Speaking of Col Robert D. "Dean" Rich, then Hq MAC Director of Supply.

83. OSA = Operational Support Aircraft. C-21s, C-12As, etc.

84. RONS = Remain Over Night(s).

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Here's something about the move of some more Patriots - "17 launchers out of Germany, two firing batteries, 26 Patriot-II missiles, 10 out of Ramstein, six unknown, 10 en route to Ramstein to be diverted to Israel, start within 24 hours, IOC within 48 hours.<sup>85</sup> Execute Patriot move on 24th at 1905Z." I was keeping book on these moves, because the first load was supposed to arrive at 2115Z and be at the aircraft at 2350Z, and it departed at 0216Z. We had somebody in the Army over there accusing that we weren't moving them fast enough, so I was just maintaining a book on it all.

### **Soviet AN-224 Checkout**

Question: You had an entry here again about the Soviet's AN-224 transport...<sup>86</sup>

LtGen Kondra: Yes...there was a request for us to do a look-see to determine if the AN-224 could be used. What we found was, first, it couldn't haul passengers because it doesn't have an oxygen system. And it doesn't have any rails, so you can't put 463L pallets on board. It has no rollers. They use a system called "skate wheels" to move stuff in and out. Rolling stock - trucks, vehicles - would have to be shored, because the floors are weak; shoring is needed to distribute the weight. The rear doors don't open, so you have to back everything in, so that you can drive it off at the destination. The aircraft doesn't forward-kneel. Containers and crates...they literally have beams in the ceiling (of the cargo compartment) and a crane that goes along and drops down a hook to pick up the crates; very time consuming, very inefficient. Instead of being able to just roll the stuff on and off, the only way to move it is through the use of these cranes that move back and forth on these I-beams in the ceiling. It's a very antiquated system - something like the one we used in the C-124s, back in the '60s.

Question: What years were these planes made, these AN-224s? Are they the same age, for instance, as our C-5s?

LtGen Kondra: No, they were built after the C-5...they were probably made in the 80s.

Comment: You'd think they would have learned, from observation...

LtGen Kondra: Yes, they're usually pretty good copiers. But they did not. So we didn't use them, because they were going to be too much trouble.

### **25 - 27 January Entries:**

85. *IOC = Initial Operational Capability.*

86. *See also p. 89.*

### **More On Patriot, Mark-117 Bomb Moves; Bombs Required Special C-5 Aircraft Used To Haul Lumber To Guam**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): On the 25th of January... "Patriot moves - are going to take 17 C-5s, 10 C-141s." We expected to close this batch on the 26th at 1539Z. "Mark-117s" - we were still using specially-configured C-5s out of Kelly (AFB, TX) that were made bigger on the interior to haul the space capsule for the shuttle crews...we were using them to haul the lumber from Korea to Guam to line the ships. There are some special handling characteristics with that airplane, and it takes specially qualified loadmasters to operate the doors and do some things. So rather than getting them mixed up in the system, we were using them "off-line" to haul the lumber.

Comment/Question: I find it odd that we had to go all the way to Korea to get the lumber, when God knows we've got enough lumber in this country?

LtGen Kondra: Well, Korea's a lot closer to Guam than this country is.

### **Use Of AF Systems Command C-141s For Channel Missions**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): We were also using the AF System Command's C-141s to operate the channel missions to the Caribbean and the North Country.<sup>87</sup> We were using every airplane that we could lay our hands on.

### **CRAF Refusals Of Nighttime Slots; Concern Over Scud Attacks**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): What have I got here... "FedEx, Northwest, World, AMT would not accept nighttime slots." Oh, yes...they would not go into the AOR at night.

Question: Just those four?

LtGen Kondra: Yes. We said that was unacceptable. We went back and did an analysis of when the most Scuds were being launched...the most likely times. So what we did was not schedule any commercials in during those times. We didn't tell anybody, but we treated everybody the same. We didn't treat FedEx, Northwest, World or AMT any differently than we treated Evergreen, Tower, Continental, American, or whoever else; we just avoided scheduling commercials in during that time frame. We put military aircraft in during those times, though.

Question: Most of the Scud attacks occurred at night, didn't they?

LtGen Kondra: Yes.

<sup>87</sup>. Referring here to channel missions flown to Greenland and Iceland.

### **Handling Characteristics, "Unstretched" vs. "Stretched" C-141s**

Question: Those System Command 141s, the "unstretched" ones...now, you've flown both the short and long versions of the C-141, haven't you? (Yes) Do they handle differently?

LtGen Kondra: I think the stretched one is more stable. The biggest problem with the stretched 141 is while you're taxiing...you cannot see the wingtips as easy as you could the other one. Flying it, it's easier.

### **Patriot Missions Close On Time; 21,000 Bombs Hauled By Airlift**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Here's more (on the 26th) on the Patriot moves - "15 C-5s on the 26th have closed, three 141s have closed, six left." And on the M-117 (bombs): "535 tons per day, 21,000 bombs" we had to haul by air..

Question: These bombs were going to be dropped by what aircraft?

LtGen Kondra: Probably by B-52s, although some were going to be dropped by other aircraft.

Question: How heavy is one M-117, do you know?

LtGen Kondra: 500 pounds, I believe.

### **Call To John Shea, "Mr. MAC," On The CRAF Activation**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): I had a note here about John Shea. When we activated the CRAF...there's an interesting story connected to him that I think is worthy of mention. Mr. Shea was the Assistant XP (at Hq MAC) for many years - over 20 of them. He was "Mr. MAC." He probably had more to do with the policy and formulation of the CRAF than any other single person in the whole DOD. He was with the program from its inception back in the early '50s.

Comment: Yes, I met him once, I remember, at a history conference. I thought he had retired.

LtGen Kondra: He did; he retired in the early '80s. The night that we activated Stage 1 of the CRAF, I called him at his home in Kansas City, at about 1700L, I believe. I used to work for him, as a major. I said to him, "Mr. Shea, you made history tonight." He said, "What did I do?" I said, "We activated the CRAF for the first time in the 38-year history of the program, and I thought you'd like to know that your program has come to fruition." His only question was, "Who did it? Did the CINC do it? Or did the Secretary (of the AF) do it?" And I said, "The CINC did it." He said, "Right on! That's the way it was supposed to be." It was so neat - I *could see him smiling*, through the phone...I mean, he was absolutely elated.

Comment: Yes, I'll bet...his judgment was vindicated.

LtGen Kondra: Yeah. John Shea is a remarkable man, and it was great for me to be able to pick up the phone and call him, after all these years. He's really a super guy.

#### **49% Of Bar Coded Cargo "No Hits"**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Oh, we were talking earlier about the bar coders?<sup>88</sup> Here, on the 27th, I get a report: 49 percent of the cargo coming in was "no hits." In other words, it wasn't in the computer system, and that really slowed down the processing.

Comment: Yeah...they've got to improve on that before the next war.

#### **ROK AF Contribution Of C-130 Aircraft**

LtGen Kondra: Let's see, here on the 27th...the 7th AF Commander called to tell me that the Republic of Korea (ROK) AF wanted to send some 130s to the AOR - five of them, I believe - , and they wanted some help. They wanted to bed down at a USAF base, out of Scud range, and to tap in to the AF supply system. We worked that issue, and they eventually got there. They wanted to be a part of the coalition, and he wanted to know how to go about doing that.

Question: You said a "USAF base..."?

LtGen Kondra: Yes, they wanted to bed down at one of our bases...not at a Saudi base, or a British one; they wanted to be co-located with one of our 130 units. Regarding the ROK AF 130s...7th AF called and advised that it would be a CENTCOM decision, whether or not they wanted any more C-130s. We could accommodate them over there, but they had to go to the Saudi government and get approval, and they needed to work with the CENTCOM J-3...and they would probably be bedded down at Al Ain (in Oman), and use the US supply system. We worked that out with the Logistics guys. Regarding those five ROK C-130s; they'll go through the Western Pacific, and here we're trying to determine here how they'll be tasked, what beddown support they need at Al Ain, etc. I think they wound up going to King Khalid, rather than Al Ain, though.

#### **895 Tons Of M-117 Bombs Hauled Out Of Hill AFB**

Question: And here's something again about the M-117 bombs..."895 tons..."?

88. See p. 102.



LtGen Kondra: Yes..."895 tons of bombs, the 28th load out of Hill; AF allocation is 240 tons until the 178 (Julian) day, then up to 300 tons to the 197 day; 45 C-141 or 15 C-5 loads," just for hauling iron bombs.

#### **AOR Routes, Airspace Clutter**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): There was also something here about "AOR routes, go south due to the fighters."

Question: Too much clutter in the airspace, I suppose?

LtGen Kondra: Yeah..."alternate Jeddah, across at 6,000 feet," which we said was a non-player. It would have burned too much gas, and we'd have no ACL if we had to do that. We eventually got that changed.

#### **Scud "Windows" Determined As 1600-2100Z**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): And here's also where we got into scheduling the CRAF around the Scud windows. The "Scud windows" were from 1600-2100Z; we scheduled no commercials in during those times.

#### **28 - 29 January Entries:**

##### **Foreign Carrier Surveys; Decision To Use For Cargo Only**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "El Al use for Patriots...survey or not survey?" This had to do with whether we had to go and survey the company. We have an Air Carrier Analysis System (ACAS) at MAC...a group of people who, as a result of the Gander crash, are responsible for performing air carrier surveys to make certain that, if a carrier is going to do business with the government, that they're qualified to do so. We check their maintenance, their crew qualifications, their training, their equipment, their financial status - all of those things. The issue here was, were we going to have to survey or not survey the foreign carriers? The decision was made to use foreign carriers for cargo only. No passengers, no couriers on board. The survey was not addressed.

##### **SAC Use Of Fairford Base (UK) - Torrejon Pipeline Back In JP-4 Operation**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Let's see...we've got "30 Buffs (B-52s), 16 KC-10s, five KC-10s to Zaragoza, will look at Fairford for both B-52s and KC-10s." You asked me earlier if we'd used Fairford, and I said I thought that SAC might use it for their B-52s? They did. "Torrejon...fuel back on 1 February, back to normal by 9 February." That had to do with getting that pipeline purged of the heating oil.

### **Routing Of C-5s Through Egypt With Israeli Mine Clearing Equipment**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "18 C-5s, Israel to Saudi with mine clearing...they'll go though Egypt."

Question: They couldn't fly directly from Israel to Saudi, eh? (No) Isn't that ridiculous, though?

LtGen Kondra: Yes.. they had to stop in Egypt.

Comment: To "purify themselves," no doubt.

LtGen Kondra: Yep.

Question: And these are *Americans* flying these planes, right? Not Israelis.

LtGen Kondra: Yes, but the fact that they depart from Israel, with their (the Israelis' mine clearing equipment on board...and we're gonna use it...but they've got to land in Egypt first.

Comment: And I suppose this wasn't the only incident of this nature.

LtGen Kondra: No, there were others.

Question: Regarding the movement of the mine clearing equipment...the Egyptians, obviously, had no objection to missions originating in Israel landing there?

LtGen Kondra: No, they didn't have any objections.

Comment: Thank you, Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin.

### **Request For Second C-29 Aircraft, Support Personnel**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Here on the 29th..."C-29s, check flight status." The C-29s are the navajds-checking airplanes, and here they're requesting a second airplane in the AOR. They also wanted a person to be assigned to the ALCC for them. We eventually ended up doing that.

### **Complaint Re Trump Shuttle**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "Two-hour ground time, new crew, must get off because no crew on board." Yes...this was a call that came in complaining about the Trump Shuttle, that they had a two-hour ground time. Let's say they'd gone from the East to the West Coast and the crew was gonna swap out at Norton, or something. The complaint was that the guys on board had to get off the airplane - and they'd been up for hours and all they wanted to do was stay on board and sleep. People were making them get off because there was no crew on board, and they didn't want to leave the plane powered up, plus the FAA rules, etc. I think we finally got that squared away and they didn't screw around with the crews anymore.

### 30-31 January Entries:

#### **Second C-29 Arrives In AOR**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): The second C-29 was due in country today (the 30th). They kept one for about a week, 10 days, and then sent it back.

Question: How many C-29s did you end up with over there, do you remember?

LtGen Kondra: Two, I believe.

#### **HMET Mission Count**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): On the HMETs...there were 43 (C-5) missions, we've closed 26 of them, and two were operating (on the 30th) - leaving 15 HMET missions to go.

#### **Restrictions On Japanese Paid-For Airlift**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): On the 30th..."\$18 million left for airlift..." The Japanese were paying for Evergreen's airlift. An issue (on the 31st) was that "Japan will pay for the lift from CONUS to Brussels, but from Brussels to the AOR MAC must contract." Remember, Japan would not pay for the movement of war materials to the AOR. What they ended up doing was paying for the lift from the CONUS to Belgium, and from there MAC had to contract for the movement to the AOR. That way the Japanese didn't pay for "war goods" that went directly to the AOR, only to Brussels.

### 1 - 4 February Entries:

#### **Luxembourg's Desire To Participate; Air Italia Offers DC-8 Aircraft**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): On 1 February...Luxembourg wanted us to come through there; they were offering free fuel, and they wanted us to use their airport. But we really didn't have any need for it. And Air Italia offered us the use of a DC-8 through the month of February.

#### **First M-117 Bombs To Begin Arriving AOR By Ship In Mid-February**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): I also make mention here that the first M-117s are supposed to arrive on the 13th of February. Those are the ones that were going by ship.

Question: Did you stop airlifting those in, after awhile? When the rest of them started coming in by ship? Or did you continue throughout the war?

LtGen Kondra: I think we finally quit hauling them once they got there by ship. But we were still hauling them up to the 13th (of February).

#### **Army Sherpa Aircraft In AOR**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): There's a note here that "there are five Army Sherpas in the AOR." These are the EDS Sherpas that we took down from the squadron in Europe, gave to the Army...and the Army has now moved them into the AOR and are using them there for all sorts of things.

#### **Six "Plywood CRAF" Airplanes Used In Pacific - DLA Cargo Main Source Of "No Hits" - Sustainment Tasking: 1600 Tons Daily**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Also, here on the 4th, we've got six plywood CRAF airplanes out in the Pacific...I wasn't sure there were that many. Oh, regarding the "no hits" business on the cargo coming into Dover...39 percent of the "no hits" were on DLA cargo, so they're the prime culprit. And it's 1,600 tons a day (of lift required) for sustainment, plus 820 tons a day for Unit Line Numbers (ULNs) to Day 191.

Question: You made the 1,600 ton quota?

LtGen Kondra: That's what we were allocated.

#### **5 - 8 February Entries:**

##### **Routing Change, Israeli Mine Clearing Equipment**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): The mine clearing equipment that we're lifting...instead of going through Egypt, we're going through Incirlik.

Question: Through Turkey?

LtGen Kondra: Yes.. through Turkey, and then into country. Better ops out of Incirlik. So from Israel we flew up to Incirlik, then back down, across Egypt, and across.

Comment: Pretty circuitous route.

LtGen Kondra: Yes.

#### **Up To Seven C-141 Polar Flights Per Day - Requirements Starting To "Dry Up," Altus Restarted**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Here on the 6th..."C-141 polar flights, seven per day." We started to run those back to the West Coast, from Upper Heyford and Torrejon. We could do it in a basic crew duty day. Also here..."requirements are starting to dry

up; need to crank up Altus." We're thinking about getting the training started again.

Question: The workload actually diminished (for MAC) once the war got going, didn't it?

LtGen Kondra: Not really.

#### **HMET, M-117, BLU-82 Shipment Status, RAF VC-10s In Flow - 10,000th Airlift Mission Lands At Dhahran**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "7 February - HMETs - 53; 47 closed, six remain, four en route. M-117s - 46 missions, 45 closed, one remains, one en route. BLU-82s - five missions, three closed, two remain and are en route. RAF VC-10s, two per week to AOR this week; CONOPs<sup>89</sup> has been passed."

Question: Those VC-10s...what kind of an aircraft is that?

LtGen Kondra: It's an RAF four-engined transport, the one with the engines on the tail, two on each side. Also here on the 7th..."10,000th airlift mission lands at Dhahran."

#### **TRANSCOM Attempt To Change DESERT EXPRESS Schedule**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): (8 February) "DESERT EXPRESS"...somebody at TRANSCOM has decided we're going to move the DESERT EXPRESS (departure time) up to 1030 (daily), vice 1230.

Question: And there must have been a "good reason" behind that idea?

LtGen Kondra: I have no idea...but 75 percent of the shipments would miss the first flight if we did that.

Question: You pointed this out, I presume?

LtGen Kondra: Yeah. Let's see...I was TDY on 9-10 February...

#### **11-15 February Entries:**

##### **ID Kits To Mark AOR Vehicles**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): (11 February) "ID kits..." Oh, yes...we needed to move "friendly ID kits" to mark our vehicles. They had to be painted in a certain way so that people could tell who was who.

Comment: Yes..."friendly fire" definitely became an issue over there.

LtGen Kondra: Yes...and the ID kits began moving on the 11th, one C-5 per day for the next 14 days. It was some kind of IR (infrared) paint.

89. CONOPs = Concept Of Operations.

### **ROK AF C-130s In Place - Use Of Modified 767s For Airevacs**

Question: OK...you're on the 11th?

LtGen Kondra: Yes..."ROK AF is in place... 767s in airevac mode." Here's where we're talking about taking commercial 767s and modifying them by taking out the seats and replacing them with litter stanchions and oxygen, so they could be used to haul patients. And we're trying to speed this process up here. We eventually got an airplane configured and ran a test on it - even though we didn't need to use it - to see how we were going to operate with it.

Question: Do you remember what airline provided these 767s?

LtGen Kondra: American had done some, and Delta. I don't remember which airline provided the airplane that was modified for this test, though.

### **Criteria For Aerial Achievement, Air Medals**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "MPC meeting, DP and XO, check criteria with CENTAF, one per tour..." OK, this had to do with the criteria for the Aerial Achievement Medal (AAM). You get one per tour...that's 25 Weather Recon, north or south, 70 degrees, 15 cyclone reconnaissance missions, 20 SOUTHCOM support - that takes two or three years - five 'heavy jump' missions (that's a classified mission), 15 radar site one-way missions. That's up in Alaska, if you went in to an airfield where you can only land one way, plus unique missions like the two-day midwinter drop down on Antarctica...you can be put in for an AAM for all these. We were still waiting for the CENTAF input here to determine what it's going to take to qualify for AAMs and Air Medals. It was going to take 30 combat support missions, apparently, for an Air Medal, or 15 combat missions - meaning missions under hostile fire - to be eligible for the Air Medal.<sup>90</sup>

### **Israeli Airlift Of Patriot Missiles From Europe - Backhaul Of Spanish Missiles**

Question: I noted something else here on the 11th - "Israeli airlift to support Patriot moves..."?

LtGen Kondra: Yes..."three 707s - C-130s per week." That's to resupply them, I think, from Europe down to the Israelis...they (the Israelis) were going to handle that. (*reading notes*) "Backhaul of Spanish missiles to Germany..." We used a mission out of Moron to do that, to provide lift for all the support they'd given us.

<sup>90.</sup> See also footnote, p. 70, re criteria for the Air Medal (Capt. J. Simmons, 39 TAS, telecon, 13 Jan 92).

Question: *Spanish* missiles? (Yes) What kind?

LtGen Kondra: I don't know what they were. They were taken back to Spain for overhaul. We brought them in, and they wanted to take them back to Germany. They were part of NATO's forces.

Question: Oh...they weren't being used in DESERT STORM?

LtGen Kondra: No.

### **Army Insistence On No Commercial Airlift For MFO Swapouts**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "MFO movement - need to resolve." This has to do with the Multi-National Peacekeeping Force in the Sinai. "Twenty tons, plus 100 people, DC-8 or DC-10, or two C-141s." They were to make two shuttles, operating on the 15th from McChord (AFB, WA) to Ras Nasrani (Egypt) to Stewart (AFB, NY). This was one of those issues that was absolutely unbelievable, and it will come up again. It has to do with the Gander crash again. The Army said, back then, that their people would "never have to go on a commercial aircraft again," and that they'll use 141s or C-5s (for the MFO troop swapouts). We're saying here that this is a great time to break this. We've now moved some 530,000 people to Saudi Arabia, 95 percent of them on commercial aircraft, and now is the time to start using commercials to move these (MFO) people. This thing went round and around and around...and at the last minute the commercials were cancelled and we had to use 141s. It went all the way to the Chief of Staff.

Question: And they refused to use the commercial lift? (Yes) Who's in charge of this MFO thing, anyway?

LtGen Kondra: Well, it's a NATO operation...but it's the movement of US Army forces.

Question: Only US Army?

LtGen Kondra: That's what we're responsible for moving.

Question: And the Army was the one digging in their heels and saying they wouldn't go commercial, eh?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...and it went all the way to the Chief of Staff; he was the one who said "No."

Question: And yet you'd safely flown over 500,000 people over there in DESERT SHIELD? (Yes) Another political football. I guess.

LtGen Kondra: Yes...it's a very emotional issue.

### **C-141s To Be Used For In-Country Shuttles**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "13 February - may need 141s to shuttle in country." Yes, to move things back and forth - rather than getting additional C-130s over there, they'd use 141s to haul ammunition and stuff out of Thumrait (Oman), where they would bed down.

Question: You actually ended up doing some of this?

LtGen Kondra: Yes, we did do some.

#### **Concern Over Possible Requirement For CDS Airdrop Assets In AOR**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "CDS, airdrop assets, no training going on; Army says they'll line haul or airland...don't need CDS." We were concerned that, as we got closer and closer to the ground offensive, that we might have to use some CDS...and did we have the buffer boards, plus all those things we talked about before? Were the crews proficient, etc.?91

#### **Need To Increase MOG At King Khalid Military City, 20 To 30**

Question: OK, here on the 14th you're talking about getting "KKMC to increase the MOG to 30..."?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...that's getting them to let us use KKMC; we needed to move that up.

#### **TAC Wants C-141s For Thunderbird Support**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): In the middle of all this, TAC is still worried about their T-bird (Thunderbird) support, saying that C-130s are "not suitable" for the Thunderbirds, they want 141s. I told them we'd try to use 141s if we could, but we had 130s identified and we'll use them.

Question: Oh, the air show business was continuing?

LtGen Kondra (agreeing): They were getting ready to gin up for their season; I told them I couldn't commit 141s.

Question: Did they go along with that?

LtGen Kondra: You'll eventually see...we ended up giving them 141s.

Comment: I might have guessed that!

#### **Use Of Floor-Loaded 747s**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "Six 747s, floor loaded, will continue operations through February." As a last resort - they'd be the first to go, when we didn't need 91. See p. 78.



to do it anymore. We'd make a decision on the 21st of February (this was on the 14th).

### **Pan Am Bankruptcy, MAC Options**

Question: You also had here, "Pan Am bankruptcy - legal options?"

LtGen Kondra: Yes...all this has to do is with MAC securing its assets, securing its investment in the CRAF modifications, because Pan Am had 19 airframes that had been modified...and were paid for. So if they (Pan Am) were going out of business, they owed MAC a couple hundred million dollars - and MAC was trying to position itself to make sure it got paid.

Question: I wonder if they ever got any of it?

LtGen Kondra: I don't know...that's all happened since I left.

### **Last-Minute Cancellation Of Commercial Lift For MFO Swapout**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Here's more on the MFO...we were going to use a TWA L-1011, on the 16th of February. This is the 15th; pretty soon I'm going to get the word that that's cancelled and I'm going to have to use 141s.

### **16 - 20 February Entries:**

**Shuttles Between Dhahran, KKMC - CRAF Use Of KKMC- C-141 Shuttles, Thumrait - KKMC "Out" When Ground War Begins**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "16 February - 21 AF and ALCC working CONOPs of shuttle between Dhahran and KKMC, with in-system selects of 141s or C-5s; looking to stage at Dhahran. Tenoso - KKMC to readdress CRAF, shuttle in, corridors for CRAF."

Question: Yes...what was that all about?

LtGen Kondra: Well, because KKMC was surrounded by Saudi air defense, you had to have an IFF<sup>92</sup> system to go in there...and there were some other restrictions regarding TACANs. And the commercials didn't have a compatible IFF, so there was a real concern about putting them in there.

Question: So you didn't put CRAFs into KKMC?

LtGen Kondra: I think we finally got approval, later on, and did. Then, "C-141 shuttles, stage...new ramp ready on 1 March." These are the shuttles between Thumrait and KKMC. When we went to (the ground) war, it (KKMC) was going to be out of business.

92. IFF = Identification, Friend or Foe.

## 21 - 28 February Entries:

### **Army Troops Positioning For Ground Offensive - Resistance To Idea Of Full-Blown Air Evac Exercise**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "Four more days of C-141 shuttles, Dhahran to KKMC..." We're moving Army troops up closer to the border (between Saudi Arabia-Kuwait-Iraq). And here, on the 21st...some flight surgeon rep over there wanted to run a full-blown air evac exercise, using airplanes to exercise the system. We didn't want to do it because we needed the airplanes for other things and we didn't want to go through the goat-rope of fully configuring up an airplane for air evac just to "exercise the system."

### **MFO Move Requires Six C-141s - No CRAF Into KKMC**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "The MFO will move by C-141s on the 25-26 February."

Comment: T'was ever thus. How many planes?

LtGen Kondra: Two airplanes, two shuttles. "Commercials into KKMC - leave it alone." I guess we're not going to do anything there, as far as the CRAF going in there.

### **"Deep Throat" Weapon Move, From Eglin To AOR**

Question: OK, also here on the 21st: "Mike Ryan - Deep Throat, 60 foot penetration." What was that all about?

LtGen Kondra: Mike was the TAC DO. They were performing tests on a weapon that would be used to go after deep underground bunkers. It's made out of a gun barrel - a big one. It'll be dropped, and it'll penetrate 60 feet through hard concrete. They'd finished two tests and they had two more to go, on the 26th. Then it was going direct from Eglin (AFB, FL) to the AOR. Mike was giving me a heads-up that we needed to be ready to load at Eglin at 1800Z on the 26th. All this was secure, over classified lines at the time, of course - but it's been in the papers since. He (MGen Ryan) coined the term "Deep Throat." They were dropped, within a matter of hours, after they got to the AOR.

Comment: Yes...I recall reading something about them, now that you mention it.

### **Reefer Vans From Norway - 600 Pallets Needed For Transfer Cases**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "Reefer vans, coming out of Norway, 26 Feb - 2 Mar." What we're talking about here is the movement of refrigerated vans down there to handle human remains. "CENTCOM J-3, J-4 is requesting to retain three 141s until the 1st of March...600 pallets needed, to be used for transfer cases."

Question: "Transfer cases?"

LtGen Kondra: Yes...for the movement of human remains.

#### **4,000 Man Tent City Planned To House POWs**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): This was from Ed Tenoso... "4,000 man tent city to house POWs; needs eight C-141s and 16 crews."

Comment: Well, they ended up with a helluva lot more than 4,000 of them, that's for sure.

LtGen Kondra: Yes...but you see, this is on the 23rd of February; that's what they're planning on.

Comment: They had to expand their plan a little bit!<sup>93</sup>

#### **"First In, First Out"; After Conclusion Of 100 Hour Ground War (23-27 February), CINC Directs Moves To Begin MAC Retrograde Movement Of Personnel, Equipment**

LtGen Kondra "First C-130 unit to Sharjah, active-Reserve, first in, first out..."

Question: You're bringing home a squadron, or something, from Sharjah? That's what it sounds like.

LtGen Kondra: They would be one of the first ones out, since they were one of the first in. We're starting to talk about bringing stuff back, now. When did the ground war start, do you remember?

Answer: 23 February - and it only lasted for 100 hours.

LtGen Kondra: Yes. You see, here we are on the 27th of February and the CINC is already starting to talk "transitions, training, Reserve release, aircraft, aerial ports, maintenance phase-in, going back to leaves, the stop-loss program, the symbolic returns, CRAF vs. organic?"

#### **Symbolic Troop Returns - Making Up For Lost Training Time - Return Of AWADS Squadron- Stop-Loss Program To Continue While Reserves Serve**

*93. Shortly after the ground offensive began, Iraqi soldiers began surrendering en masse; at one point, CNN reported over 50,000 were being held by coalition forces.*

LtGen Kondra (continuing): That last, on the symbolic returns, was about whether we were going to use CRAF or organic aircraft to bring the first guys home on. We'd get some guidance on that, later. And we're talking about getting our best equipment back, bringing the Altus school back up with airdrop and A/R training, and how to make up for the lost time there. Plus bringing the AWADS squadron back to Pope, along with five Pope crews and aircraft...oh, these were from Woodbridge (UK); they'd been sent over there to support some special unit.

Question: You were canceling the stop-loss program at about this time, weren't you?

LtGen Kondra: Not yet. My view was that we should not cancel stop-loss as long as we still had Reservists called up.

### **OSA Aircrews To Remain In Flight Suits - 1,736 Troops In First Symbolic Redeployment, 1 March**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "Leave OSA in flight suits until CINC says to disarm..." And they're still there! "1 March - first retrogrades back, 1,736 troops." Let's stop there.

Comment: Yes...that's a good quitting point.

## **END OF FIFTH SESSION**

### **SESSION 6 - ENTRIES OF 1 MARCH - 30 APRIL 1991**<sup>94</sup>

#### **1-3 March Entries:**

#### **Return Of 375th AW To CONUS; Input From Wings Re Cessation Of Stop-Loss Program - Replacing ALCE Personnel In AOR**

LtGen Kondra: Here (on 1 March) we're talking about getting the 375th AW back, out of the AOR; this is all part of the transition process. Earlier, I'd put down a note which said, "Put a hold on the 'back-enders,'" meaning the air evac crews, and to put a hold on Quonset State (the AFRES C-130 unit)...

Question: Which were some of the C-130s involved in the air evac system?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...and redeploy the airplanes that were out at Norton as part of the air evac system. The 375th could operate from Kelly and Myrtle Beach, which is where they'd deployed. We were also checking with the wings at this time to find

<sup>94.</sup> *The taping of this session took place on 10 Feb 92.*

out when we could take stop-loss down and let people start getting out And we had an ALCE en route to replace those folks in the AOR with new CONUS folks...active duty types. Then the first redeployment of the 1,736 troops...

Question: Wasn't that the "symbolic redeployment" business?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...and we should see some more, soon.

### **700 Tons Of Commercial Capability Bought**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "Commercials...700 tons bought." In other words, we've bought 700 tons of commercial capability; now we've got to figure out how we're going to use it. We're going to take two 747s and turn them back into pax aircraft again.

Question: This is for bringing stuff back, now?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...we're shifting from going over to - the very next day - bringing it back.

Question: When you bought the 700 tons of commercial lift, did it make any difference whether you were picking stuff up in the CONUS and bringing it over there, or bringing it back?

LtGen Kondra: It sure did. Specific destinations, plus positioning (considerations).

### **Redeployment Priority Established By JCS As 2A1 (Lower Than Frequency Channels) A "Dumb Decision"**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Here's something..."Redeployment priority - 2A1." Everything that went over there went Priority 1...but coming back the priority was going to be 2A1. Which meant the *frequency channels* were going to have a higher priority than the redeployment of ULNs.

Question: Who made that decision?

LtGen Kondra: That was done at the JCS (level). A dumb, dumb decision, which was really gonna cause us a lot of problems.

Comment: Because those people over there wanted to get home!

LtGen Kondra: Sure! And you were gonna have to tell units and commanders that "You can't come home because we've got higher priorities someplace else." Nobody was going to do that, of course, but you really end up bastardizing the priority system. It was a really dumb thing to do.

Question: Did it get changed?

LtGen Kondra: No, it never did, as far as I can remember.

**15,000 Redeploying Troops, First Four Days; Units, Service Branches Selected**  
LtGen Kondra (continuing): "3 March - capabilities, 5,000 pax, 15,000 for four days. 9,000 for the 82nd (Airborne) and the 2nd Armored Cavalry out of Europe, 900 for the 1st Tactical Fighter Wing, tanker support, 800 Special Ops, 3,000 Marines, 1,560 Navy." And they wanted "organic, rich up front, and then commercials."

### **"Operation Claw"**

Question: Here on the 3rd - "Operation Claw." Describe this, will you? I heard about this...

LtGen Kondra: That was a tasking to airlift a 21-pound lobster over to General Schwartzkopf...

Question: From General Powell, wasn't it?

LtGen Kondra: I'm not sure...

Question: But it had to get over there alive, right?

LtGen Kondra: Oh, sure.

Comment/Question: A 21-pound lobster! I never saw anything that big! Did anybody ever get a picture of this thing?

LtGen Kondra: Not that I know of...but we did it.

### **Kuwait IAP Not Cleared For Use - 20 C-141s In 24 Hours For Symbolic Redeployment**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "Kuwait not clear of EOD,<sup>95</sup> no navajds..." I'm talking about the Kuwait International Airport here. "Symbolic redeployment - 20 C-141s within 24 hours, 33 total. Five Ramstein, five McGuire, four Charleston, nine at Travis, three at Norton, four McChord..." What we were doing here was identifying where the aircraft were going to come from.

### **4-5 March Entries:**

**Idea To Air Refuel Return Missions Discussed, Discarded- 1st TFW First Out Of AOR, 5 March - Redeployment Offload Bases - 49 Aircraft Needed For Redeployments**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): There was some talk of scheduling air refueling for the return missions; we nixed that idea. Here I note, "1st TFW, first out, 0500Z 5 March." And these must be the offloads (for the redeployments): Biggs, Campbell, Dobbins,

95. EOD = Explosive Ordnance Devices.

Forbes, Rhein Main, Hunter, Kelly, MacDill, McGuire, Nuremburg, Pope, Robert Gray, Stuttgart, Eglin, North Island, Langley, and the Marines.

Question: You've got Rhein Main, Nuremburg and Stuttgart mentioned there...

LtGen Kondra: Sure...there were a lot of Army guys going back to Europe. "Pax-configured aircraft, two at McGuire, eight in Europe, five more by tomorrow, 13 on the West Coast, plus three spares in the AOR, two in Europe...need 49 aircraft total." This is to handle the redeployment.

#### **C-5 Shuttle, Dhahran-KKMC**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "C-5 at Dhahran to shuttle, KKMC." We needed an airplane to move equipment for the units coming out of KKMC, to bring it down to the port at Dhahran so they could send it home. They (the Army) had to get their stuff cleaned up, showered, shaved, etc.

Comment: They must've had some big stuff, to warrant use of a C-5.

LtGen Kondra: Yes, there were trucks and a lot of other vehicles. Most of it was going to be returned by ship.

#### **Use Of Loring, Bangor Airfields, Avoidance Of Goose Bay**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "4 March - possibility of using Loring or Bangor (ME); prefer Goose, but don't use Goose." We'd already made the commitment to close Goose down 1 October.

Question: Seems to me we closed down operations at Goose in July, didn't we?

LtGen Kondra: Yes, that's right...the day after I took over, 20 July. But we didn't want to rekindle the fires again about the use of Goose.

#### **Setting Up AOR-Europe-CONUS Shuttle Operations- Masirah C-130, 82 ABN Units Returning Same Time Frame - Floor-Loaded Movement of Troops, KKMC-Dhahran**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "5 March - 11 aircraft, 19 crews en route to Europe." They're going there to set up the shuttles down into the AOR. Also on 5 March: "Masirah C-130s return to Pope, same as the 82 ABN..." In other words, they'll come back at the same time. And "3,200 move out of KKMC to Dhahran; floor load if they have to." Just put them on the floor, tie them down with straps, and take off.

Comment: They were probably glad to get the hell out of there any way they could.

LtGen Kondra: Yes...this is to get them down there so they can clean up before they get on the commercial planes and come home.

**2,500 To 3,700 Passengers On Commercials Out Of Dhahran 9 March List Of Airlines Involved - FAA Looking At Flying Hour, Maintenance Check, Hazardous Cargo Waivers**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "Commercial carriers for Saturday (9 March); 2,500 to 3,000 pax, can go to 3,700 with time." We had Tower, Pan Am, Continental, Northwest, AMT, World, Hawaiian, United and Delta 767s...

Comment: There's a couple of additional names you mentioned there. I don't recall you saying "United" or "Delta" before, during the deployment phase.

LtGen Kondra: I think they were (involved), before. "FAA looking to cancel waivers." This had to do with their waivers to extend flying hours and maintenance checks. "Airborne 16 out of 24, vs. 12, normally." In other words, I think that before a commercial crew could only be airborne 12 out of 24 hours. Over a 30 to 90 day time frame the FAA was going to do away with that, as well as the hazardous materials restrictions.

**POW Returns, Family Greetings At Andrews - 1st TFW Return, With Accompanying Aircraft Arrival Times At Langley**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "POW family moves, ground rules?"

Question: What POWs are you talking about?

LtGen Kondra: The US POWs...when they came back, we moved 100-some family members to Andrews to meet them there. Remember we had the big ceremony there? (Yes) "5 March - 1st TFW at Langley, one B-52, one C-141, one tanker and six fighters, possible Friday (8 March) 1300L arrival. To RON on Thursday at Torrejon; 1230L would be the arrival of the 141, 1240L the B-52, 1250L the tanker, and 1300L the fighters. Include the families of the crewmembers. Weather decision 13 hours prior." This really became a goat-rope.

**6-10 March Entries:**

**Clearance Given For Missions Into Kuwait City - First To Return: 24th Mechanized Brigade, 900 Strong, To Hunter**

LtGen Kondra: Here on the 6th of March, "Ed Tenoso runs...mission numbers will get clearance into Kuwait." We're getting the OK to fly into Kuwait...

Question: You've got something there, "1st ULN is 900 soldiers to Hunter"96?

96. *Speaking here of Hunter AAF, GA.*



LtGen Kondra: Yes, that's right - the 24th Mech(anized Brigade)...would be the first ones. And, oh by the way, the first airplane to touch down with returning DESERT STORM would be that mission, and "no other mission will touch down before this one."

Question: And why was that? Somebody important on board who was anxious to get off first, or something? Oh...you don't know? (Yes)

**First Day Homecoming Total: 4,941 Personnel - Customs Problems - Symbolic Redeployment Units, Sites - Heads-Up On C-5 Firefighting Equipment Missions**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "4,941 folks on the first day," is the plan. That involved six 141s, seven 747s, five L-1011s, and one DC-10. "Customs is still a problem," I note..."pre-clearance vs. pre-departure inspections?" If we needed pre-clearances, TRANSCOM was going to work it.

Question: Did that system work out all right - the pre-clearance business? That was a problem being discussed here (at 21 AF), I recall.<sup>97</sup>

LtGen Kondra: Yes, they finally got it working pretty well. Other redeployments we were planning on that I've got listed here:

| <u>Unit &amp; Total Personnel (if known)</u> | <u>Returned To - Date/Time (if known)</u> |
|--|---|
| 11th ADA, <sup>98</sup> 250                  | Biggs AAF, TX, 8 March                    |
| 1st Infantry, 175                            | Forbes AAF, KA, 8 March                   |
| 2nd Armored Cavalry, 75                      | Hamburg, GE, 8 March/2215Z                |
| 27th TFW, 520                                | Langley AFB, VA, 8 March/1730Z            |
| 24th ID                                      | Hunter AAF, 8 March/0530Z                 |
| US Marines (Jubail)                          | Hickam, March & Norton (8-9 March)        |
| US Navy (Bahrain)                            | Travis AFB, CA, 8 March/2215Z             |

Those were what we were planning on. Plus a C-141 (static display) at Langley for the TAC ceremonies there for the return of the 27th TFW. Then there was the POW return on Sunday (10 March) via the VC-137 at Andrews.

*97. Col Mike Clay (21 AF/DO), in an interview for the CY91 21 AF history, stated that pre-clearances were performed in the AOR after the US Customs Service and military customs put teams at the APOEs over there. As the planes passed through en route stops (such as Rhein Main) on their way back to the CONUS the passengers were permitted to disembark and proceed to a 'sterile' holding area. They were not, hallowed to leave these areas to shop at the BX, etc. See 21 AF history, CY91, Appendix XII, for additional information.*

*98. ADA = Air Defense Artillery.*

(continuing, from notes) "Schedule 16 of 24 CRAF requirements for the first three days." In other words, if we've got 24 requirements, we've got 16 of them scheduled on the 6th of March. We were also given a heads-up on the 6th that 11 to 13 C-5s would be needed to airlift oil firefighting equipment from Ellington (AFB, TX) to Kuwait.

### **POW Returns**

Question: Regarding this return of the US POWs and their meeting up with their families at Andrews...how many POWs were you talking about here, do you remember?

LtGen Kondra: Well, there were close to 100 family members. I think there were less than a dozen (former) POWs, total...including one female.

### **"800 Number At Scott" Tasking**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Oh, here's one...on the morning of the 7th of March, I got tasked to arrange for an "800" (toll free) number hot line so that we, MAC, would have knowledge of when everybody was coming home from the desert. This 800 number would be aired on CNN, and everybody would be free to call that number - it would be at Scott - to find out when their "Johnny Jones" was coming home from the war. Now think about that!

Question: One number was going to handle all that?

LtGen Kondra: Hell, I didn't know. I got all the necessary people together - and we had an hour to do this in - and asked them, "What would it take to do this? How many people are we talking about? How many phones? Where would we do it? And how would we get the information?"

Question: That was the first question I thought of.

LtGen Kondra: So we did all this brainstorming. It would take at least 20 to 30 numbers, and at least 225 people to man the phones around the clock. We figured they could do it at the Recreation Center, or at the bottom of the wing headquarters building. It would take two or three days to set up, and we would man it with volunteers.

Question: But how were you going to get the information from the theater? By tying up the circuits going over there, asking for it?

LtGen Kondra: Well, we were going to try and work it out so that it would be part of the GDSS information. To make a long story short, after we figured out the numbers of people, the location, how we would try to get it set up, etc., we put it

together...and the services already had something in being. Data was getting to each of the services, and they were calling their units and getting the information. And so we turned it off (the 800 number idea) that afternoon.

Question: You said "no"?

LtGen Kondra: You never tell the CINC "no." He asks you to do something, you tell him how you would do it. "This is what you told me to do; this is how to do it. Now, if you *really* want to do it, this is how you ought to do it. " That's exactly what we did, and he could see that what was being suggested by the JCS was not a good idea, and he went back and told them so.

Question: So this whole thing lasted a morning and an afternoon? (Yes)

### **The POW Return Saga: Making It All "Smooth As Glass," And Setting The Air Staff Straight - Movement Of POW Family Members To/From Andrews AFB**

LtGen Kondra: Yes. Let's see...on the 8th of March - "Langley mission, two hours late."

Question: Did that cause any consternation, because it was two hours late?

LtGen Kondra: Yes. I got a call at home from the Air Staff on Saturday (9 March) informing me, "Your airplane got off two hours late. The AC told them" - whoever "them" was - "that he can't make up the time. You MAC guys have really screwed this up." The plane was supposed to arrive at noon on Sunday at Andrews AFB. This was on Saturday, remember...and it's still got to go from Bahrain to Sigonella to Lajes, possibly Loring if the winds were bad, to Andrews. So I told the individual who called me, "Why don't you let me make a few phone calls and find out what really happened? And I'll call you back." So I did that. What I found was - and we knew all along that the POWs were going to come back on a VC-137, the "Air Force Two" airplane - that it had been laid on by the JCS or the Air Staff that we would have a 141 for one of them, an Army Specialist who had been hurt in a helicopter crash. He needed to have special attention, a medical crew, etc., and they wanted him on the 141; the others were going to come back on the VC-137. That was OK. And, oh by the way, the 141 that was bringing back the Specialist would be the backup airplane for the VC-137...which was *not* OK. That meant that he'd take off last. The VC-137 cruises at (Mach) .82 to .84, while the 141 is cruising at (Mach) .74...so you can't take off "after" and get there "before." So what we did was preposition a spare at Bahrain, one at Sigonella, one at Lajes, and we put one into Torrejon, just in case something happened there.

Question: C-141s, everywhere?

LtGen Kondra: Yes, a 141 at each place, with crews, ready to go. When I checked on why the mission got off late, I found out that the individual had not been stabilized and the medical crew would not let the plane depart.

Question: A perfectly valid reason, eh? (Yes) And you were doing all this for this one Specialist?

LtGen Kondra: Yes. That was the first thing. The next thing that happened was...the VC-137 was en route from Bahrain to Sigonella, and so was the 141, albeit late. En route to Sigonella, the doctor on board said, "No, we'll go to Torrejon, and from Torrejon we'll go direct (to Andrews); we don't want him having to go through any more ups and downs than absolutely necessary."

Question: This guy was in pretty bad shape, was he?

LtGen Kondra: Well, his condition was such that they wanted to make sure he was treated as gently as possible. So the 141 diverted to Torrejon. Now, we're still going to arrive (at Andrews) on Sunday, 15 minutes apart. The VC-137 departs Sigonella, heading to Lajes, and en route the winds go out of limits at Lajes, so he diverts to Shannon (Ireland). So now we've got the 141 at Torrejon, and the VC-137 at Shannon...but the long story-short story of that is, they landed exactly as they were supposed to; the 141 landed at 1145L, and the VC-137 was there at noon. The decision had been made that the USAF POWs would be given leather flight jackets when they stepped off the airplane. So we had prepositioned the leather jackets, with their proper sizes and their name tags made up, at Lajes.

Comment: Oh oh.

LtGen Kondra: But nobody went to Lajes! So when the planes landed at Andrews, if you happened to be watching CNN, there was a comment made about the VC-137 pulling off the end of the runway, stopping, and waiting for somebody to get on board carrying a large cardboard box. Those were the leather jackets - *another* set of them - that were given to the Air Force members.

Comment: What a goat-rope!

LtGen Kondra: Yeah. Oh, the other thing that happened...the day before we picked up - I think it was 94 family members - from something like 25 different locations all over the United States, and brought them to Andrews. Yet, on CNN, they talked about how "family members had to drive 600 miles that day to be there to greet their loved ones."

Question: Where was CNN getting this information from?

LtGen Kondra: I have no idea, because that's not what happened at all. We hauled them in, and got them all together. When you watched it on TV, everything was just

ass smooth as glass, you know? And I've given this little briefing many times to many people, saying there's a moral to this story...and it goes back to CNN reporting that the "Patriot moves had obviously been planned long in advance, otherwise it could never have happened that quickly." The first moral is: never believe everything you see or hear on CNN. The second moral is, as you watched the POWs coming down the stairs, being met by the Secretary (of Defense) and everybody, and it was all smooth as glass...just remember, it's like a duck going across a pond. The duck looks very smooth on top of the water, but underneath he's paddling like hell! I told people that there were a lot of people paddling like hell to make that whole thing come together.

Question: I imagine so. There was just one VC-137 plane involved, wasn't there?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...and it wasn't full. There were something like 12 or 13 (former POWs) on board.

Question: And most of them were Air Force?

LtGen Kondra: Well, there were Air Force, there was an Army female, and there were some Navy folks. I'd made my call back to the Pentagon when I found out what had happened, because I was also told - in the initial phone call - that the litter patient had not been handled very well, and had been "passed over baggage," and was "not being treated well," and that "you guys in MAC have screwed this up." When I called back and gave them the facts of what *really* happened, I also reminded them that this was not the first time we've ever done this sort of job...and that we (MAC) know how to do this sort of thing. I told them, "If you just let the experts who know how to do this *do it*, your job would be a lot easier...just sit back and relax and let us do what we know how to do."

Question: Rather than listen to secondhand information that's "always positive, sometimes right," eh?

LtGen Kondra: Yes.

### **Use Of Passenger-Configured C-141s To Bring Troops Home**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): 9 March...let's see what we have in there. "Pax-configured C-141s." We had 43 aircraft configured, and we could do five more at McGuire, six more at Charleston, and three in 22 AF. See, here we are, starting to move back...we don't have the requirements, but we're trying to gin up to make sure that we can move as many people as we can, because everybody's going to want to come home...

Question: But weren't you going to use CRAF aircraft for these moves? Wasn't the CRAF still in force?

LtGen Kondra: Yes, but we couldn't use only CRAF, because we didn't have that many. And you can't call them today and tell them to be there tomorrow. You can only do that to the military...and a lot of people didn't understand that. They thought that you ought to be able to call the civilians - like you just said - "Hell, you've got CRAF-II, why can't you move these guys?" Well, they've got to get crews, and equipment, and people...and pilots bid on routes, etc.

Comment: I'm glad I asked the question, because it's one that's one that would have been asked. "Why the hell didn't you use the CRAF?" You *did* use the CRAF...

LtGen Kondra: That's right...but you've got to give them time to spin up.

### 11 March Entries:

#### **In-Transit Visibility - C-130s, "FIFO" - Ground Rules On Return Of POW Families**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "ITV - In-Transit Visibility" - we're trying to get information on the number of passengers, who they were, and the types of cargo on the airplanes coming out. We worked that out with our computers, and wound up getting pretty good information on it, but it took awhile. "C-130s, FIFO," meaning First In, First Out; that's what we were trying to do. And, "need to know ground rules on return of POW families." In other words, we'd gotten them to Washington, now how do they get home? We had some that may have come from California, but they wanted to go to Michigan...and do we take them to Michigan, or back to where they came from? Or did we have any obligation to take them anywhere?

Question: What did you determine?

LtGen Kondra: We took them wherever they wanted to go.

Question: Via MAC aircraft, or by commercial?

LtGen Kondra: Usually by MAC, C-21s. We told the families that if they gave us 48 hours' notice we'd help them; less than 48 hours, they went by commercial.

### 17 - 22 March Entries:

#### **Handling Westover Noise Complaints**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Here's a thing about Westover...we had some complaints coming in from there about noise, now that the war was over. People were complaining that the environmental impact statements were being violated by the (C-5) aircraft operations out of there...and they were going to "take them to court," etc. And people were asking why we weren't going to Stewart (AFB, NY),

why weren't we going someplace else? My point was, we should not answer that question. We had no reason to answer why we didn't go to Stewart, anymore than we should answer why we didn't go to Loring (AFB, ME), or some other place. I mean, we ought to pick where we go...lawyers and newspapers shouldn't decide where our operations should take place. So I refused to answer those questions, because they're like answering "when did you stop beating your wife?"

Comment: Opening up a Pandora's Box...

LtGen Kondra: Yes. Stewart was never an option because of the reduced capability they had, etc. Westover's runways and support system made it the logical place for us to operate from. That thing brewed and brewed for a long time, and it's still brewing today.

Comment: You mentioned earlier that the people of Westover were great in their volunteer efforts, and such...

LtGen Kondra: Yes, they were. But there's a certain faction up there, a clique...

#### **Airlift Of Fire Suppression Gear To Kuwait; Commercial Allegations**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "Fire suppression, 18 March, five more C-5s."

Question: That turned out to be a big operation, the movement of all that firefighting equipment, didn't it?

LtGen Kondra: Yes. It also became an issue, in that there were allegations from the commercials that we were using military airplanes to haul stuff in there that they could have hauled. We tried to be very scrupulous about that, to make sure that we were only hauling outsized equipment that only C-5s could haul. And yes, there was some non-outsized stuff...in other words, there may have been some piping or other equipment - but they were paying for the whole airplane, so it made no sense to just put the heavy equipment on and then have ACL left and not put their other boxes and stuff that went with it. That wouldn't have been reasonable.

#### **Stop-Loss Program Cutbacks**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): In the stop-loss program, here on the 20th, MAC was keeping seven out of 97 AFSCs on the list, while TAC kept zero and SAC kept 20; we were being challenged on how many AFSCs we kept.

Question: Was that a big problem during the war, the stop-loss program? Did it cause much consternation on the part of anybody?

LtGen Kondra: I'm sure there were some personal hardships on the part of guys who were planning on getting out...guys who were going to start a business, etc.

Comment: And now we're on the other side of the coin, where the Air Force is asking everybody, "Please, go, get out," just one year later - they're throwing them out, as fast as they can.

LtGen Kondra: Yep...the price of peace.

#### **Free Airlift Offer, Lux Air - Playing Airlift Priorities "Straight"**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "22 March - Lux Air, \$5 million worth of free airlift, need to certify." Yes...every passenger carrier has to be certified (by the FAA) before they are allowed to do it. I don't recall whether we took them up on it. "Priorities - play it straight." Whatever the priorities (for airlift) were, let them fall out, sort out whatever they are...this goes back to what I was talking about before. Redeployment was given a Priority 2, so we were going to play it straight. What I was really trying to do is get them off that dumb idea that made them Priority 2s.

Question: By embarrassing them into changing their minds, eh?

LtGen Kondra: Exactly. But they never did.

#### **25 - 30 March Entries:**

**FAA Prohibition On Commercials Into Kuwait- Training Regimens Resuming- C-21s Remaining In Theater Until Mid-May - Redeployment Of Patriot Missile Battery Personnel**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "FAA won't allow commercials into Kuwait..." That was because the navajids hadn't been checked out there yet.

Question: But you were flying organic aircraft into there already, weren't you?

LtGen Kondra: Yes. Here on the 25th... "holding out 17 C-141s a day for local proficiency sorties, airdrops, etc." We're starting up our training again here. Then, on 28 March, I've got "four C-21s to remain in theater, scheduled to return by 15 May." And here on the 29th of March I've got "redeploy Patriots, 787 people only Thursday through Saturday next week (4-6 April).

#### **5 - 18 April Entries:**

##### **Feedback From Reserves On Operational Conditions**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Here on 5 April, I noted a call from Westover, a Reservist, and he was talking about King Fahd. By this time we were staging out of King Fahd and Dhahran and King Khalid, and there were some who wanted us to quit staging the C-5s - they didn't like living in tents. I'd run into him on two trips over there, and he gave me some pretty good feedback on what was bad and what was good. When



he called me about King Fahd he said, "King Fahd - great food. The stage manager - a Captain - is doing a super job. Basic crews is good." Meaning it was better that way than flying augmented all the way down and back. "ALCEs are great. At Frankfurt..."rooms are going to the NCO Academy and Space-As; need to get rooms for aircrews."

### **"Heads Up" Given, Provide Comfort Operations To Begin**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Also here on the 5th of April: "322nd ALD, JCS warning order, 7th at 2300L, food, tents, water, blankets, medical units, northern Iraq and Turkey. Stuff is at Pisa (Italy). Ten to eleven aircraft, short of tacticians, don't know where and how many. Riggers and loads at Pisa have equipment, additional riggers at Aviano. 12 F-15s, 12 F-16s in the combat search and rescue (CSAR) package, 500 SOCEUR people, 20 C-141s, 2 MH-53s at Woodbridge, 15-20 C-130s from EUCOM, oporder (operations order tomorrow." This is when we got the heads-up for the Provide Comfort operation.

*(continuing, from notes)* Here on the 11th...and I must have been getting tired, because I've got '11 August' written here -

Comment: You put in some long days, during all of this.

LtGen Kondra: Yeah..."Provide Comfort, no additional tasking for C-130s...land bridge." In other words, we were talking about doing some of this by trucks.

Question: Out of Turkey?

### **Spain Reverts To 48 Hour Notice Requirement For Diplomatic Clearances**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Yes. Here on the 15th..."Dips in Spain, 48 hour notice causing problems." Spain had gone back to their normal way of doing things, and it was causing problems. I think we worked that out, though, and got back to blanket clearances again.

### **Disciplinary Problems, Contraband Material; Overall Impression Of DESERT SHIELD/STORM Discipline**

Question: You've got an entry here (on the 15th) about "4-5 people, Article 15, from a CCT." What was that all about?

LtGen Kondra: Yep...we had some guys caught trying to smuggle weapons home.

Comment: Kinda dumb, with all the warnings that had been issued against doing stuff like that.

LtGen Kondra: Really dumb.

Question: I was going to ask you...a bit of a parenthetical question: what was your overall impression of the DESERT SHIELD - DESERT STORM disciplinary situation? Overall, how did we do over there?

LtGen Kondra: I think, by and large, that we did pretty well. The only disciplinary problems that I know of that we, MAC, had... well, there were a couple of people disciplined for drinking alcohol, and this weapons thing, and we sent one weather female back for actions unbecoming an officer in a Muslim country.

### **Provide Comfort Operations, Statistics**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Let's see..." 18 April, 16 C-5s, 10 C-141s through Incirlik, assault strips, helo (helicopter) only, truck stuff into and helo out, C-130s to use five hard stands at Incirlik. Airdrop equipment to sustain 400 bundles per day. 26 C-130s at Incirlik, with 51 crews, plus four from Mildenhall, 600 bundles per day." This is all for Provide Comfort. 99

Question: Meaning to be airdropped?

LtGen Kondra: Yes. I see here that on the 17th of April we had 33 C-130s scheduled and 26 of them flew. We scheduled 30 lines per day, 16 bundles per airplane. Also, "300 chutes have to be repacked; land bridge is working." In other words, some stuff was moving over the road, too.

Question: How did they get the chutes back?

LtGen Kondra: I'm not sure.

Question: You also noted, "POC<sup>100</sup> for donated \$\$. "

LtGen Kondra: Yes. Every time you get into one of these (humanitarian assistance) things, the phones start ringing off the hooks. It's the American way: "Where can we send money? Medical supplies? Food? Clothing?" So I wanted to establish a POC for all of it.

### **Air Force Strength In AOR - Korean Air Lines Offer of Free List**

*(continuing, from notes)* "Air Force down to 17,000 in the AOR; (LtGen) Horner leaves this weekend." This was on the 18th of April. And here's something else: "Korean Air Lines, free airlift in the Pacific; possible problems with FedEx."

99. *By the time the Provide Comfort operation had run its course in late May, MAC aircraft had flown over 1,400 missions (4,000 sorties) in 19,000+ flying hours to airlift more than 11,000 passengers and 37,000 tons of cargo for the destitute and disenfranchised Kurdish people of northern Iraq. The Kurds were being victimized by the Iraqi forces still under the control of Saddam Hussein. From HO notes, 4 Jun 91.*

100. POC = Point Of Contact.

Korean Air Lines was going to give us free airlift, but if we took it we were going to have to cancel out FedEx...so we said "no."

Comment: Yes...you mentioned this once before...."America first."<sup>101</sup>

LtGen Kondra: Yes...even if it's free you can't, in good conscience, cancel out contracts with people who have been supporting you all along.

Question: What was Korean Air Lines offering to carry?

LtGen Kondra: Anything. They would just provide free lift. In addition, they were trying to establish themselves in the routes. I mean, it wasn't all altruistic.

#### 19 - 24 April Entries:

**BGen Hobson Named As Commander AF Forces For Provide Comfort; Col Bucky Jones, COMALF - BGen Hinkle To Replace BGen Tenoso as AOR COMALF In May**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "Commander of air forces is (BGen Jim) Hobson (for Provide Comfort)." Which is unusual, because he's got all the allies, plus US fighters, AWACS and tankers. He was named the Commander of AF Forces, and (Col) Bucky Jones was his COMALF, down in Incirlik.

Question: You did all this out of Incirlik, didn't you? And Diyarbakir?

LtGen Kondra: Yes. "(BGen Jim) Hinkle to replace Tenoso as the COMALF 10 May."

Question: Where was he from?

LtGen Kondra: He was the Commander of the 834th ALD.<sup>102</sup>

**Redeployment Airlift From KKMCC, Dhahran, King Fahd - General Schwartzkopf's Return**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "20 April - begin 25 April for 10 days, 3,000 passengers per day, KKMCC, Dhahran and King Fahd. Fahd MOG to dwindle, Jubail will close. CINCCENT going to Cairo en route, then on to MacDill."

Question: This is General Schwartzkopf coming home? (Yes)

**Possible Use Of Iranian Airfields For Provide Comfort; Strategic Airdrop Idea For Provide Comfort "Killed"**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): We were also looking at at the possibility of using some Iranian airfields for Provide Comfort...Bakhtaran, Tabriz, Uromiyeh.

<sup>101</sup>. See pp. 18-19. 1

<sup>102</sup>. BGen Hinkle was subsequently replaced as the COMALF by Col Fred L. May, from Charleston AFB, in the autumn of 1991.

Question: Did you ever do that?

LtGen Kondra: We did send some stuff into Tehran, a little later on. We also finally killed the idea of a strategic airdrop for Provide Comfort on the 20th of April.

Question: You mean hauling stuff all the way from the CONUS and dropping it over there?

LtGen Kondra: Yes, some people wanted to do that.

### **Firefighting Equipment Missions Reach 25; Strategic Airdrop Idea Resurfaces**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "Four firefighting equipment missions...brings us up to 25" (as of 22 April). "Strat drop - back on the string."

Question: Oh, it resurfaced on the 22nd?

LtGen Kondra: Yeah...we thought we had it killed, but the sucker raised its ugly head again.

### **"Favorite Saying" About TRANSCOM**

Question: I meant to ask you...sprinkled throughout these notes were references to "TC." What was that?

LtGen Kondra: TRANSCOM. My favorite saying about TRANSCOM: "They never met a requirement they didn't like."

Comment: You've gotta be careful when you say that, now; after all, you're talking about your boss H.T. (Johnson).

LtGen Kondra: I've told him the same thing.

### **SecAF Kudos To MAC, CRAF**

Question: OK. Here on the 24th, "Airlift is a national asset in peace and war...MAC has world experts, thanks to all the people...CRAF recognized as 'rookie of the year.'" What is this, a letter or a message you're sending out, or something?

LtGen Kondra: No, that's the SecAF (Donald B. Rice). He was recognizing the C-130s, too; he'd been to Charleston, Little Rock and Hurlburt, giving the Air Guard and Reserve recognition. The "CRAF recognized as rookie of the year" refers to the fact that it was the first time in its 38-year history that it had ever been activated, and it did a good job. He'd come to Scott; that's where all these notes came from.

### **25 - 30 April Entries:**

#### **Security Force Protection Considered For Provide Comfort**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "Airlift into, or airdrop into Turkey." We're still talking about moving the 3rd (Battalion) of the 325th (Airborne Infantry Regiment) out of Vicenza, Italy, into Turkey because the Iraqis were acting up around Baku and Zaku...and there was a discussion about putting in Army security forces. The question was were we going to airdrop them, airland them, or were they going to go in overland?

#### **C-141 Mission Into Tehran; Iranians "Incensed" Over Donated Used Blankets**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "Wolthius mission, C-141 into Tehran..." This decision was made on 25 April...

Question: This was part of Provide Comfort, wasn't it?

LtGen Kondra: Yes, we were going to take in blankets and stuff...we did, and they were incensed because they were used.

Question: The Iranians were incensed?

LtGen Kondra: Yes, because they're Muslim, and you don't give Muslims hand-me-downs.

Question: So did we pack them up and take them back out, or did we leave them there?

LtGen Kondra: We left them there.

#### **Diyabakir "Gridlock"- Routing, Restrictions, Notes On Wolthius C-141 Mission To Tehran**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "Diyabakir, gridlocked, MOGED out." We had the Brits coming in there, the Germans, we were coming in there, and nobody knew what anybody else was doing. And here's the routing for the Wolthius mission: Rhein Main - Incirlik - Tehran - Incirlik. No weapons, no women, no cameras, no pornography, wear civilian clothes, bring money. 21 AF working dips."

Comment: That was the first American mission into Iran since the 70s.

LtGen Kondra: Yes. The crew<sup>103</sup> got the Air Medal. Here on the 27th..."Tehran mission off at 1432Z, arrives 1700Z (on 2 May). Crew briefing well received. Hand offload the entire load; no forklifts or K-loaders. \$3,000 service fee, work out diplomatically, no dollars passed. Swiss meet crew, work with Iranians. Iranians see this as an opening but don't want to go to other bases; lack of equipment, etc. News media: NBC ABC, CNN, AP and local press, send as many as you can."

Question: They (the Iranians) were trying to hold them up for \$3,000?

103. From Charleston AFB.

LtGen Kondra: There was a \$3,000 service fee - for bringing the stuff in.

Question: This business about the news agencies...?

LtGen Kondra: They were going to be there, with their coverage.

Comment: We can put a stop to things here, this being the end of April.

LtGen Kondra: OK, let's do that.

## END OF SIXTH SESSION

### SESSION 7 - ENTRIES OF 1 - 31 MAY 1991<sup>104</sup>

#### 1-20 May Entries:

**Tehran Mission Validated For 2 May - EUCOM "Comfort Express" Mission Proposal Fails Validation Test**

LtGen Kondra (*continuing, from notes*): "Tehran mission validated, to arrive 0730Z 2 May with 13 pallets, 50,000 pounds of medical supplies, routing Dhahran - Tehran - Dhahran." And "Comfort Express..." that was a proposal to have a C-130 mission going from EUCOM down to Turkey, to join in with the Provide Comfort operation. They (EUCOM) wanted to have their own dedicated airplane involved...but we had airplanes flying back and forth daily, and my notes said here they didn't need it. I don't think we ever did that.

Question: You turned them off?

LtGen Kondra: Well, I don't know that I turned them off; I don't think it ever got validated as a requirement through the JCS or TRANSCOM.

#### **LMI Study Response**

Question: On the first of May you had the entry, "LMI study, take report and answer issues." You mentioned this earlier, when you described the study as a "poor" one...<sup>105</sup>

LtGen Kondra: Yes, the Logistics Management Institute study, and this had to do with the CRAF. It was a study done by some people who had their own paradigms and their own axes to grind...and they didn't do a very good job. There were people who tried to make more out of that study than it was worthy of...

Comment: But it didn't fool you or General Johnson...

104. *The recording of this session took place on 13 Feb 92.*

105. *See p. 54.*

LtGen Kondra: Well, it wasn't a question of 'fooling,' it was a question of whether we were going to be forced to respond and to institute some things that had no basis...that was the real issue.

#### **Fire Suppression Missions, Actions of Firefighters**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Here on the 5th of May I've got written "27 fire suppression missions (thus far)..."

Comment: OK, let's stick that in. They did a helluva job, those firefighters, didn't they? (Yes) Because when they first investigated the situation, I remember them talking about it taking a year, maybe two years, before they could put out all the fires - and they got most of them out in less than 10 months, or something like that. (Yes)

#### **Proposal To Insert US Army Unit Into Kuwait City As Peacekeeping Force- The "Mother Of All Parades" Planning**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Here on the 8th of May we're talking about moving an Army unit from Ft. Lewis (WA) into Kuwait City, using one FSS,<sup>106</sup> with an LAD<sup>107</sup> of 1 June. The air requirement would be 200-300 tons of cargo, 5,000-7,000 passengers. This had to do with a proposal for a peacekeeping force being moved into Kuwait.

Question: They didn't do this though, did they? It would have been in the news...

LtGen Kondra: I don't think we did, no. Also, here on the 8th... "3,000 to 5,000 people in Washington, 750 to 1,250 in New York. Pick units close to Washington DC, go by surface wherever possible, EUCOM and PACCOM will have token representation. TAC is the OPR for the fly-by, with a 6 June arrival for DC; 3,000 from McGuire and Ft. Dix by surface." This is the beginning of the "mother of all parades."

#### **Evergreen Gets FAA Passenger Certification**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Remember we talked about how Evergreen had to be certified by the FAA to carry passengers?<sup>108</sup> I say here on 8 May, "they'll be looking for business."

Comment: Took them long enough to get certified, eh? They almost missed the whole show, as far as hauling passengers was concerned.

106. FSS = Fast Surface Ship.

107. LAD = Latest Arrival Date.

108. See pp. 59-60.

### **Parade Uniforms For Air Force Representatives**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Yes. Here's more on the parade, on 14 May: "C-21 added to the fly-by, use (BGen) Ed Tenoso as one of the provisional commanders in the parade. Uniform: short-sleeved blue shirt." And I've got a whole series of questions about that, since I had a hard time believing that the Air Force was going to march in short-sleeved blue shirts...because you knew damned well the Army and everybody else is going to be in BDUs.<sup>109</sup>

### **DESERT EXPRESS To End 18 May; Impressions Of Operation**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "16 May...Desert Express, last flight will be 18 May."

Question: Yes...what was your impression of the DESERT EXPRESS operation?

LtGen Kondra: Well, they flew well over 200 missions,<sup>110</sup> all with on-time arrivals. They had one delay for weather, and one mission that took off, air aborted, came back, swapped loads and made up the time. From the time of its touchdown to the takeoff of the spare airplane it took something like 22-30 minutes.

Question: They swapped the loads, too?

LtGen Kondra: Yes...they swapped the loads and got airborne again. They made up ground time at Torrejon and made their scheduled arrival time in Dhahran.

Comment: Pretty remarkable.

LtGen Kondra: Yes. I flew that mission once, in December, out of Charleston. It was an Altus crew that I was flying with, and the people at Charleston let it be known that "we'd better not screw it up." (*laughter*) They were "letting us fly their mission," and they did not expect us to screw it up. And we did not.

### **CRAF II Deactivated 17 May - COMALF Drawdown Plan**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): "CRAF II deactivated 17 May."

Question: How many additional aircraft did you pick up in the CRAF II, do you remember? Seventeen, or something like that? Less than 20?

LtGen Kondra: Well, we picked up a lot of passenger airplanes, but I think it was something like 17 cargo aircraft. On the 20th of May..."COMALF drawdown plan;

109. *BDUs = Battle Dress Uniform(s). The Air Force representatives did in fact march in BDUs or flight suits in the parade.*

110. *The DESERT EXPRESS final statistics: 235 missions, 2,700 tons of cargo, 63,103 shipments (the bulk of them for the AF - 31,341, and the Army - 29,068), during the 30 Oct 90 - 18 May 91 time frame. (From briefing, 19 May 91, by Capt Bryant Herrity, 21 AF/TRO).*



release St. Joseph (MO), Guard from Delaware, Rickenbacker (OH) (AFRES) out of Fahd by the end of June; want three C-141s for shuttle, KKMCC to Kuwait City. Bring crew stages down."

## **22 - 31 May Entries: -**

### **Return To Quiet Hours In Germany - Near Miss, C-141s Over Atlantic**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): On the 22nd..."Germany wants normal operations and hours." We had not been observing their 'quiet hours,' and they wanted us to go back to them. We did so, eventually.

Question: On 23 May there was that incident involving the close call two C-141s had over the Atlantic...they might have awakened you in the middle of the night to tell you about that one.

LtGen Kondra: Yeah, "23 May, near miss." Flight level 350, and they were on the North Atlantic tracks, eastbound and westbound. The eastbound one put in the wrong coordinates (into his INS); he was supposed to have had 55 North, I think, and he put in 54 North...he was on the wrong track.

Comment: Apparently they didn't miss by much.

LtGen Kondra: I don't know what it (the distance) was, but it was close enough to get people's attention.

### **General Kondra's Physical Exhaustion - Col Murdock In Charge Of Parade Practice, BGen Tenoso Overall commander**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Right around this time I was getting physically exhausted; I was working harder now than I was during the war, in there until 6, 7, 8 o'clock at night...

Question: Why was that? Because of all the other stuff that had been pushed aside and delayed, etc.?

LtGen Kondra: That was part of it. I used to say, "Let me make it through one day at a time." If I could make it through one day at a time, I'd be all right. Then I'd say, "Let me make it until noon, so I can go home and take a nap..."

Comment: I want to put some of this in here...the fact that you were damned near exhausted by this time. There's nothing wrong with saying it...what hours again did you say you were working?

LtGen Kondra: Oh, probably three or four days out of the week I was going in at 4 o'clock in the morning, and working until 7, 8 o'clock at night, Saturdays, Sundays, holidays. I was tired; I got to the point where I was tired of being tired.

Comment: I would imagine so.

LtGen Kondra (continuing) : The 29th of May...and the "mother of all parades," again...(Col) Bob Murdock is going to be in charge of the practice; he was the vice commander out of Dover (the 436 AW), and Ed Tenoso is the overall commander. *(scanning remainder of notes)* And that's about it, Clay...do you have anything else?

### Closing Comments:

**Why "Doing It All Again Tomorrow" Would Be Difficult, Due To The Reduced Availability Of Airframes, Downsizing Of The Force**

Comment/Question: Not, not really...that's all I've got. The war is over, we won, the troops are home, the parade is on...and you're tired. But let's tie this all up with some of your own personal comments, as a sort of a "wrap" here. You said, at one point in one of these interviews, that you didn't think this could be done again.<sup>111</sup> Why do you say that? Suppose tomorrow we all of a sudden had to jump into another contingency?

LtGen Kondra: If we had to do it again tomorrow? Well, there are a number of reasons why I say I don't think it could be done again. The 141s, in the next couple of years, are going to start dropping out of the inventory, so you're going to have less airplanes available - even with the C-17s coming on board. Eventually, you're going to end up losing 234 PAA C-141s, and you're going to replace them with 120 PAA C-17s. Yes, the C-17 will haul more than the 141, but it isn't going to haul *that* much more...so you're going to lose containers. The makeup of the commercial carriers is changing. FedEx is getting rid of some of their 747s. UPS will get rid of some of their 747s. They're going to smaller airplanes, because the 747 doesn't meet their requirements for Stateside deliveries. They don't need those bigger airplanes, so you're not going to have those 747s available. Pan Am has gone out of business. So the airplanes available, to do the things we did, with the types of airplanes we used...are going to be fewer in number. Not to mention the fact that the airlift force itself, while basically staying the same, is downsizing. So I think it would be very difficult to do it all over again.

Comment: Well, I think all of this is "good stuff," and I hope you agree that it hasn't been a waste of time.

### **Communicating With People: A Problem And A Leadership Essential**

111. See p. 63.

LtGen Kondra: Oh, no, not at all. But if I had to go back and summarize what sticks out in my mind about this whole thing, I think the number one thing that comes out is how difficult it is, and how poor a job we did, to *communicate* to the aircrews and to the people of MAC *what* they were doing, and *why*. We did not do that very well. It goes without saying; if people understand why they're doing something, they'll go to hell and back. But a lot of the complaints, gripes and concerns were because people didn't understand. I mean, when I went out there in December...out flying around Christmastime...and we've got people who still don't understand why they're out there, "we thought we were going to surge," they didn't know *they've already surged*. They didn't know that we were running at the peak; they don't see it. It's painfully obvious, when you're looking at it from a macro view, but when you're down amongst it and caught in the quagmire you don't see that. All you see it is getting jerked around.

Question: How would you propose resolving that?

LtGen Kondra: I don't know how you do that. I've said that many times.

Comment: Unless you could have some kind of a "town meeting," with everybody in attendance...

LtGen Kondra: But the problem is, your "town meeting" is 80,000 people spread all over the world, and it's very difficult to get the word to everybody. But I think that's one of the things that we - / - did not do very well. As hard as we tried, we didn't do it very well. And I don't know how to solve it for the next time...because it "ain't going to go away."

Comment: How about...and I'm just throwing out a thought that came to me, now - how about CNN? Everybody watched CNN...it was covering the war, "live." Wouldn't it be neat if MAC - or AMC, as it is going to become - could get themselves either hooked into CNN, or have its own broadcasting method, where you could say, "OK, crewmembers, here it is." I don't mean just a "rah rah" pitch from the CINC...

LtGen Kondra: Oh, I think it's necessary, to be from the CINC on down. It doesn't have to be "rah rah," it has to be informative.

Comment: Well, I mean...take advantage of the medium of television.

LtGen Kondra: The problem is, of course, that you don't have the infrastructure to do that. CNN certainly isn't going to do it for us. And the problem is, people don't want to watch videotape...but when you go over and visit with them and make yourself available, I'll guarantee you they'll sit down and listen. As I did on that trip at Christmastime...in the lobby of the billeting office at Torrejon...I bet I sat out there for a couple of hours as hundreds of crewmembers filed by. And we just had open

sessions. I did the same thing at the 24-hour feeding facility at the Officer's Club at Torrejon, from about 4 in the morning until 6 in the morning; I did that two mornings in a row. But that is such a small number of people you're reaching...

Comment: And you're only one man...

LtGen Kondra: Yes...and I did the same thing at Rhein Main. But it's amazing how you could start off with a group of people who were really hostile, and as you sit and talk to them and explain to them what you're doing and why, and answer questions...you end up with people doing a 180. But I don't know how you'd do that on a mass-media basis.

Comment: I also have to point out here...and I don't mean to be "buttering you up," or anything...but you are a personable man who can get out there and talk man-to-man with anybody on the planet...

LtGen Kondra: Well, you have to do that...

Comment: I know you do, but not every man in your position, or was in your position, or will be in your position, might be able to do that as well. Of course, I think that's part of being a General, if you want to know my feelings on it.

LtGen Kondra: I think it's a basic thing called "leadership."

Comment: Yes, it certainly is.

LtGen Kondra: But I don't know how you do that, Clay; I don't know how you get that word out to everybody. And that's something that the person who does this the next time needs to be very concerned about.

Comment: Well, as far as I'm concerned... when we finish up here, the product that comes out of this, should be "required reading" for the next AMC/DO...because many of his problems are going to be the same.

### **The Importance Of Patience**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): Well, the situations will be different. But there's another problem. If communication was a severe problem, *patience* is an absolute virtue that you must have when you start something of this magnitude. And it makes no difference whether it's of this magnitude...or if it's Patriot moves, the move of peacekeeping forces, it doesn't make any difference if it's Provide Hope to the Soviet Union. *Patience is an absolute must.* But patience is the last thing that decision makers, and the people who push these things, have - because they want it all to happen "now." And lack of patience wastes airlift.

### **The One Constant That Can Be Anticipated: Dynamic, Changing Requirements**

LtGen Kondra (continuing): I don't remember that we've talked about it, we may have, earlier...but to summarize what I'm talking about: somebody saying they "need eight C-5s," and then getting them...and then not being able to have loads to put on them - is a waste of airlift. Wanting a 141 "every 30 minutes" and getting them, and not being able to mobilize and process loads, and having airplanes sit - is a waste of airlift. Wanting to move C-5s out of Germany to Tel Aviv with Patriot missiles on board faster than they can be accepted at the other end - is a waste of airlift. People have to understand that trying to push the maximum number of airplanes through an en route system and to an offload point that can't handle them is an *inefficient way of doing business*. You work *much harder than you need to work*, and you accomplish *less*, because you clog the system up and work it to death for no more appreciable gain. Now, there is a fine line between where do you push it at the maximum it can handle and where you step across that line and put too much into it, so there are things that you are not doing that you should be doing. That's a balancing act. I would say that in this (DESERT SHIELD) we erred on the wrong side. We tried to push too much and we ended up clogging the system and it became inefficient. Nobody will stand for not doing everything you can do...and consequently you tend to overdo; but that's a fact of life, and it's not going to go away. I'll guarantee you that 20 years from now, 50 years from now, with all the command and control, all the computers, all the things you'll have, you are still going to have some of these problems. And whoever works this kind of an operation next time will be faced with these same issues. The other thing that will have to be dealt with is the lack of requirements and the changing of known requirements. In other words, those things like people, equipment, *stuff*, that you're gonna take from Point A to Point B, is going to be an unknown. It is going to be an evolving, changing, dynamic process that will *never be identified*, and I don't care how good your TPFDDLs are. You can have the TPFDDLs, you can have the plans, you can have it all there...but when you get ready to execute, the theater commander is going to adjust things as he sees fit. And once that happens, now it becomes a dynamic, evolving, changing thing. You'd better understand it's gonna happen, no matter how hard you try, and you're gonna have to deal with it., in my opinion. It absolutely will not go away. And for the next time...the potential exists for having non-experts pushing a system that they don't understand.

Comment: Yes...you've had lots of that happen to you - "Airlift 101," you've mentioned it a number of times.

LtGen Kondra: Yes. That doesn't mean that airlift can't get better - it will. But in my opinion there will be certain things that will have to be dealt with, and some of them are going to be costly.

Closing Comment: Thanks for all your time. It's certainly been interesting, and I've got to tell you...in all my history writing career, I think this is one of the best things I've ever had the privilege of working on, and I think we've done something really worthwhile here. I deeply appreciate your candidness and your taking me into your confidence; it's been a real pleasure working for and with you.

**END OF SEVENTH SESSION**

**END OF TRANSCRIPT**

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